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A B ST R A C T
The American Indian Religious Freedom  Act has proven to be a terrible 
disappointment for the Indians all across the country. This act presupposed an analogy 
between Native American ceremonial practices and Euro-American religions, but Native 
American ceremonies involve a broader range social institutions than Euro-American 
"religion." Hence, the analogy between Indian ceremonies and Euro-American religions 
broke down after passage of the act, and Indians failed to receive the legal remedies sought 
under its provisions. The following is an attempt to address the problems associated with 
this act by examining the historical development of a Native American rhetoric o f religious 
freedom in the twentieth-century.
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Introduction.
W hereas the United States has traditionally rejected the concept of a government 
denying individuals the right to practice their religion and, as a result, has benefited from a 
rich variety of religious heritages in this country;
Whereas the religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskan and 
Hawaiian) are an integral part of their culture, tradition and heritage, such practices forming 
the basis of Indian identity and value systems;
Whereas the traditional American Indian religions, as an integral part of Indian life, are 
indispensable and irreplaceable; ̂
-Preamble to the American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution of 1978.
The preamble to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act treats religion not only as 
of intrinsic worth, but as a central element of Indian culture, emphasizing the dual values o f 
strengthening Indian personal identity and of enriching the larger society through diversity. 
. .  While stressing cultural distinctiveness, the Act places Indian religion in the context o f 
universal values, terming the exercise of traditional practices an 'inherent right,' and 
asserting that Indian practices should be accorded the respect due all religions.^
-Ellen M. W. Sewell, "The American Indian Religious Freedom Act."
The American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution of 1978 emerged during a time 
of heightened public concern for ethnic and cultural diversity.^ This resolution affirmed 
that the United States would follow policies protecting the religious freedom of "traditional" 
Native American religions, and it directed the executive branch to evaluate federal policies 
in light of this re s o lu tio n T h e  resolution was signed into law on August 11th, 1978, 
(after which it became generally known as the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, or 
the AIRFA). Sewell argues above that the preamble to the AIRFA appeals to notions o f 
both universal value and cultural diversity. This conjunction of two very different abstract
^Preamble, The American Indian Religious Freedom. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978).
2 Ellen M. W. Sew ell, "The American Indian Religious Freedom Act," Arizona Law Review. 25 (1983) 
431. (Footnotes have been omitted, as has a quotation taken from sections of the preamble itself.)
^Sewell, 30
'̂ The American Indian Religious Freedom. 469-70.
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values shaped the distinctive nature of interests advanced through appeal to the AIRFA. 
The difference between these values remained, however, largely in the background of 
dialogue throughout the history of the act. The text of the AIRFA itself made it easy to 
speak as if maintaining the integrity of Indian culture(s) and preserving individual freedom 
of conscience could be embodied in the same notion. Both principles were subsumed under 
the rubric of "religious freedom," but this marriage of rhetorical themes continually came 
apart in the process of implementation. Not surprisingly, the AIRFA came to be something 
of a disappointment to Indians all over the United States.
Throughout the nineteen-eighties Indian activists appealed to the AIRFA in 
conjunction with the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment to support a variety of 
legal interests, (e.g. access to sacred sites, ceremonial harvesting o f endangered species, 
rights to distinctive fashions of bodily adornment, control of cultural artifacts, and 
protection of burial sites and ancestral remains). W hile an appeal to both the First 
Amendment and the AIRFA may appear to contain redundant references to the same 
abstract principle of religious freedom, each of these references actually invoked a different 
sense o f the social context implicit within that principle. The sense of "religious freedom" 
informing the AIRFA could not be understood apart from the legal history of Indian-white 
relations, nor could it be understood apart from the culturally specific interests of Native 
Americans. Its preamble includes as attempt to model the value o f cultural diversity as a 
secondary benefit o f individual freedom (thus voicing James Madison's famous argument 
Federalist Ten), but many of the cultural values addressed within the act simply could not 
be understood in these terms.^ Hence, the AIRFA borrowed from the language of the First 
Amendment, but it infused that language with a set o f values tied closely to a working 
relationship between the federal government and Native American tribes. In keeping with
5See James Madison, "The Federalist," Number 10, American State Papers. The Federalist. J. S. Mill. 
Volume 43, Great Books o f the Western World, ed., Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago, London, 
Toronto: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1952) 49-53 passim.
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that working relationship the federal government asserted an interest in Native American 
religion quite different than that implied by concepts of individual freedoms. Under the 
AIRFA the rhetoric o f "religious freedom" implied a broad range of cultural interests not 
normally associated with the First Amendment. This conjunction of appeal to religious 
freedom and cultural diversity under the AIRFA constituted a unique rhetorical stance in the 
history o f Indian-white relations, playing on subtle features o f the public imagination as 
well as technical facets of the American legal system.
Through the AIRFA Congress explicitly linked notions of religious freedom to 
aspects o f Indian culture which policy-makers would normally have dealt with in secular 
terms. Few of the interests advanced under the AIRFA met with complete success, 
however; and with the determination of the Lvng (1988) and Smith (1990) cases by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the working rationale behind AIRFA litigation became untenable. In 
the interim Native Americans could plausibly generate a distinct set of legal arguments in 
favor of mandatory accommodation for the aforementioned practices in the event that they 
conflicted with federal policies. Many of these claims involved a novel sense of the right of 
free exercise. The prospect that matters of free exercise could be implicated in general 
policy guidelines involving federal management of public lands, for example, seemed 
counter-intuitive to many schooled in free exercise jurisprudence. The prospect certainly 
struck Justice O'Conner as absurd, and the majority opinion she wrote in Lvng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemeterv Protective Association (1988) effectively brought the prospect 
o f sacred site litigation to a close.^ The AIRFA linked other aspects of federal policy to 
novel questions of free exercise, and for a time this encouraged a host of unusual litigation 
strategies. All told, those active in the struggle for Native American rights enjoyed a unique 
set o f strategic options from the passage of the AIRFA in 1978 to the decision of
^Lyng V.  Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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Employment Division. Department of Health and Human Resources o f Oregon, et al. v. 
Smith et al. in 1990.
The AIRFA has in fact led to some positive developments for Native American 
rights. Simply by laying the groundwork for dialogue about a broad range of subjects, the 
act has played a role in shaping public opinion, in transforming certain aspects of federal 
policy, and in generating the rationale for subsequent legislation dealing with similar 
issues.^ Yet, the consensus of opinion about the AIRFA remains that the act has generally 
proven to be ineffective.^ Perhaps this can be attributed to an unrealistic set of expectations 
regarding what was essentially no more than a joint resolution by Congress and the
^E.g. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. Statutes at Large. 104,3048 (1990); 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Statutes at Large. 107, 1488 (1993); American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994. Statutes at Large. 108, 3125 (1994).
See also, "Repatriation Act Protects Native American Burial Remains and Artifacts," NARF Legal 
Review. 16 (Winter, 1990) \-A passim-, James E. Wood, Jr., "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act," 
Journal o f  Church and State. 33 (1991) 63-19 passim; Kristin L. Boyles, "Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 
Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," Cornell Law Review. (July, 1991) 
1117-1149 passim
8See Kristin L. Boyles, 1117-1149 passim; Celia Byler, "Free Access or Free Exercise?: A Choice Between 
Mineral Development and American Indian Sacred Site Preservation on Public Lands," Connecticut Law 
Review. 22 (1990) 416-420; Ward Churchill and Glenn T. Morris, "Key Indian Laws and Cases," The State 
of Native America: Genocide. Colonization, and Resistance, ed. M. Annette Jaimes, Race and Resistance 
Series, (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1992) 17; Vine Deloria, God is Red: A Native View of 
Religion. (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing: 1994) 268; Vine Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle, 
American Indians. American Justice. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983) 237-239; Walter Echo- 
Hawk, "Loopholes in Religious Liberty: The Need for Federal Protection of Worship for Native People," 
American Indian Religions. 1 (Winter, 1994) 5-16passim; Charlotte Frisbie. Navaio Medicine Bundles or 
Jish: Acquisition. Transmission, and Disposition in the Past and Present. (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1987) 371-389; Paul E. Lawson and Jennifer Scholes, "Jurisprudence, Peyote and the Native 
American Church," American Indian Culture and resource Journal. 10 (1986) 21; Ira C. Lupu, "Where 
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion," Harvard Law Review. 102 
(March, 1989) 946n; Robert S. Michaelsen, "Is the Miner's Canary Silent? Implications of the Supreme 
Court's Denial o f American Indian Free Exercise o f Religion Claims," Journal of Law and Religion. 6
(1988) 97-98,105-106; Patrick T. Noonan, "Mining Desecration and the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites: 
A Lesson in First Amendment Hurdling," Public Land and Resources Law Digest. 27 (1990) 317-321; 
Sharon O'Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments. (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1989) 90; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of Indian Tribes: The Basic ACLU Guide to Indian and 
Tribal Rights. Second edition. An American Civil Liberties Union Handbook, ed. Norman Dorson, 
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992) 230-231; Steve Talbot, 
"Desecration and American Indian Religious Freedom," Journal of Ethnic Studies. 12 (1985) 14-15; 
Christopher Vecsey, ed.. Handbook of American Indian Religious Freedom. (New York: Crossroad, 1991) 
passim; John R. Wunder, "Retained bv the People": A History of American Indians and the Bill o f Rights. 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 193-199.
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presidency. But the full significance o f the AIRFA could not have been known at the time 
of its passage, and as with any legal conflict, a good deal of the AIRFA's implications were 
actually generated after the fact through debates which were ostensibly about its "real" 
meaning.
AIRFA Case History: A Record of Disappointments.
Soon after passage of the AIRFA a disparity emerged between the expectations of 
Indian activists and the policy provisions entertained by Federal agencies concerned with its 
implementation. Naturally the disparity between Indian activists and policy-makers led to 
extensive litigation. At the time of the AIRFA's passage some Native Americans were 
already involved in free exercise litigation. A collection of Navajos sought to enjoin the 
National Park Service to accommodate their ceremonial interests in Rainbow Bridge 
National Monument, and Cherokee litigants sought to prevent construction o f the Tellico 
Dam (of Snail Darter fame) which would soon flood lands sacred to their own tribe. After 
passage o f the AIRFA the Indian litigants in each of these disputes simply added AIRFA 
claims to their ongoing cases, but each of their respective claims ended in defeat.^ The 
District Court of South Dakota then drew on these precedents in denying Lakota and 
Tsistsistas claims relating to management of the Bear Butte State Park in the Black Hills, as 
did United States Court of Appeals in its rejection o f Hopi and Navajo efforts to block 
expansion of a ski resort in the San Francisco Peaks of Arizona. *0 The district court of 
Arizona further denied free exercise and AIRFA relief to Navajo p lain tiffs forcibly 
relocated as a result of the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act.* i Thus, despite extensive
9See, Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah, C. D., 1977); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F. 2d. 
172 (Tenth Circuit, 1980); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E. D. Tennessee, 
N. D., 1979); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F. 2d 1159 (Sixth Circuit, 1980).
>OCrow V .  Gullett, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D. South Dakota, 1982); WHson v. Block, 708 F. 2d 735 (District 
o f Columbia Circuit, 1983).
* *Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Arizona, 1989).
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litigation efforts the AIRFA did not generally improve the courts' willingness to back 
Indian interests in sacred geography.
During the nineteen-eighties there were a few rulings which seemed promising from 
the standpoint of Indian litigants. Three cases initially yielded favorable results for their 
Indian claimants: New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. I.C.C.: United States v. Means: 
and Northwest Coast Indian Cemeterv Protective Association v. Peterson. I n  1988, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Northwest Coast Cem etery Protective 
A ssociation v. Peterson. In this case, known as Lvng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association, the Supreme Court ruled that the internal policies of a government 
agency could not have posed a burden on any right o f free exercise. Following this 
Supreme Court ruling both Means and the New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Association lost 
their respective cases in continued l i t i g a t i o n .T h e  Lyng case had effectively ended the 
prospect o f successful sacred site litigation, and thereby produced a chilling effect on 
Indian attempts to secure federal accom modation for Indian interests in sacred
geography. 15
The case law dealing with federal game management includes a small number of 
victories for Indian claimants, as well as a few losses. Many of the issues involved in cases 
o f game management turned on questions about the specific details o f management policy. 
Hence, questions about the facts of such cases generally overshadowed debate over 
abstract principles of religious freedom. Before passage of the AIRFA federal agents
l^New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. I.C.C., 702 F. 2d 227 (District o f Columbia Circuit, 1983); 
United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D. South Dakota, W.D. 1985), Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association v. Peterson, 764 F. 2d 581 (Ninth Circuit, 1985); Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association v. Peterson, 795 F. 2d 688 (Ninth Circuit, 1986).
l^Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
’"^United States v. Means, 858 F. 2d 404 (Eighth Circuit, 1988); New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v.
I C C. 850 F.2d 729 (D.C. Circuit, 1988). See also Star Lake R. Co. v. Lujan, 737 F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C. 
1990).
*5cf. Sharon O'Brien, in Handbook. 35-40.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
successfully prosecuted members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe for sale of eagle feathers 
under the Bald Eagle Protection Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently 
rejected an appeal claiming that such actions infringed upon one defendant's right o f free 
exerc ise . In 1979, however, the Supreme Court of Alaska ruled in favor o f an 
Athapaskan Indian who had killed a moose out of season for use in a funeral potlach.*^ 
This decision referred to the First Amendment and the written opinion did not mention the 
AIRFA, but the case did seem promising to those who hoped to employ notions religious 
freedom in the context o f Indian ceremonialism. The District Court of New Mexico also 
dismissed charges against a member of the Isleta Pueblo for possession of eagle parts in 
violation o f the Bald eagle Protection Act. That court cited concerns over the defendants' 
right o f free exercise as well as the terms of the Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo.'® On the 
other hand, courts upheld the confiscation o f bald eagle parts from Chippewa tribal 
members in United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, and rejected the First Amendment 
/ AIRFA appeal of an Indian claimant who had killed endangered birds for commercial gain 
in United States v. D io n . '^  Most of these cases turn of details of game management 
policies. W ith the exception of Frank v. S tate, a case largely ignored or misread by 
subsequent courts, the cases dealing with endangered species and game management have 
produced nothing that would constitute a clear principle o f case law connecting principles 
of religious freedom to federal policies of game management.
The courts also dealt with a collection of AIRFA cases involving treatment of prison 
inmates. Indian inmates gained favorable rulings over dress codes as well as access to 
religious facilities and ceremonial authorities in three of these cases, Reinert v. Haas. Bear
'^United States v. Top Sky, 547 F. 2d 483 (Ninth Circuit, 1976).
'^Frank v. State, 604 P. 2d (Supreme Court of Alaska, 1979).
'^United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. (D. New Mexico, 1986).
'^United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nevada, 1986); United States v. 
Dion, 762 F. 2d 674 (Eighth Circuit, 1982).
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Ribs V. T avlor. and M arshno v. M cM annus.̂ Q In other cases, however, courts ruled 
against mandatory accommodation for Indian rights of free exercise at both the district and 
circuit levels, arguing that inmates' religious rights were over-raled by the security interests 
of prison regulations.^' The courts were thus split for some time on questions about 
mandatory accommodation of religious freedom for prison inmates, including those of 
Native Americans. In 1987 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Islamic inmates in a New 
Jersey prison, affirming the notion that deference to the disciplinary judgement of prison 
authorities should override a prison inmates right of free exercise.22 This non-Indian case 
effectively shut down any general prospects that Indian litigants could obtain mandatory 
accommodation for their religious practices.
Some of the AIRFA-related cases are hard to classify. The Oneida Indian Nation, 
for example, fought denial of federal recognition based in part on questions about the role 
that attendance in a ceremony had played in preventing one of its members from signing the 
necessary petitions. They lost the c a s e . 2 3  An Abneki Indian, Steven J. Roy, challenged a 
Department of Health and Human Services policy requiring that his daughter receive a 
social security number in order to gain health benefits. Roy had argued that a social security 
number would rob his daughter of her spirit, but the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
internal policies o f the Social Security administration could not have imposed a burden on 
either Roy's or his daughter's religious b e l i e f s . 2 4  This rather unusual case involving the 
details o f bureaucratic procedure would later provide the groundwork for the Lvng decision
20Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa, 1984); Bear Ribs v. Taylor, Civ. No. 77-3985RJK(G) 
(C.D. California, 1979); Marshno v. McMannus, Case No. 79-3146 (D. Kansas, 1980).
2'Shabazz v. Bamauskas, 600 F. Supp. 712 (D. M.D. Florida, 1985); Indian Inmates of Nebraska 
Penitentiary v. Grammar, 649 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Nebraska, 1986); Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F. 2d 
1525 (Ninth Circuit, 1987).
22o'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 340 (1987).
23Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Clark, 593 F. Supp. 257 (D. N.D. New York, 1984).
24Sowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
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in which the Supreme Court treated construction of a road through sacred lands as another 
internal matter beyond the scope of the Free Exercise clause.
Native American ingestion of peyote posed a unique set of problems during the 
years following passage o f the AIRFA. Indian interests in the use o f peyote seemed 
generally secure throughout the nineteen-eighties, at least insofar as the practice took place 
under the auspices of the Native American Church. This accommodation had actually been 
reached long before passage of the AIRFA, and the Native American Church would not be 
considered a "traditional" religion in many Native American communities. Hence, the right 
to ingest peyote occupied a marginal role in the development of AIRFA policies and case 
law. During the years immediately following passage o f the AIRFA, Indians limited their 
peyote litigation to a defense of the special status given the Native American Church and its 
Indian members.
In three separate cases various courts pointed to the AIRFA as evidence o f the 
special interest taken by the federal government on behalf of Native American religion, 
thereby effectively heading off attempts to use the Native American Church as a basis for a 
general religious exemption for drug u s e . 2 5  in the 1990 case of Employment Division. 
Department o f Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that the Free Exercise clause could not be used to preclude the application o f criminal 
laws, including those proscribing the use of peyote, unless such laws were clearly intended 
to discriminate against a given r e l i g i o n . 2 6  The Sm ith ruling effectively nullified long 
standing Constitutional protections exempting Indian members of the Native American 
Church from prosecution for ceremonial use of peyote.2? The ruling also signaled the
25peyote Way Church of God, Inc, v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632 (D. N.D. Texas, 1983); United States v. 
Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D. North Dakota, 1984); United States v. Rush, 738 F. 2d 497 (First Circuit, 
1984).
2^Employment Division, Department of Human Resources o f Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2?See People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Supreme Court of California, 1964); State of Arizona v. Janice 
and Fred ^ itt in g h a m , 504 P. 2d 950 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1971); George L. Whitehom v. State of 
Oklahoma, 561 P. 2d 539 (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 1975).
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Court's general unwillingness to extend any extra latitude to the religious practices of 
Native Americans. Many have therefore read the Smith decision as a denial of the principles 
associated with the AIRFA. The case subsequently led to new interest in legislation dealing 
with the topic of Indian religious freedoms. Moreover, it is the Smith case itself which led 
AIRFA proponents to link the interests of the Native American Church with the protection 
of "traditional" Native American religions, a link that many Indians themselves themselves 
had previously considered i m p l a u s i b l e . 2 8
It is easy to look back on the history of AIRFA litigation and proclaim that the goals 
pursued by various Indian activists were unrealistic in relation to the provisions o f the act 
itself, but this is to transform a historical fact into a teleological principle. W hatever the 
outcome of subsequent legal conflict the significance of the AIRFA remained in some sense 
an open question until the Lyng and Smith decisions. In retrospect it is clear that the 
AIRFA embodied an inconsistent set of principles. The principle of religious freedom could 
not be stretched far enough to reach the interests advanced under the provisions o f the 
AIRFA, and once framed as matters o f religious freedom, courts were reluctant to 
accommodate attempts to portray the act as something other than a restatement of the same 
principle implicit in the free exercise clause. Thus a significant part of the rationale behind 
passage o f the AIRFA was lost on the courts, and the inconsistencies implicit within the 
text o f the act remained largely in the background of the legal discourse following its 
passage. Interested parties simply invoked alternative visions of the AIRFA based on 
different ideological positions, each of which could be read into the text of the act itself. It 
is only through the coercive authority of the Supreme Court that a given construction of the 
AIRFA was finally determined. Moreover, it is only because the Supreme Court voiced an
28As a result the AIRFA was amended in 1994, providing for the use o f peyote in traditional Indian 
religious practices. See, U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, vol. 140 (August 8, 1994) 7155-57; 
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 140 (September 27, 1994) 13433; U.S. Congress, 
House o f Representatives, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994. Report to 
accompany H R. 4230, One hundred-third Congress, Second Session, House Report No. 103-675. (1994).
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ideological position of its own that the AIRFA acquired a more or less fixed meaning. So 
long as the highest court in the land had not spoken clearly on the subject, Indian activists 
had reason to hope for a broad interpretation of the AIRFA. In the wake of the Lyng and 
Smith decisions, however, little remains o f the AIRFA itself except a historical record of 
disputes about its significance.
"Religion" and Native American Culture: Some Preliminarv Remarks.
Passage of the AIRFA laid the groundwork for a particular kind o f argument in 
which Native Americans could pursue a concrete interest by linking that interest to 
generalized notions of their own cultural order. This strategy rested on an analogy between 
the significance that a given legal interest would receive in a Native American culture and 
the significance that it would receive within the relatively narrow category of Euro- 
American culture known as "religion". Under the AIRFA Native American practices of an 
ostensibly religious nature (e.g. the taking of endangered species, hunting out o f season, 
maintenance of religious artifacts, performance of ceremonies, conduct of burial rites, etc.) 
would receive protection comparable to that of a right of free exercise. The AIRFA also 
brought the relatively narrow language of "religious freedom" into the service o f a broader 
public interest in Native American "culture" - as such. The provisions o f the AIRFA 
therefore applied to a potentially vast scope of legal subject matter. Yet, the AIRFA 
addressed this broad range of subject-matter by means of a term possessing a normally 
restricted scope o f legal implications. Not surprisingly, AIRFA rhetoric consistently 
stumbled over the difference between the significance that various Indian practices would 
receive in Native American cultures and the significance made available through the Euro- 
American category of "religion." The prospective success of the AIRFA therefore rested on 
a tenuous analogy between Native and Euro-American cosmological systems and patterns 
of social organization.
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It took the better part of this century to form the case for such an analogy in the 
American popular consciousness, and the (in)ability to maintain it under the full weight of 
law would prove a crucial stumbling block for interests advanced under the AIRFA. The 
Taos Indians of New Mexico had successfully used an abstract appeal to religious freedom 
in their efforts to reclaim Blue Lake, a natural feature long considered sacred by the tribe, 
from control of the Forest Service (See chapter 2). The tribe had been fighting for control 
of Blue Lake and its watershed since 1906, and efforts to cast their interest in terms of 
religious freedom evolved rather slowly along with changes in public opinion and federal 
Indian policy. The success of the Taos campaign in 1970, however, generated a vast 
number o f similar claims by various Indian peoples. Yet, the problems associated with 
such an appeal could already be seen in the history of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 
1968. Congressional debates over the passage of the ICRA touched on significant cultural 
differences between the major categories o f tribal social organization and those 
presupposed by Euro-American notions of civil rights (see chapter 3). Tribal courts had 
already learned that placing Native American ritual practices under the heading of "religion" 
offered a mixed set o f blessings.
Drawing the equation between any given feature o f Indian culture and the 
significance of religious practices for Euro-Americans generally constitutes an artificial 
narrowing of its cultural significance. The Euro-American category o f "religion" is 
normally contrasted with notions of "politics," "economics," aesthetics," etc. Hence, this 
Euro-American term presupposes a set of social divisions largely absent from Native 
American culture. It is possible to define Euro-American notions of religion in contrast to 
such institutions; but it is not really possible to contrast Indian religions from other aspects 
of Indian society. Native American appeals to "religious" freedom have therefore generally 
carried implications far beyond those normally contemplated under the First Amendment. 
Moreover, such Indian claims do not emerge from conventional Euro-American sources of 
religious discourse, written doctrines. This leaves them with an ambiguous source of
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motivation by the standards of First Amendment jurisprudence. This in turn has made it 
easier forjudges to view Indian claims as though they were rooted in something other than 
religion.29 So, theoretical problems associated with glossing various aspects of Indian 
culture as "religious" matters led directly to mistrust of Native American claimants.30
The difference between various social institutions found in Native American 
cultures and those presupposed by the legal principles o f religious freedom helped to give 
rise to the AIRFA, as an attempt to redefine the legal basis for free exercise cases involving 
Native Americans. Under the AIRFA a right of free exercise would constitute a kind of 
positive government interest in keeping with federal trust doctrine rather than serving as a 
limit on government interest to be exercised by individuals. According to trust doctrine, the 
relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government could be modeled as a 
relationship between ward and trustee (see chapter 1). During the nineteen-seventies, 
moreover, federal authorities had begun to understand tribal authority in terms of the 
distinct cultural patterns belonging to individual tribes, federal authorities therefore came to 
express an interest in maintaining generally intangible features of Indian cultures as a means 
of fulfilling its responsibilities to Indian tribes.
The rubric of "religion" helped to provide a category through which such interests 
could be understood, but the government interest at stake in fulfilling its trust 
responsibilities remained nominally secular. Implementation o f federal trust responsibilities 
under the AIRFA effectively grounded the right of free exercise in a working relationship 
between governmental agencies rather than a theory about the natural rights of individual 
Native Americans. Whereas the AIRFA seemed called on the courts to adopt a broad 
interpretation o f "religion," this reflected an historical expansion o f federal trust 
responsibilities as much as it did an expansion of the principle o f free exercise. As a
29cf. Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians. American Justice. 237-8; Frisbie, 371-2.
30cf. Robert S. Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Litigation: Promise and Perils," 
The Journal o f Law and Religion. 3 (1985), 63-64.
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instrument of trust doctrine, the AIRFA engendered a practical subordination of individual 
religious freedom to cultural relativism. This recontextualization of "religious freedom" 
would, it was hoped, provide Native Americans with a device capable of extending the 
significance of this phrase to aspects of their own culture which would never have received 
such protection under the First Amendment.
Congressional efforts to recontextualize the significance o f religious freedom 
through the AIRFA were frustrated by bureaucratic attempts to read it as a simple 
restatement of the Free Exercise Clause (see chapter 4). The Carter administration, 
responsible for signing the bill, and various federal agencies responsible for its 
implementation generally treated the AIRFA as a moral equivalent to the Free Exercise 
clause. M ost o f the courts hearing AIRFA cases seem to have followed their lead, 
effectively blocking attempts to recast questions about the government stance toward 
relevant Indian practices in terms of trust doctrine. This effectively returned questions about 
the legal viability of Native American interest in religious freedom to the standards o f free 
exercise jurisprudence in effect prior to its passage. Having thus framed the legal context of 
AIRFA cases in terms of conventional free exercise doctrines, the courts naturally rejected 
each of the unusual claims advanced through its provisions. Hence, the abstract appeal to 
an American sense of "religious freedom" which made the AIRFA possible also rendered it 
generally ineffective.
AIRFA Scholarship: The Pragmatic Limitations of Cultural Awareness.
The unravelling of the AIRFA has been well documented by previous scholars and 
activists. Scholarship on the AIRFA typically dealt with themes about the differences 
between Native American religious practices and those of a predominantly Christian public. 
Native American perspectives on the environment provided a favorite theme for such 
scholarship. Peter Nabokov, for example, explained the religious significance that the 
American landscape held for Native Americans and provided an abstract commentary on the
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role that this played in Indian-white relations.^' Daniel McCool provided a detailed case 
study of Papago interest in a particular sacred Mountain, called " B a b o q u i v a r i . " 3 2  Such 
work helped to illustrate the vast differences between Native and Euro-American religious 
practices, effectively underscoring the need for unusual mechanisms of free exercise 
protection relating to Indian interests in the environment.
Other scholars attempted to relate the significance of the American landscape 
directly to legal disputes associated with the A I R F A .3 3  Sarah Gordon, for example, related 
the inability of AIRFA claimants to secure their free exercise right over land claims to 
deficiencies in case law, a problem which in turn stemmed from the displacement o f an 
American public from the Jewish and Christian holy l a n d s . 3 4  The absence o f such 
mainstream sacred geography in the American landscape has facilitated the assumption that 
land may be dealt with exclusively in economic terms. After the Lvng case in 1988, a host
3 'Peter Nabokov, "America As Holy Land," North Dakota Quarterly. 48 (Autumn, 1980) 9-20 passim.
32oaniel McCool, "The Sacred Mountains of the Papago Indians," Journal o f Ethnic Studies. 9 (Fall,
1981) 57-69 passim.
33E.g. Cynthea Thorley Andreason, "Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed of 
Religion Cases," Utah Law Review. (1984) 313-336 passim; Celia Byler, 397-435 passim; Mark S.
Cohen, "American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis 
in an Unconventional Setting," Michigan Law Review. 85 (February, 1987) 771-808 passim; Vine Deloria, 
"Sacred Land and Religious Freedom," NARF Legal Review. 16 (Summer, 1991) 1-6 passim; Laurie 
Ensworth, "Native American Free Exercise Rights to the Use of Public Lands," Boston University Law 
Review. 63 (1983) 141-79 passim; Jeff Fish, "Sacred Site Free Exercise Claims on Government Land: The 
Constitutional Slighting o f Indian Religions," New Mexico Law Review. 20 (Winter, 1990) 113-34 
passim; Scott David Godshall, "Land Use and the Free Exercise Clause," Columbia Law Review. 84 (1985) 
1562-89 passim; Robert S. Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 
93-115; Steven C. Moore, "Sacred Sites and Public Lands," in Handbook of American Indian Religious 
Freedom, ed., Christopher Vecsey, 81-99 passim; Patrick T. Noonan, 311-32 passim; Richard Pemberton, 
Jr., '"I Saw that it Was Holy': The Black Hills and the Concept of Sacred Land," Law and Inequality. 3 
(1985), 287-342 passim; Michael N. Ripani, "Native American Free Exercise Rights in Sacred Land: Buried 
Once Again," American Indian Law Review. 15 (1991) 323-39 passim; Howard Stambor 59-89 passim; 
Dean B. Suagee, "American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting 
Mother Earth's Caretakers, " American Indian Law Review. 10 (1982) 1-57 passim; David R. M. White, 
"Native American Religious Issues. . .  Also Land Issues," Wassaia. The Indian Historian. 13 (1980) 39-44 
passim; James H. Woodall, "American Indians and the First Amendment: Site-Specific Religion and Public 
Land Management," Utah Law Review. (1987) 683-702; and see below.
3^Sarah B. Gordon, "Indian Religious Freedom and Government Development of Public Lands," The Yale 
Law Journal. 94 (1985) 1447-71 passim.
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of articles appeared criticizing the Supreme Court's unwillingness to find place for sacred 
site interests within the framework of the American legal system.35 Such works 
documented the unusual problems facing Indian litigants who asserted a religious interest in 
the physical environment. The cross-cultural problems were indeed substantial, but the 
authors working on this subject could do little other than lay the responsibility for resolving 
these problems associated with sacred site claims at the feet of the judiciary, a responsibility 
easily rejected by a conservative American Supreme Court.
Native American burial practices posed a number of problems that could be 
characterized in terms of sacred sites, but this issue also posed some concerns of its own. 
Many Indian remains had long been stored in various museums around the country, and the 
largest collection was located in the government owned facilities of the Smithsonian. 
Indians made an effort to ensure more respectful treatment for their burial sites and to 
secure the return of such remains as could be identified and linked to a given tribe. A 
number of works dealt with the contemporary legal stanis of Indian r e m a i n s . ^ 6  Some were 
critical of the present legal framework affecting Indian remains, and offered comments on
3^E.g., Nancy Akins, "New Directions in Sacred Lands Claims: Lyng v. Northwest Indian cemetery 
Protective Association," Natural Resources Journal. 29 (Spring, 1989) 593-605 passim; Donald Falk,
"Lyng V. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing First Amendment Protection of 
Indian Sacred Lands," Ecology Law Quarterly. 16(1989) 515-570 passim; Joani S. Harrison, " 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment- Goyemment Action Does Not Violate Free Exercise Clause 
o f First Amendment When it Neither Coerces Action Contrary to Religious Beliefs Nor Prohibits Access to 
Practice Those Beliefs, But Merely Imposes an Incidental Burden on Religious Practice. Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. ed. 2d 534 (1988)." St Mary’s 
Law loumal. 20 (1989) 427-451 passim; Robert J. Miller, "Correcting the Supreme Court's 'Errors’: 
American Indian Response to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association," Enyironmental 
Law. 20 (1990) 1037-1062 passim; S. Alan Ray, "Lyng y. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association: Goyemment Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause," Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly. 16 (Spring, 1989) 483-511 passim; Joshua D. Reisman, "Judicial Scrutiny of Natiye American 
Free Exercise Rights: Lyng and the Decline of the Kader Doctrine," Enyironmental Affairs. 17 (1989) 169- 
199 passim; Michele L. Seger, "Unjustified Interference of American Indian Religious Rights: Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association," Creighton Law Reyiew. 22 (1988) 313-31 passim.
^^For a general discussion of the issue, see Margaret B. Bowman, "The Reburial of Natiye American 
Skeletal Remains: Approaches to the Resolution of a Conflict," Haryard Enyironmental Law Reyiew. 13
(1989) 147-208 passim; Lawrence Rosen, "The Excayation of American Indian Burial Sites: A Problem in 
Law and Professional Responsibility," American Anthropology. 88 (March, 1980) 5-27 passim.
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the policy (non-)implications of the AIRFA and a host o f related laws.^^ Often such a 
critique involved a historical commentary relating differences between the legal status of 
Native and Euro-American remains to past policies of oppression and scientific racism.^^ 
All together, this work successfully demonstrated both the inequities of the current legal 
system and described the historical process through which Indian remains had become 
valuable "property" in the public eye.
Other scholars dealt with similar problems regarding a variety of sacred objects held 
by, or destined for, museums and private collections. Charllotte Frisbie, for example 
described the inadequacies o f both the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act in reference to Navajo medicine b u n d l e s . 3 9  And 
Walter Echo-Hawk provided a general critique of the property rights affecting sacred Indian 
artifacts.'*® The return of eleven wampum belts to Iroquois leadership and the return of the 
Zuni war gods to that Pueblo provided some positive examples of respectful treatment by 
museums.'** These examples seemed, however, only to underscore the fact that museums
^^E.g. David J. Harris, "Respect for the Living and Respect for the Dead: Return of Indian and Other Native 
Remains," Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law. 39 (1991) 195-224 passim; Dean Higginbotham, 
"Native Americans Versus Archaeologists: The Legal Issues," American Indian Law Review. 10 (1982) 91- 
115 passim; John E. Peterson H, "Dance of the Dead: A Legal Tango for Control of Native American 
Skeletal remains." American Indian Law Review. 15(1988) 115-50pasj(m.
^^E.g. Vine Deloria, Jr., "A Simple Question of Humanity: The Moral Dimensions of the Reburial Issue," 
NARF T.egal Review. 14 (Fall, 1989) 1-12 passim; Walter R. Echo-Hawk and Roger Echo-Hawk, 
"Repatriation, Reburial, and Religious Rights," in Handbook of American Indian Religious Freedom, ed., 
Christopher Vecsey, 63-80 passim; Walter R. Echo-Hawk, "Tribal Efforts to Protect Against Mistreatment 
o f Indian Dead: The Quest for Equal Protection of the Laws," NARF Legal Review. 14 (Winter, 1988) 1-5 
passim; Steven C. Moore, "Federal Indian Burial Policy - Historical Anachronism or Contemporary 
Reality?" NARF Legal Review. 12 (Spring, 1987) 1-9 passim; Red Arrow Inc., "Why Were Native 
American Remains taken to Museums for Study and Research," Akwesasni Notes. 23 (Summer, 1991) 10- 
11 .
39prisbie, 365-400.
'*®Walter R. Echo-Hawk, "Museum Rights Vs Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal 
Interests in Native Cultural Resources," Review of Law and Social Change. XIV (1986) 437-53 passim.
41gee William F. Fenton, "Return o f  Eleven Wampum Belts to the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy on 
Grand River, Canada," Ethnohistorv. 36 (Fall, 1989) 392-410 passim; William T. Merrill, Edmund J. Ladd,
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and private collections across the country continued to hold artifacts sacred to a variety of 
Indian peoples.
As had been the case with burial rights, the principle threat to sacred artifacts lay in 
the potential economic value that such artifacts held for non-Indians as well as vast 
historical precedent for practices divesting Indian tribes o f many o f their most sacred 
objects. Many of the objects held in various public and private libraries had ironically been 
placed there by tribal elders hoping to preserve them in the days of rescue anthropology and 
government assimilation. At the same time that religious and government leaders sought to 
eradicate Indian ceremonial practices, a number o f anthropologists and archaeologists 
attempted to document and preserve the artifacts o f these "vanishing" cultures. Hence, 
Indian practitioners often turned to museums and private collections as likely repositories 
for sacred materials. Other artifacts had simply been stolen from Indian tribes by scholars 
and entrepreneurs seeking to profit from public interest in the material culture o f Native 
Americans. In either event, by the nineteen-seventies it had become clear that Indians 
wanted many of these objects back, or that they wanted to have a say in the treatment and 
display of artifacts remaining in non-Indian hands. The AIRFA did not quite mandate the 
return o f Indian artifacts; but it did provide a channel through which Indians could voice 
their interests and initiate dialogue with universities and museums holding such materials.
Although peyote constituted an important sacrament to many Native Americans; the 
legal disputes surrounding possession of this substance had been defined before passage of 
the AIRFA, and so the issue did not draw much additional attention for AIRFA proponents 
until the Smith decision in 1990.^*  ̂The Smith decision, however, sparked a tremendous 
backlash from several different quarters. M ainstream religious organizations grew 
concerned about the principles of case law announced in Smith. This immediately led to a
and T. J. Ferguson, "The Return of Ahayu:da" Current Anthropology. 34 (December, 1993) 523-67 
passim.
^2por an excellent example of pre-Smith scholarship on peyote law, see Paul E. Lawson and Jennifer 
Scholes, "Jurisprudence, Peyote and the Native American Church," 13-27 passim.
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body of work critical o f the Court's handling of case. Much of this criticism dealt with the 
reasoning offered by the court in Smith, and such complaints could be found in a variety of 
newspapers and legal journals.'*^ Those interested in Indian law usually had something to 
say about this, and about the potential impact that the Smith case would have on existing 
accommodations for the Native American Church.'*'* Ultimately backlash against the 
decision would lead Congress to deal with both lines of criticism. It passed the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 in an attempt to redirect the Court's handling of case law 
dealing with free exercise, and it Amended the Religious Freedom Act itself in 1994, 
largely out of concerns over the status of the Native American Church.'*^
'*3por examples o f the popular reaction to the Smith decision, see Linda Greenhouse, "Court is Urged to 
Rehear Case on Ritual Drugs: Religious Groups Team With Legal Scholars," The New York Times 
NATIONAL. (Friday, May 11, 1990) A16; Charles Levendosky, "Court Guards religious Liberty for Some, 
Not All," Las Vegas Review Journal. (Monday, December 9,1991) 9b; Richard John Newhaus, "Church, 
State, and Peyote," National Review. (June 11,1990) 40-44; David E. Williams, "Endangered Free 
Exercise' Clause," Christian Science Monitor. (May 21, 1990).
For examples o f scholarly backlash against the reasoning used in Smith decision, see "The 
Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Leading Cases," Harvard Law Review. 104 (1990) 198-209 pajs/m; Daniel A. 
Hess, "The Undoing o f Mandatory Free Exercise Accommodation - Employment Division, Department o f  
Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)," Washington Law Review. 66 (1191) 587-603 
passim; Michael W. McConnell, "Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision," University of 
Chicago Law Review. 57 (1990) 109-53 passim; Rebecca Rains, "Can Religious Practice be Given 
Meaningful Protection After Employment Division v. Smith?' University of Colorado Law Review. 62 
(991) 687-710 passim; James E. Wood, Jr., "Abridging the Free Exercise Clause," Journal of Church and 
State. 32 (1990) 741-52 passim.
'*'*E.g., Robert N. Clinton, "Peyote and Judicial Political Activism: Neo-colonialism and the Supreme 
Court's New Indian Law, " Federal Bar News & Journal. 38 (March, 1991) 92-101 passim; Jerilyn 
DeConteau & Steven C. Moore, "1990 Decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Erosion of Native 
Tribal and Religious Rights," Indian Law Support Center REPORTER. 13 (September & October, 1990) 
1-6 passim; 19 Paul E. Lawson and Patrick Morris, "The Native American Church and the New Court: The 
Smith Case and Indian Religious Freedoms, " American Indian Culture and Resource Journal. 15 (1991)79- 
91 passim; Steven C, Moore, Esq., "An Unwarranted Crusade: The State of Oregon's Persecution of the 
Native American Church," Indian Law Support Center REPORTER. 12 (August & September, 1989) 1-11 
passim; Steven C. Moore, esq., "Supreme Court Deals Devastating Blow to Native American Church, " 
Indian Law Support Center REPORTER. 13 (March-April 1990) 1-2 passim; Harry F. Tepker, Jr., 
"Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case," American Indian Law Review. 16 (1991) 1-56 
passim.
45See the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.107.1488 (1993); American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994. 108,3125 (1994). The potential impact of these laws remains an open 
question at present.
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Much of the scholarly commentary on the AIRFA addressed the role that it was to 
play in shaping federal Indian law. Often these commentaries directly addressed the abstract 
differences between Native American and Euro-American religions and attributed the 
relative lack of constitutional protection for the former to these abstract cultural differences. 
From the standpoint of Indian activists and sympathetic scholars such differences pointed 
to a structural bias in the American legal system. Early commentaries located this structural 
bias in case law relating to the First Amendment, and interpreted the AIRFA as an attempt 
to overcome it. Later studies indicated that the AIRFA itself had come to embody this same 
bias, either because it had been written into the text o f the law by Congress, or because it 
had been read into the text by policy-makers and judicial authorities. In either event, most 
saw the cultural gap between Indian notions of religion from those guiding the American 
legal system as the central problem facing Indias throughout the history of the AIRFA. In 
pointing out the gap between Indian and American legal cultures most of the scholars 
working on this subject sought to pressure courts and federal policy-makers to overcome 
any structural bias existing in the American legal system.
Such critics tacitly accepted the initial absurdity inherent in designating Native 
American ceremonial practices as a form of "religion." Their rhetorical strategy could only 
work to the extent that it remained consistent with a basically naive acceptance of the key 
term "religion." Scholars often took the time to explain that Indian practices could not easily 
be designated as forms of "religion," but in doing so they typically sought to create a more 
flexible sense of the term for use in reference to the AIRFA. Hence, they effected a kind of 
social criticism by turning the relative narrowness of this Euro-American term into evidence 
that Euro-Americans typically had an impoverished understanding of "religion".'*^ One 
could as easily have taken the problems associated with the narrow sense of this term as
George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fischer's comments on defamiliarization in Anthropology as 
Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986) l ' i l -(A passim.
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evidence that Indians do not have "religions," at least not religions cognizable from the 
standpoint o f the American legal system. Hence, the structural differences between Native 
and Euro-American cultures could only be viewed as a bias to the extent that one insisted 
on confounding them  in a single utterance. Those willing to insist on their own categories 
of social organization, on the other hand, would have found little bias in the matter.
The immense record of scholarship on the AIRFA sheds little light on the process 
by which this term had become such an important aspect of Indian-white relations. So long 
as Indians perceived the AIRFA as a viable legal resource, most scholars and activists were 
content to illustrate the problems that Indians faced in implementing the law. This practice 
usually meant drawing attention to the awkward relationship between Indian religious 
practices and the sense that "religion" takes as legal category. Hence, it is with some irony 
that one must read the words of Justice Antonine Scalia in the majority opinion for the 
Smith case:
It may be fairly said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which 
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.'*^
Scholars had labored hard throughout the history of the AIRFA to demonstrate that the 
American legal system contained a systematic bias against Native American ceremonial 
interests . . . and now Justice Scalia seemed to be agreeing with them. Justice Scalia 
himself seemed to stress the cultural limitations implicit within the American legal system, 
and turned this in itself into an argument against granting free exercise relief for the Native 
American Church. There is little in the majority opinions of either Smith or Lyng to suggest 
that their respective authors did not understand the depth of problems stemming from 
cultural differences between Native and Euro-Americans. In each case the Supreme Court 
simply disclaimed responsibility for the problem, leaving each individual Indian claimant to
'*7Smith, 494 U.S. 890 (1990).
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resolve his or her religious dilemma according to the dictates o f his or her own personal 
conscience.
In retrospect the decision to gloss a wide variety o f Indian legal interests with the 
Euro-American term "religion" led to something of a dead end. Scores of articles written 
during the interval between passage o f the AIRFA and its demise at the hands of the 
Rehnquist Court indicate both an awareness of the problems inherent to the use of this term 
and a hope that something could be done to overcome those problems. In the end, it is the 
critical points of these articles that have proven correct, whereas the aspirations for a more 
enlightened sense o f religious freedom have proven unworkable. The term "religion" 
clearly does not convey an adequate sense of the legal interests associated with the AIRFA, 
and yet the act is a testament to the role that this term has come to play in the contemporary 
history of Indian-white relations. It therefore makes sense to inquire as to process by which 
such a variety of disparate legal interests could come to be understood under the heading of 
"religion." The following is an attempt to understand this process by analyzing those 
developments in the history of Indian-white relations which have played a role in defining 
the structure of the AIRFA.
Discourse and the Cultural Status of "Cultural" Categories.
In order to understand the history of the AIRFA one must explain both the 
inconsistencies inherent within the act itself, and the relative inability of AIRFA proponents 
to address those inconsistencies in a strait-foreword manner. As noted above, the 
inconsistencies associated with the AIRFA tended to remain in the background of debate 
over the significance o f the act itself. Congressional proponents of the AIRFA argued about 
the specific implications of the act in debates over its passage, but they seemed to ignore 
substantial differences in the perception of contemporary Indian-white relations. This 
produced a text which invited at least two significantly different perceptions of the context 
behind its own passage. The text of the AIRFA seemed to invite either a  reading informed
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by the dominant principles of case law in free exercise jurisprudence or a reading informed 
by case law involving the trust relationship between Indians and the federal government. 
The principles derived from each of these two bodies o f case law were unfortunately 
inconsistent with one another. Hence, the prospect that either of them could be used as a 
contextual framework for interpreting the AIRFA led those concerned with its 
implementation to adopt radically different notions of what was expected of them under the 
provisions o f the act itself. Ambiguities within the text o f the AIRFA thus led to real 
problems, but these problems remained implicit in the context of discourse throughout 
much of the history o f the act rather than emerging as the focus of direct legal 
interpretation.
Contextual information rests by definition in the background of discourse, and so 
conflicting opinions over the general context of Indian-white relations seemed to escape the 
attention of key AIRFA proponents. Participants in AIRFA debates thus failed to address 
the full scope of relevant disagreement. The history of the AIRFA is this respect a study in 
meta-linguistic consciousness. Each episode in the history o f the AIRFA represents an 
interesting study in the ability of historical actors to chart there own role in the history of 
the act according to the immediate context o f their own discourse. It will therefore prove 
worthwhile to examine the relationship between discourse and culture before reviewing the 
empirical history of the AIRFA.
The term "discourse" refers to the context in which both language and culture make 
their appearance. It is literally "language in use", to borrow a phrase from Deborah 
Schiffrin.'** Discourse may be thought of as the "real-time" context of verbal exchange, or
“̂ ^This approach focuses on "language use" as the defining feature of discourse. It can be contrasted with 
formalist notions of discourse which define it as a unit of language structure that is larger than a sentence. 
See Deborah Schiffrin, Approaches to Discourse. (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, U.S.A.: Blackwell, 1994) 
20-43 passim; See also Greg Urban, A Discourse-Centered Approach to Culture: Native South American 
Mvths and Rituals. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991) %-24 passim.
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as the interactional relationship between the author(s) and the reader(s) o f a written text.'*^ 
This sense of "language in use" may be contrasted with notions of culture. The term 
"culture" implies questions about social relationships and socially constructed meanings 
above and beyond the immediate context of verbal or written exchange. An explicit 
description of a culture therefore presupposes a process wherein moments of real-time 
discourse have been mapped onto an abstract model representing the social relationships 
implicit within that discourse.
The aforementioned mapping process is always problematic, but the problem is not 
only the concern of social scientists. The participants in any given discursive process must 
also form notions about the cultural patterns relevant to their own situation. At least one 
folk-model o f social context is therefore implicit in every actual instance o f discourse. Such 
a folk-model defines the immediate context of a discursive event, and thereby enables its 
participants to coordinate their discursive practices according to pre-established norms of 
behavior.^® People engaged in a given instance of discourse frequently proceed according 
to very different models of what is happening in the very context o f that discursive 
event.5* Such has normally been the case throughout the legal history of Indian-white 
relations, and it has certainly been the case in disputes over the significance of the AIRFA. 
Such discrepancies normally rest in the background of a discourse event, though they may 
become apparent when that event itself becomes the topic of another moment of discourse.
Michael Silverstein, "The Indeterminacy of Contextualization: When is Enough Enough?" in The 
Contextualization of Language, eds., Peter Auer and Aldo Di Luzio, (Amsterdam and Philadelphia; John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 1992) 55-76 passim; Michael Silverstein, "A Minimax Approach to 
Verbal Interaction; Invoking 'Culture' in Realtime Discursive Practice," Workshop on Language. Cognition 
and Computation: Lectures Sala Prat de la Riba Institut d'Estudis Catalans November 25th and 26th 
Barcelona. (Barcelona: Institut D'Estudis Catalanis, 1993) 79-89 passim.
5®Cf. John J. Gumperz, Discourse Strategies. Studies in Interactional Linguistics, 1, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982) 130-52 passim; Silverstein, "Indeterminacy," 55-76 passim;
Silverstein, "Minimax," 79-89 passim.
5* Gumperz, 130-31.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 5
Reflection on the context of a discursive event requires a shift o f attention away 
from its original topic. Such reflection therefore presupposes a form o f meta-linguistic 
framing, a device which organizes discourse about discourse into a coherent pattern of 
utterance and response. The meta-linguistic framing used in focusing on the context of a 
discursive event must be distinguished from the use of paraphrasing and quotations which 
retain much the same focus of attention from one discursive moment to the next. For 
example. Justice Scalia's comments in the Smith case (see above) could be described either 
by paraphrasing his statements about democratic process, or by suggesting that in uttering 
those statements he "dismissed" a set of concerns advanced by the respondent. The former 
characterization o f Justice Scalia's comm ents would serve to decontextualize the 
significance of his utterance by generating a theoretical position about the nature of the 
democratic process. The latter characterization of his comments on the other hand calls 
direct attention to the pragmatic or interactional significance of Scalia's utterance in that 
context. This illustrates a basic distinction between different patterns o f meta-linguistic 
framing. Any given utterance can be modeled in terms of at least two different kinds of 
textual analysis; a "denotational text" consisting o f what its participants have said or talked 
about, and an "interactional text" consisting of what they have done.^2
The event-like qualities associated with discourse posses a number of distinct 
structural characteristics. The relationship between an utterance and a response provides 
any given stretch o f dialogue with a definite pattern of role r e l a t i o n s h i p s . ^ ^  Moreover, 
every language possesses a set of sign-vehicles, commonly referred to as indexicals, which 
provide a structural pattern to discursive events. An index refers to something within the
^^Silverstein, "Indeterminacy of Contextualization," passim; Michael Silverstein, "Minimax," passim.
53See M. M. Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres," Speech Genres & Other Essavs. tr.) Vem W. 
McGee, ed., Carl Emerson and Michael Holquist, (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1986) 60-102 
passim; Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs, "Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on 
Language and Social Life," Annual Review of Anthropology. 19 (1990) 59-88 passim.
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immediate context of discourse.^'* Deictic categories (which include pronouns) constitute 
an important subset of indexical signs; they determine the relationship between author, 
addressee, audience, etc. as well as the spatio-temporal parameters forming the immediate 
context o f d i s c o u r s e . 5 5  The appearance o f such patterns in an utterance or text conveys 
something about its author's sense o f context. The study o f indexical relationships and 
meta-linguistic framing (which defines the relationship between utterance and response) 
provides a model of discourse-in-context which can be distinguished from abstract notions 
o f grammar as well as methods of textual analysis focusing on propositional content.
The necessary link between an indexical sign and its referent contrasts sharply with 
the arbitrary nature o f the sign stressed by classical methods of structural analysis. An 
arbitrary link between a sign and its referent generally obtains for yet another set o f sign- 
vehicles, dubbed "Symbols" by Charles Sanders P e irc e ." S y m b o lic "  relationships 
constitute general categories of reference and predication ("red," "house," "guilty," etc.) 
which are used in the construction o f propositions (sentences that are subject to truth 
evaluation). Such propositional content often constitutes the major focus of attention in any 
given discourse. Even in such cases, however, the ability to refer to objects-in-a-world
^'*This is the classic formulation given for indexical signs by Charles Sanders Peirce, "Logic as Semiotic: 
The Theory of Signs," Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed., Justus Buchler, (1940. New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 1955) 102, 107-108.
number of scholars have followed Peirce's lead in elaborating on a theory of indexical sign systems to 
provide a structural account of speech. C.f. Roman Jakobson, "Shifters, Verbal Categories, and die 
Russian Verb, " Roman Jakobson: Selected Writings. (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1971) 131-132;
Emile Benveniste, "The Nature of Pronouns," Problems in General Linguistics, tr. Mary Elizabeth Meek, 
(1966. coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971) 217-222; Michael Silverstein, "Shifters, 
Verbal Categories and Cultural Description," Meaning in Anthropologv. ed., Keith Basso and Henry Selby, 
(Albuquerque: School of American Research, 1976) 29-30; William Hanks, "The Indexical Ground of Deictic 
Reference," Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon, ed., Charles Goodwin and 
Allessandro Duranti, Studies in the Social and Cultural Foundations of Language, vol. 11, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1992) 71n.
^^Peirce "Logic as Semiotic," 102-3,112-115. Note that this terminology is directly opposed to that of 
Saussure who refers to the relationship between a sign and its referent as arbitrary and that of a "symbol" 
and its referent as one that is fixed. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles 
Bally and Albert Sechehaye, tr. Roy Harris, (1972. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986) 67-69, 73. The 
differences pose a minor semantic problem which will be avoided in the present context by using Peirce's 
terminology.
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necessarily presupposes an implicit set of indexical relationships which define the context 
of reference. For example, a court may focus its attention on the guilt or innocence of a 
given defendant; but the process o f deciding this question must take place within a 
structured set of social relationships defining the jurisdiction of the court itself and the role 
relations between authorized speakers (judge, jury, legal counsels, defendant, etc.). Hence, 
the focus of attention in a criminal trial consists of a proposition involving symbolic sign 
vehicles, but the conduct o f the trial itself presupposes a working set of indexical 
relationships.
Although indexicals are by definition context specific sign vehicles, they are also 
the principle indicators of abstract cultural information. The actual employment of indexical 
patterns effectively relates contextual information about the micro-structural features of a 
discursive event to the macro-structural features o f a given cultural order. Hence, 
"contextualization cues" index both the minimum role relations necessary for dialogue, 
(speaker, addressee, audience, etc.) and substantial cultural information about the status of 
such participants in a larger social network. For example, systems of deference such as T 
(familiar) an V (polite) forms of address in Standard Average European languages index a 
speaker and addressee relationship while at the same time conveying information about the 
social status of those i n v o l v e d . ^ ^  Likewise, the inherently ambiguous boundaries of words 
like "we," "you(pl)," "here," "now," "there," and "then" are settled in terms o f social 
parameters implicitly understood by those who use them. The implicit invocation of such 
large scale patterns of social order in the micro-social pattens of discourse provides a 
substantial basis for the cultural understanding of social interaction.^^
These patterns can be found in the interactional structure of legal disputes. Matters 
o f "jurisdiction" and "legal standing," for example, involve explicit questions about the
S^See R. Brown and A. Gilman, "The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity," Language and Social Context, 
ed. Paolo Giglioli, (1972. New York: Penguin Books, 1990) 252-82 passim.
^^Cf. Silverstein, "Indeterminacy," 55-76 passim; Silverstein, "Minimax," 79-89 passim.
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context of a given legal dispute. These legal categories pertain directly to questions about 
who is authorized to speak such a given legal dispute, and hence they constitute a set of 
indexical relationships crucial to the legal process. Moreover, burdens o f proof are 
unevenly distributed in legal conflicts. This makes it possible for the courts to reach 
decisions in the event that empirical evidence proves inconclusive. Burdens of proof are 
often described as problems of evidence, but the assignment of a burden of proof to one or 
another party is also an attempt to distribute the responsibilities for moving the legal 
discourse along in an orderly fashion.^® Burdens of proof serve to structure legal 
discourse according to an implicit pattern of utterance and response, enabling one party to 
structure its own case as a response to another. Hence, legal discourse is structured 
according to a definite set of indexical patterns.
The indexical patterns implicit in legal discourse furthermore contain numerous 
indirect references to an extended cultural order. Burdens of proof, matters of jurisdiction, 
and issues of legal standing in a trial are all conventions dealing with context specific 
questions about how to proceed in a legal dispute, but each also affects the role that larger 
social issues take in the courtroom itself. Questions of jurisdiction involve a kind of 
speaker addressee relationship, and burdens of proof involve a relationship between 
utterance and response. Each of these conventions therefore constitutes an implicit indexical 
relationship which can be mapped onto questions about large scale divisions of a social 
order. Questions of jurisdiction are necessarily related to the social categories available to 
the courtroom, and burdens of proof correspond to vested interests operating beyond the 
scope of any given case. Each of these conventions therefore ties the cultural significance 
of issues involved in a legal dispute to a specific set of role relations constituting the 
structure o f the legal proceeding (as a discursive event). It is in this sense that James Boyd
S^Gaskins, 2 1 -3 0 .
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W hite refers to the law as a constitutive branch of rhetoric.®® Each legal dispute 
presupposes an established set of role relations (a kind of speech community) which in turn 
presupposes a regularized pattern of social organization (a culture).®* Hence, the context of 
legal discourse certainly reveals many of the discursive properties normally associated with 
questions about language and culture. In reference to the AIRFA these properties can be 
used to generate questions about the legal identity fashioned for Indians under the auspices 
o f the American legal system. One can thus determine the structural patterns of culture 
informing the history of Indian-white relations by examining the interactional relationship 
between Indians and various federal authorities involved in different phases o f American 
history.
The participants in a given discourse as well as third parties (such as ethnologists 
and historians) may generate models o f culture by examining notions of an extended 
cultural order implicit within an interactional text. A cultural order need not be described 
explicitly, however, to structure the possibilities of a given interaction. Moreover, any 
overt description o f a cultural order presupposes a context o f its own, and hence an overt 
description of culture will in itself presuppose a system of cultural order. One may always 
look for a set o f cultural preconditions behind any given description of a culture. Overt 
descriptions of culture frequently (perhaps always) reflect political manipulation, a prospect 
which has led many to question the value of "culture" as a category of social analysis.®^
®®James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism. (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1990) xiv (and see chapter 1).
®*C.f. J. Gumperz, "The Speech Community," Language and Social Context, ed., Paolo Giglioli, (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1972) 219-231 passim; J. Gumperz, "Types of Linguistic Communities," Readings 
in the Sociology of Language, ed., Joshua A. Fishman, (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968) 460-472 
passim.
®^E.g. James Clifford and George F. Marcus, eds.. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography. (Berkeley, Las Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1986) passim; James 
Clifford, The predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Centurv Ethnography. Literature, and Art, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1988) passim, but see especially chapter 12; 
"Identity in Mashphee," 277-346; James A. Clifton, ed.. The Invented Indian: Cultural Fictions & 
Governmental Policies. (1990. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994) passim.
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Yet, it is always possible to reduce the strategic values underlying an explicit description of 
a "culture" to another cultural order defining the interests served by that description. This 
fact underscores a thesis most closely associated with the work of Marshall Sahlins, that 
there is a culture o f "culture," so to speak, and that this culture o f "culture" provides 
important clues into the historical trajectory o f a given form of social organization.®^ 
Discourse informed by explicit consciousness of cultural patterns may often appears 
spurious and inauthentic, but there is always an implicit cultural pattern behind social 
behavior, even in seemingly invented traditions.
This relationship between culture and discourse carries serious implications for 
study of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. When under the provisions of this 
act Indians, lawyers, judges, politicians, and various political activists talk about Indian 
cultures, they effectively reduce these cultures to a stereotypical pattern of activity. Each 
such description o f Indian "culture" must itself play a role in the cultural order of the 
American legal system. This makes it necessary to relate ethnographic questions about 
Indian worship of "Mother Earth", for example, to the rhetorical value that this concept has 
in facilitating land claims and other such political agendas.®'* Likewise, differences 
between various Indian "cultures" generally reflects the political divisions of contemporary 
Indian "tribes." Far from constituting a death knell to cultural theory, such matters simply 
enrich the body of data available for cultural analysis. And anyone who wishes to feign 
shock at the thought that Indian representations o f their own culture may reflect a degree of 
political manipulation had best not look too closely at the course of western history.
The cultural significance of AIRFA dialogue can be found in a set of ostensibly 
straight foreword arguments about its legal implications and its potential impact on Indian
®^Cf. Marshall Sahlins, "Goodbye to Tristes Tropes: Ethnography in the Context o f Modem World 
History," Journal of Modem History. 65 (1993) 3-4.
®^Sam Gill, Mother Earth Earth: An American Storv. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
1987) passim; Daniel S. Wall, "Space, Time, and Cultural Landscape in the Political History of Indian- 
white Relations," Unpublished M.A. Thesis. (University o f Chicago, Spring, 1995) passim.
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culture. For example, each judicial opinion relating to the act itself presents an argument 
which can be modeled in terms of a denotational text; but the ethno-historical significance 
o f that argument must be related to an interactional text determining the social relationships 
at play in the case itself. In Badoni v. Higginson. for example, the District Court of Utah 
denied that Navajo interests in Rainbow Bridge constituted a religious belief (because they 
were not rooted in an organized religion).®^ This position involved both a factual assertion 
about the nature of Navajo culture and an assumption of authority by the court to define the 
normative relationship between individuals and religious institutions. The court's 
description of Navajo religion could be considered either true or false, but its assumption of 
authority over the structure of religious devotion could also be accepted or rejected 
independent of that truth value. Hence, AIRFA litigation provides both an interesting set of 
arguments containing explicit claims about Indian culture and Indian law, and a set of 
interactional texts containing implicit clues about the culture of Indian-white relations.
As sources of background information, interactional texts provide a likely source 
for the changing value of the AIRFA's basic rationale. The analogy between ritualized 
forms of Native American behavior and Euro-American forms of religion was no more nor 
less plausible at the time of the AIRFA's passage than it was earlier in this century when 
Indians could be jailed for such practices under the authority o f the the Religious Crimes 
Codes (see chapter 2). Nor did the logical implications of this analogy change radically 
from the passage of the act itself to the determination of the Lvng and Smith cases. What 
had changed about the value of this analogy was the pattern of context informing official 
implementation of Indian law. AIRFA proponents had wanted an explicit federal 
commitment to maintain the integrity of traditional Indian cultures, but the Rehnquist Court 
had denied government aid to individual Native Americans. Hence, the Rehnquist Court 
had effectively answered a different kind of question than that informing the text of the
®5Badoni. 645-8 (D. Utah. C.D. 1977).
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AIRFA. In one respect the difference just mentioned involved an explicit difference in the 
context of dialogue (the difference between discourse taking place in a court and a that 
taking place in a  legislative body). In another respect that difference was constituted 
through ideological positions, as Congress sought to treat Indians as members of quasi­
sovereign nations whereas the Rehnquist Court had addressed them as U.S. citizens. In 
either event, a good deal of the discursive significance attached to the analogy between 
Indian ceremonies and Euro-America religions had been determined by context specific 
conventions for processing information about Indian culture. However (in)accurate it may 
be to describe aspects of Native American culture as forms of "religion"; various changes in 
the use of this descriptive orientation tell us a lot about the cultural patterns of Indian-white 
relations. Such have been overdetermined by the indexical values associated with notions 
of Indian identity and citizenship, and hence they reflect the patterns o f conflict over the 
role that Indians may play in the contemporary history of America.
Chapter by Chapter Outline.
Chapter one is an attempt to situate the AIRFA within the overall histoiy of Indian- 
white relations. It begins with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between legal 
arguments and a sense of legal history. This discussion is intended to illustrate the 
paradoxical relationship between the explicit text of a judicial opinion and the contextual 
models implicit within it. Each such text is modeled as an explicit argument in favor of a 
concrete legal outcome, but its contribution to the history of case law is more deeply rooted 
in the contextualization strategies that it makes available to future litigants. The historical 
significance o f an appellate decision therefore stems from the prospect o f reading it 
according to a common set of ideological assumptions.
The rest o f this chapter will contrast the case law dealing with Indian-white relations 
(as described through trust doctrine) to case law dealing with free exercise doctrine under 
the First Amendment. Each of these case histories embodies a legal principle linked to the
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AIRFA, and hence each of them presents an alternative contextual model for a legal dispute 
involving the AIRFA. The text o f the AIRFA itself never resolved which o f these 
contextual models would inform its implementation, and it is important to see how each 
contributed to the development of the act itself. The events presented in this chapter should 
illustrate a theoretical approach to the interactional significance of legal argumentation as 
well as provide useful background information about the history of Indian law in the 
United States and the First Amendment.
Chapter two describes the efforts o f the Taos Pueblo in New Mexico to reclaim a 
lake from the national Forest Service. This path-breaking campaign provides an excellent 
opportunity to discuss the role of "religion" as a category describing aspects o f American 
Indian culture, and to assess the semantic implications of appeal to a principle of "religious 
freedom" by Native Americans. The concept of "religious freedom" played a central role in 
this campaign, and the campaign itself played a central role in developing a Native 
American rhetoric dealing with the subject. The history of the Taos campaign to recover 
Blue Lake foreshadowed many of the difficulties associated with the principle of religious 
freedom under the AIRFA, and the success of this campaign provides an interesting 
contrast with the (non)impact of the AIRFA.
Chapter three is an analysis o f the relationship between "religious freedom" and 
cosmological principles implicit in governmental structures. The essay is intended to 
explore the limitations that appeal to "religious freedom" has, given the fact that such a 
principle presupposes a number of culturally specific political institutions. This may 
indicate something about the degree to which Native American culture is (in)compatible 
with the terms available under normal standards of Constitutional law. Hence, a number of 
the difficulties associated with the AIRFA can be ascribed to differences between Native 
and Euro-American forms of social organization. Indian tribes had already felt the impact of 
these long before the AIRFA's passage. Each of the points made in this chapter are 
illustrated by legal conflicts and Congressional discussions pertinent to the American Indian
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Civil Rights Act of 1968, and so the chapter closes with a discussion o f this act as well as 
the the legal conflicts which led up to it.
Chapter four covers passage o f the AIRFA itself, and includes a discussion of its 
initial (lack of) impact on federal policy. Special attention will be given to the conflicting 
interpretations of the AIRFA which emerged between different branches of the federal 
government during the process o f securing its passage. The Senate Select Committee on 
Indian affairs wanted a relatively strong piece o f legislation that would mandate real 
changes in federal policy as an extension of trust doctrine to the protection o f Native 
American religions. The Executive branch, however, wanted the AIRFA to do no more 
than affirm that Indians would be accorded the usual right o f free exercise included in the 
First Amendment. AIRFA proponents in the House of Representatives secured its passage, 
but weakened the bill in the process o f satisfying critics. An official 1979 report, mandated 
within the act itself, attempted to resolve many of these conflicts by articulating a general 
theory of Indian culture that would enable a strong reading of the act while at the same time 
limiting the scope of potential Indian claims. The report opens with a historical narrative 
outlining the context of Indian-white relations, and articulating a theory of cultural 
differences based on distinct cultural perspectives on space and time. This narrative 
conveys a distinct pattern of role relations between Indians and the federal government, one 
which its social theory reduces to an overly simplistic notion of both cultures. Hence, the 
most systematic exposition of the policies mandated within the AIRFA failed to resolve the 
basic tensions implicit within the act itself.
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Chapter I:
Legal Argumentation and the Ritual 
Production of Indian Rights.
The law indeed works by argument, and does so under circumstances where agreement 
cannot be compelled by resort to logic or to data. It is thus a branch of rhetoric, conceived 
o f both as the art of persuasion - necessary when intellectual or other compulsion is 
impossible - and as the art of deliberation, that is, as the art of thinking well about what 
ought to be done when reasonable people disagree. It can also be a branch of rhetoric in a 
third sense, which can be called constitutive, for through its forms of language and of life 
the law constitutes a world of meaning and action: it creates a set of actors and speakers and 
offers them possibilities for meaningfol speech and action that would not otherwise exist; in 
so doing it establishes and maintains a community, defined by its practices of language. At 
every stage the law is in this sense an ethical and political activity and should be understood 
and judged as such.®®
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation.
The text o f the AIRFA employs an awkward analogy between various aspects of 
Indian culture and Euro-American notions of "religion," and AIRFA proponents could not 
successfully defend this analogy in efforts to enforce the act through litigation. Few denied 
that Indian cultures actually possessed religious features, but many were unwilling to 
extend a legally enforceable right o f free exercise to those aspects of Indian culture that 
involved unusual religious claims (e.g. sacred site claims). Participants in AIRFA-related 
discourse therefore exhibited substantial differences o f opinion over the historical 
significance of the act itself and the legal significance o f its specific provisions. These 
differences seldom found direct expression in the denotational content o f AIRFA-related 
debates. Instead they emerged out of the contextualization strategies employed by those 
debating the meaning of the act. Those who advocated a strong interpretation o f the act 
generally viewed potential Indian claimants as members o f semi-sovereign nations which 
were themselves wards of the federal government. This position effectively minimized the
®®James Boyd White, Justice as Translation, xiv.
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role that the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment played in defining the sense of 
religious freedom that would apply in AIRFA-related cases. Those who advocated a weak 
sense of the act generally viewed Indians as United States citizens, and sought to interpret 
the act according to traditional standards of free exercise. Hence, the two most prominent 
interpretations of the AIRFA rested on two very different contextualization schemas; one 
involving a relationship between collective governmental agencies, and one involving a 
limit on governmental authority over individual conscience.
Neither interpretation of the AIRFA could have been excluded by the text of the act 
itself, nor could either interpretation be viewed as an inaccurate description of the legal 
status of Indian concerned over its implementation. Each interpretation served to over­
determine the specific legal significance that the AIRFA could play in the lives of Native 
Americans. Hence, each interpretation of the AIRFA emerges out of a complex relationship 
between a denotation text which employed notions o f "religion" to describe aspects of 
Indian culture, and an interactional text which presupposed a stance toward the ongoing 
relationship between Indians and the American legal system. The following section is an 
examination of the historical precedent for both of these contextualization strategies and the 
relationship that each could play in the history of the AIRFA. This will entail a comparison 
of the case law dealing with Indian tribes and the case law dealing with the Free Exercise 
clause of the First Amendment as each were understood in 1978.
Between Text and Context: The Performative Side of Legal Argumentation.
An established set of ritual procedures underlies the production of any legal 
argument. The substance of laws and constitutional provisions are generated by fiat, 
receiving a cosmological significance sometimes described as "the will o f the American 
people." Such pronouncements are generally rooted in images of a homogeneous
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population residing within a bounded space at a "homogeneous empty time."®^ The 
American legal system establishes this image of cultural unity through recourse to its 
appellate system, a set of institutions which provide for the resolution of conflicting legal 
positions by imposing a hierarchy of legal interpretations.®^ These social institutions form 
an important part o f the context of legal discourse in America, and they provide important 
constraints on the patterns of reasoning available to participants in any given legal dispute. 
These constraints make their appearance through a series o f pragmatic presuppositions, 
some o f which are likely to appear as vacuous premises from the standpoint of abstract 
reason. A long-standing precedent, for instance, may appear to be simply wrong-headed 
and yet continue to receive deference in legal briefs, judicial opinions, etc. Such 
conventions may seem foolish or gratuitous to laymen, but for those involved in legal 
professions such deference is simply a pragmatic necessity. Where such weaknesses in the 
logical rigor of legal discourse appear they generally correspond to moments in which the 
interactional text of a given argument is maximally salient to the flow of discourse. It is at 
such moments that the individuals involved in a particular dispute give voice to the 
institutional structure of the American legal system.
The American legal system clearly poses no threat to the truism that all reasoning is 
ultimately circular. An opinion authored by members of the U.S. Supreme Court is 
virtually guaranteed to have an explicit circular quality. Such opinions are ostensibly posed 
as arguments in favor of a specific legal action (condemning someone to prison, awarding 
damages to an injured party, etc.), but any case making it to the Supreme Court must 
involve some constitutional principle as such. Hence, the role of the Supreme Court is 
actually to supply something equivalent to the major premise of a syllogism rather than to
®^Cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
(1983. London and New York: Verso, 1992) passim.
®^C.f. Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modem Discourse. (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1992) 19-20.
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establish the soundness o f its conclusion, or "result." In fact, the "result" of a legal case is 
significant precisely to the degree that it instantiates the principles affirmed in the legal 
opinion itself.®^ For example, there is no inherent reason why anyone other than the 
litigants involved in the Sm ith case should have been concerned over the denial of 
unemployment benefits to Alfred Smith and Galen Black, but the rationale offered by 
Supreme Court in favor o f this decision gave its result a degree of significance far beyond 
that experienced by Smith and Black themselves. Thus, it appears that in direct contrast to 
intuitive notions of how an argument works, it is the argument itself which constitutes a 
significant historical event within a legal opinion, and not its concrete "result." It is as if the 
entire process proceeds by misdirection; as the higher courts argue for a concrete outcome 
while using that outcome to persuade people in the value of their own assumptions.
The circularity o f higher court opinions has its counterpart in the reasoning 
process used in lower courts. In his book. An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Edward H. 
Levi described legal argumentation as "reasoning by example:"
"It is a three step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition 
descriptive o f the first case is made into a rule o f law and then applied to a next similar 
situation. The steps are these: Similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent 
in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case. 
This is a method of reasoning which is necessary for the law, but it has other characteristics 
which under other circumstances might be considered imperfections.
It is the apparent randonmess o f this process which constitutes the "imperfections" of
which Levi speaks. The jump from a given case to a legal principle appears arbitrary from
the standpoint of abstract reason, as is the selection of a case history which is supposed to
bear out the principle. This weak link in the denotational text structure of legal reasoning
corresponds to historical transformations in the principles of case law. W hereas the
denotational text of a legal opinion offers up a logical demonstration in favor of a given
®^A thesis put foreword by James Boyd White in Justice as Translation. 91-93.
^®Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1949) 1-2.
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judgement, the assumptions used in this demonstration appear arbitrarily linked to a body 
of previous cases. A body of case law is held together by a judicious sense of the 
similarities between each case mentioned within it, but it is always possible to find 
alternative principles o f case law based on an alternative selection of cases.
As if the preceding were not sufficient cause for concern, nothing appears sufficient 
to prevent the continual changes observed in case law. According to Levi, the formation 
and application of legal concepts follows a circular process in which rules pass through 
three successive stages of analogical reasoning:
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are compared. 
The period is one in which the court fumbles for a phrase. Several phrases may be tried 
out; the misuse or misunderstanding of words itself may have an effect. The concept 
sounds like another and the jump to the second is made. The second stage is the period 
when the concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by example continues to 
classify items inside or out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the concept, 
as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the suggestive 
influence o f the word is no longer desired.
The process is likely to make judges and lawyers uncomfortable. It runs contrary to the 
pretense o f the system. It seems inevitable, therefore, that as matters of kind vanish into 
matters of degree and then entirely new meanings turn up, there will be an attempt to escape 
to some overall rule which can be said to have always operated and which will make the 
reasoning look deductive. The rule will be useless. It will have to operate on a level where 
it has no m ean ing .. . The statement o f the rule is roughly analogous to the appeal to the 
meaning o f a statute or of a constitution, but it has less of a function to perform. It is 
window dressing.7*
Whereas changes in legal precedent may appear vacuous from the standpoint of deductive 
reasoning, (or inductive reasoning for that matter) this does not mean such changes are 
entirely random. In fact, the appearance of randomness in such cases can only follow from 
inattention to the interactional significance of any principles at issue. The logical gaps 
which appear in the relationship between a particular case and a legal principle are similar to 
those which occur for scientists in the jump from empirical data to the formation of an 
hypothesis. As Charles Sanders Peirce argued, the formation of an hypothesis must 
proceed through some plausible linkage (what he called an "abduction") even though this
^ ’Levi, 8-9 A footnote referring to John Stewart Mill's work, A System of Logic, has been omitted from 
the last sentence.
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type of connection plays no role in demonstrating the truth of the hypothesis i t s e l f T h a t  
such a link should fail to appear in the explicit demonstration o f a scientific hypothesis or 
legal argument constitutes a problem in the denotational text models used to evaluate both 
types of discourse. This lack of a rational warrant appears to detract from the propositional 
rigor o f judicial opinions, leading to tautological inferences and the endless historical 
transformations of case law.
In such transformations an important part of the discursive process is dropped from 
the focus o f attention dealt with in a denotational text. As Levi notes, this apparently 
vacuous process is liable to make the participants in a legal process uncomfortable. Hence, 
people frequently attempt to address the weak points of legal argumentation through ad hoc 
principles, effectively providing a metalinguistic commentary on legal discourse without 
improving its logical rigor. These meta-linguistic principles address the subject matter of 
abductive inferences in terms of denotational text sentences, but the relationship between 
these timeless principles and the dynamic process of legal discourse remains unclear. Such 
statements provide an ideological objectification of the discursive framework involved in 
case law, in effect; transforming heuristic principles into cosmological statements. Hence, 
the social structure which guides a legal proceeding is typically projected onto the universe 
itself, generating ideological notions of "justice," "liberty," etc. Such ideological categories 
purportedly denote abstract concepts of great objective significance, though in effect they 
generally reflect the interactional patterns of a given cultural order.
In its own way, the ideological "window dressing" o f legal argumentation does 
provide a link between the interactional significance of a legal text and its denotational text 
structure. They may be be thought of as instances of linguistic ideology. A linguistic 
ideology constitutes "a set o f beliefs about language articulated by the users as a
^^Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed., Charles Hartshome and Paul 
Weiss, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960) 5.112-131 passim.
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rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use."73 As such, an 
ideological position about any pattern of discourse (such as legal reasoning or historical 
narrative) constitutes a position describing that pattern in denotational terms. Whether or 
not this kind of ideological position effectively characterizes the interactional structure of a 
given cultural framework, adherence to it does effectively provide a individuals with a 
definite stance within that framework. Thus, ideological statements will normally address 
the social categories available in a given language or culture, often providing the 
interactional value o f a social category with an illusory sense of objectivity. Hence, behind 
each of the fictive principles invoked to rescue case law from its historical context lies an 
interactional schema (an indexical relationship) which is in fact salient to the process of 
legal dispute.
Such ideological statements appear necessary because the conventions of legal 
argument are slow to address the dynamics of non-propositional discourse, or interactional 
texts.74 Simply put; the courts are slow to recognize any convention of discourse that does 
not take the form of a proposition, even when that convention takes place within the courts 
themselves. This "linguistic unifunctionalism" informing the conventions of legal discourse 
makes it necessary to fill in the gaps of legal reasoning with apparently objective statements 
about the cosmological nature of legal principles, and of law as such.^^ Such a position 
may be suspicious when framed in terms of an explicit ideological proposition, but the 
indexical relationship behind it may yet structure the rhetorical options available to 
participants in a legal dispute. Judges and lawyers make use o f such principles through
^^Michael Silverstein, "Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology," Papers from the Parasession on 
Linguistic Units and Levels, eds., P. Clyne, et. al. (Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 1979) 193. See 
also Bernard Weissbourd and Elizabeth Mertz, "Rule-Centralism Versus Legal Creativity: The Skewing of 
Legal Ideology Through Language," Law & Society Review. 19 (1985) 623-59 passim.
^'^Mertz and Weissbourd, 623-59 passim.
^^Mertz and Weissbourd, 649.
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performative discourse, that is; by effectively assuming a posture consistent with the 
cultural categories available to them through the interactive framework of a legal disputeJ^ 
Because the ideological nature o f a timeless legal principle corresponds to the 
ideological nature of folk models about linguistics, historical narrative, social organization, 
etc., the invocation of an ideological position in case law may (depending on the visibility 
o f the case) contribute to the construction of master-narratives common throughout other 
areas of American culture. Hence, ideological positions about the nature of legal reasoning 
draw support from discourses occurring outside o f the courtroom, thereby providing a 
stable link between the micro-social interactions found in a given legal dispute and the 
patterns o f a larger cultural system. In this respect an ideological position may form the 
interactional link between an indexical relationship and an abstract cultural order. Such a 
position may also provide the link between the interactional text and the denotational texts 
o f a written legal opinion, because any viable legal strategy must take notice of existing 
cultural norms. Each such ideological position therefore dictates the range o f plausible 
assumptions that someone may draw from in the process of constructing a legal argument. 
The "result" of a given court case will normally prove acceptable to those who share the 
court's expectations about the social identity of its participants, in which case it will find a 
welcome place in subsequent historical narratives, social commentaries, further case 
histories, etc. Thus, legal history shares a common ideological orientation with other 
aspects o f historical narrative, and it is through the ideological positioning o f legal 
disputants in some form of master-narrative that a legal outcome serves to shape the 
organization of society and the course of history. Without this step a legal decision is an 
event significant only to its own participants, but positioned within an appealing master- 
narrative a legal decision may in effect transform the prevailing cultural order.
^^C.f. James Boyd White's discussion of justification and performance in Justice as Translation. 105-109.
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The Ideological Dimensions of Indian Identity.
The kind of process outlined in the preceding remarks can be seen clearly enough in 
the cases associated with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, but many of the 
ideological themes associated with the AIRFA became enshrined during a much earlier 
phase of Indian law. Interaction between Indians and whites has been structured 
throughout American history along the lines of an ideological contrast between change and 
stasis. This contrast between past and future is normally tied to value assumptions in 
historical narratives. Thus, for example, visions of a better future dominate a great deal of 
the Euro-American historical consciousness.^^ Such visions of progress may be reversed, 
however, leading to a "declensionist " view of h i s t o r y Appeal to tradition is frequently 
tied to the latter view, as a means of halting the decline of history. Such value statements 
constitute a kind o f meta-historical thesis, or historical ideology; they contribute to a stance 
toward the nature of history as such.^^ Moreover, such a meta-historical thesis need not 
always be explicit; they appear implicitly in a broad range of historical narratives concerned 
with more concrete subjects.
The contrast between a positively valued future and a negatively valued past 
emerged in early European discourse about colonization of the American hemisphere and 
treatment of its indigenous population. Just as the American hemisphere represented the 
colonial future o f Europe; its indigenous population was taken to represent Europe's 
uncivilized past. Thus, Euro-American mythology typically assigned Native Americans a
^^Cf.George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live Bv. (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980) 22-24; and Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language. (1959. New York: Anchor Books, 
1981)6-9.
^^Cf. William Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative," The Journal of American 
History. 78 (1992) 1352 and passim.
^^Cf. Elizabeth Mertz, "The Uses of History: Language, Ideology, and Law in the United States and South 
Africa," Law & Society Review. 22 (1988) 661-85 passim-, Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essavs in 
Cultural Criticism. (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1978) 1-25 passim; Karl 
Lowith, Meaning in History. (Chicago and London: Phoenix Books, 1949) 1.
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fixed place along a temporal dimension serving as an ideological prototype of past stages in 
the history of humanity. This ideology cast Euro-Americans as agents of progress an 
assigned Native Americans a negative value as the representatives o f an uncivilized past.^O 
The image of an uncivilized barbarian was of course counterbalanced with images of the 
"noble savage" in which Native Americans emerged as exemplars of a more perfect past.^i 
A related version of this declensionist narrative emerged with the rise of Native American 
literature; one emphasizing the positive value of indigenous land rights, and advocating a 
strong environmental ethic in contrast to the destructive forces of European i m p e r i a l i s m . ^ ^  
As Christopher Vecsey put it: "Perhaps Indians have taken the role of nature lover as way 
of identifying themselves as Indians. That is to say, it is Indian' to revere nature. Doing so 
is a political, ontological statement."83 Thus, Indians have countered the the Euro- 
American rhetoric o f "progress" with a native "environmentalism," and thus fashioned a 
source of ethnic identity out of the ideological basis for an ostensible description American 
history.
Both notions of "progress" and notions o f "environmentalism" constitute an 
ideological position about the value of American history from the standpoint of Indian- 
white relations; and while neither position could be adequately justified on empirical
8®See for example the famous references to American living in "a state of nature" in Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan. Ed., C.B. Macpherson, (1951. New York: Penguin Books 1968) 187; John Locke, Two 
Treatise of Government, (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1960) 286,294, 
317-18, 334-337, 338-40.
8*E.g. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The First and Second Discourses Together With Replies to Critics and 
Essav on the Origin of Languages, ed. and tr., Victor Gourevitch, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
1986) passim.
82see for example Russell Means, "Same Old Song," Marxism and Native Americans, ed.. Ward Churchill, 
(1983. Boston: South End Press, 1992) 19-33 passim; Peter Nabokov, ed.. Native American Testimony: A 
Chronicle of Indian-White Relations From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-1992. (1978. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1991) 381-403 passim.
83christopher Vecsey, "Environmental Religions," American Indian Environments: Ecological Issues in 
Contemporary Native American History, ed., Christopher Vecsey and Robert W. Venables, (Syracuse, New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1980) 6.
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grounds, each of them also provides an indirect source of identity for both Native and non- 
Native Americans. Each of these positions appears to take a particular value as the objective 
basis for contrasting the ethnic identities of Native and Euro-Americans, whereas in reality 
the rhetorical value o f this contrast changes freely from one context to another while 
preserving its structural properties.*^ Adherence to one or the other ideological position 
therefore constitutes an indirect or constitutive index of Native or Euro-American political 
identity.85
As an indirect index of Indian identity, the contrast between progressive whites and 
environmentally friendly Indians can seriously affect the outcome of any legal or political 
conflict. Such contrasts are frequently limited to the presuppositional aspects of political 
discourse, loading the political identity of participants in a given dispute with implications 
far beyond those necessary to establish who is talking to whom. And yet, it is because the 
implications of this contrast are established through an indexical relationship that its use 
becomes a powerful tool in political discourse. In identifying the participants in a given 
dispute through such terms one assigns a definite political value to the interests associated 
with either side, but without asserting any explicit proposition about those interests. 
Different variations o f this contrast between Indians and whites therefore rest in the 
background of numerous legal and political disputes involving Native Americans.
Indian Identitv and the Legacv of John Marshall.
Images of a dynamic white and a static Indian identity have occupied a prominent 
place in U.S. law throughout American history. This is clearly seen in a trio of cases 
defining the relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal government. In the 1823
8^C.f. Susan Gal, "Bartôk's Funeral: Representations of Europe in Hungarian Political Rhetoric," 
American Ethnologist. 18 (August, 1991) 440-58 passim.
85c.f. Elinor Ochs, "Indexing Gender,” Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin, eds.. Rethinking Context: 
Language as an Interactive Phenomenon, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 335-358; Wall, 
"Space, Time and Cultural Landscape," passim.
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case o f Johnson v. M cIntosh the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to decide the nature of 
Indian land title in the United States. In the majority opinion for this case Chief Justice 
John Marshall explained that the doctrine of discovery gave the United States " . . .  an 
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by 
conquest. .  ."*^ Having established a legal groundwork for advances on Indian territory, 
Marshall explained that Indian land title was not thereby cancelled, and barring proper 
action by the U.S. government, Indians would retain legal title to the lands they 
occupied.87 The McIntosh decision therefore denied legal title to land privately purchased 
from Indians living in Indian territory.88 While the decision preserved the territorial claims 
o f an Indian tribe, it did so by denying the capacity of Indians to sell their own lands 
without an action by the Federal government. By preserving the boundaries of Indian 
territory from private encroachment in this particular manner, the Marshall court denied a 
significant form of agency to Indians while at the same time securing a legal framework for 
further U.S. advances into Indian territory. Hence, the outcome of McIntosh ensured the 
march of history across the American continent.
If McIntosh made it clear that the Federal government reserved a right to extinguish 
Indian land title, the case did little to clarify the relationship between Indian tribes and state 
governments. So, in 1831 the Cherokee Nation brought suit against the state of Georgia 
which had recently extended its laws into Indian territory. The Supreme Court then refused 
original jurisdiction on the grounds that the Cherokee Nation did not constitute a foreign 
state in the sense required by the Constitution.®^ In his majority opinion for the Cherokee 
Nation case John Marshall fashioned a new political identity for Indian tribes:
BGjohnson and Graham Lesee v. William McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, 587 (U.S. 1823). 
8^McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, 587-94 (U.S., 1823).
8*McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, 603-4 (U.S., 1823).
*^The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 5 Peters, 15-19 (U.S., 1831).
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"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a 
voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether these tribes which 
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, 
be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated 
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent 
of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession 
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relationship to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian."'^
This celebrated passage forms the basis for trust doctrine, a principle which remains the 
cornerstone of Indian law up to the present day.^* M arshal's comparison of the 
relationship between Indians and the Federal government with a fiduciary responsibility 
implied a clear political hierarchy, but it did little to clarify the responsibilities of the Federal 
government. His analogy was flawed from the start, because sovereign nations such as the 
United States cannot easily be compelled by law to live up to such a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ^ ^  Not 
surprisingly, early perspectives on trust doctrine rested on little more than a vague sense of 
cultural superiority, and that superiority usually meant the right to take away Indian land.^5 
As wards of the federal government, Indians constituted little more than children; and 
attempts to change their cultures could be understood as a process of education. The 
Marshall court had once again created a legal framework for the march of history through 
Indian territory, and it fashioned that framework by modeling the relationship between 
Indians and the federal government after the image of a relationship between a parent and a 
child.
The decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia certainly had a substantial impact on 
Indian law, but it did not do much to resolve the conflict between Indian tribes and state 
governments. This was no small matter in the early years o f the Republic wherein Federal
^®Cherokee Nation (emphasis added), 5 Peters, 17 (U.S., 1831)
^*See "Notes: Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law," Harvard Law Review, 98 (1984) 422- 
40 passim.
92sewell, 438-499.
93"Notes," 426-427.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 8
and State governments struggled to define their own spheres of authority. So, Georgia's 
attempts to expand its jurisdiction over Indian territory soon led to another conflict between 
Federal and State authorities. When a missionary named Samuel Worcester was sent to the 
Cherokee nation under the authority of the President of the United States he was eventually 
prosecuted for failure to secure a permit from the state of Georgia.^^ He challenged 
Georgia's jurisdiction over Cherokee lands, and John Marshall (a staunch Federalist) wrote 
the majority opinion for the Court ruling in Worcester's favor. This effectively answered 
the question raised originally by the Cherokee nation and provided another lasting principle 
of Indian law: any tribal authority not explicitly extinguished by Federal legislation remains 
with the tribe itself, leaving state governments without any jurisdiction over tribal territory.
The denial of state jurisdiction over tribal land holdings has led to significant legal 
victories for both Indians and the Federal government. Often the one has led to the other as 
victories by tribal entities are often quickly followed by advances in Federal jurisdiction. 
For example, in 1883 a Lakota named Crow Dog was tried under state jurisdiction for the 
murder of another Lakota on a reservation in South Dakota. The Supreme Court declared 
that the District Court of South Dakota did not have the necessary jurisdiction to hear the 
case and subsequently overturned Crow Dog's c o n v i c t i o n . ^ 5  public outrage over Crow 
Dog's release soon led to passage of the Major Crimes Act which redefined seven different 
crimes as Federal offenses when committed In Indian t e r r i t o r y O v e r  the years since then 
the American public has called upon the Federal government to fill numerous gaps In State 
jurisdiction over tribal territories, and to provide a general source of government authority 
on Indian reservations. This pattern of relations has served to strengthen ties between tribal 
interests and the Federal government and led to a gradual re-definition o f trust doctrine.
^'^Samuel A. Worcester v. The State of Georgia, 6 Peters, 515 (U.S. 1832).
Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556-72 (1883).
^^Francis Paul Prucha, Documents of the United States Indian Policy. 2nd Edition, Expanded. 1975. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) 167-68.
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Vague notions o f cultural superiority have gradually been replaced with a theory that the 
Federal government's fiduciary responsibilities stem from its control over Indian land, (a 
perspective dubbed "control theory").^^
There is little evidence for trust doctrine in the text of the Constitution. Neither the 
Marshall court, nor many of the subsequent courts using trust doctrine have consistently 
attempted to ground that relationship in the text of the Constitution.^® Thus, Vine Deloria 
Jr. has argued that the trust relationship rests on extra-Constitutional authority, and he has 
repudiated attempts to reduce the legal status of Indian tribes to any doctrine of legal 
t h e o r y . D e l o r i a  thus Indian tribes as political entities which the M arshall court 
acknowledged to exist as a matter of common sense, so to speak. This certainly reflects the 
interpretive strategies employed by the Marshall court in its attempt to deal with the 
Cherokee land cases. In each of these cases the Marshall court did not so much articulate an 
explicit theory about any of laws that it was called upon to interpret as identify the parties 
before it and clarify their relationship to the jurisdiction o f the U.S. Supreme Court, thus 
accomplishing a great deal of his legal task by merely identifying the issues before it.^00 
Marshall was therefore able to derive a set of pragmatic implications from the context of 
each case simply by invoking the appropriate social indices for each of the relevant parties.
In fact, it is only through subsequent reflection on the interactional texts presented 
in the Marshall trilogy that the outcome of these cases has been fashioned into a theoretical
97"Notes," 427-429.
^®David E. Wilkins, "The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of 'Federal Plenary Power:' An Analysis of 
Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty," 1886-1914," American Indian Quarterly, 18 (1994) 349-68 
passim.
99vine Deloria, Jr. "The Distinctive Status of Indian Rights," The Plains Indians of the Twentieth- 
Centurv. ed., Peter Iverson, (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985) 237-48 passim; 
Vine Deloria, Jr., Beyond the Pale: American Indians and the Constitution, " A Less than Perfect Union: 
Alternative Perspectives on the U.S. Constitution, ed., Jules Lobel, (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1988) 249-647 passim; Vine Deloria, Jr., "Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the 
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, " Arizona Law Review, 3 1 (1989) 201-23 passim.
lOOMertz, "The Uses of History," 677.
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doctrine. It is significant that Marshal's greatest contribution to the Indian law amounts to a 
literal non-event. For, in describing Indian tribes as "domestic dependant nations" Marshall 
was essentially placing the case before him beyond the authority of his own court, and it is 
only because non-action by the U.S. Supreme Court acquires an interactional significance 
by default that this decision meant anything to those involved at the time. Moreover, the 
effort required to transform Marshal's interactional texts into a legal doctrine (which is a 
type o f denotational text) has produced some uncertainties. It is unclear, for instance, 
whether "trust doctrine" merely clarifies the implications o f tribal status as "domestic 
dependant nation" or constitutes a countervailing principle, Hence, later courts have 
read a principle known as the doctrine of "plenary powers" into the Marshall trilogy, 
declaring the Federal government immune to lawsuits from its Indian wards and asserting a 
right to make unilateral changes in the provisions o f various Indian t r e a t i e s .  Hence, the 
prospect that the Federal government is responsible for the protection o f Indian tribes has 
enabled the courts to defend actions clearly injurious to Indian tribes. In theory "trust 
doctrine" implies "plenary powers," but in practice the exercise o f plenary powers 
constitutes an escape from the trust responsibilities of the federal government. Had 
Marshall produced an explicit theory of Indian law this inconsistency might have been 
resolved but, as it stands, both principles have become theories only through attempts to 
read a legal precedent back into the interactional text of Marshal's judicial opinions.
Any notions o f precedent found in the Marshall trilogy are closely tied to images of 
historical progress. It is an historical ideology that informed Marshal's treatment of the 
Cherokee land cases, and it is a similar ideology that guides placement of these cases in the
*0*Hence, when Vine Deloria refers briefly to the overall significance of the Marshall cases he simply 
refers to "Trust doctrine." See for example, "Trouble in High Places," State of Native America. 272-73. 
Yet, when Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle examined the impact of the cases in detail they suggest that the 
two principles are "contradictory," because Trust doctrine amounts to the denial of sovereignty to Native 
American tribes whereas the doctrine of "domestic dependant nations" in effect recognizes a form of 
sovereignty comparable to that of a small European state, American Indians. American Justice, 25-33.
•02united States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone W olf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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history of Indian law. Each of the opinions authored by the Supreme Court in the Marshall 
trilogy makes an implicit appeal to an historical ideology contrasting progress and 
civilization with savagery. Without completely denying that Indians had a history, (a 
rhetorical option that was certainly available to him) Marshall placed the responsibility for 
historical progress in the hands of American citizens.^^3 Moreover, his comparison of 
"Christian" "discoverers" with "savages" living in the "wilderness" served to provide a 
religious significance to the transfer of Indian lands to the United States.*®^ The mere use 
o f such terms placed questions about Indian status within a familiar historical scheme at 
least one level below and behind whites. Trust doctrine matched the abstract spatial 
dimensions of Indian territory with an abstract sense of time tied closely to images of the 
United States and its future. Marshall made it clear that the initiative for change on the 
American continent would come from from civilized Americans, and hence the language of 
trust doctrine has transformed a historical ideology into a principle of l a w .  *05 The salience 
o f this same principle to contemporary Indian law remains contingent on continued 
adherence to an historical ideology consistent with its terms.
Marshal's opinions facilitated the colonization of Indian territory, but he did not 
commit the judicial branch to an active role in that process. Following the Marshall 
hearings, the Supreme Court has served throughout American history as a comparatively 
stable source o f protection for Indian i n t e r e s t s .  By contrast, the majority of 
encroachments on Indian territory and rights have come from the legislative branch of 
g o v e r n m e n t . ‘07 Neither of these facts can be surprising, given the text of the Marshall
'O^Mertz, "The Uses of History," 673-677. 
'O'^Mertz, "The Uses of History," 674. 
'O^Mertz, "The Uses of History," 673-677. 
iOÔDeloria and Lytle, 57. 
lO^Mertz, "The Uses of History," 672.
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opinions. His view of history forces the legislative branch to act deliberately and explicitly 
when limiting the rights and powers of Indian tribe's. Absent any such legislation, Indian 
tribes have commonly been able to defend their interests successfully in the American legal 
system, effectively ". . . turning the 'white man's' ideology of history to their own 
a d v a n t a g e . " ‘ 0 8  Because the language of trust doctrine involves a relationship between 
forms of government, it is tribes themselves which can make use of this ideology rather 
than individual Native Americans. Thus in the twentieth-century the Federal government 
has developed an elaborate set of administrative policies for dealing with Indian 
reservations, effectively putting into operation a control theory of trust doctrine. In direct 
contrast to the assumptions of the Marshall court, its decisions have fashioned a permanent 
role for Indian tribes in the American legal system.
Trust Doctrine and the Survival of Native American Tribes.
The transition from an historical theory of trust doctrine based on imminent 
assimilation to a theory about a continuing government interest in the welfare o f Indian 
tribes was not altogether a smooth operation. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth- 
centuries various changes in Indian policy indicate a continuing tension over the value of a 
permanent relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal government. This tension 
rests on the implications of an indexical contrast between white visions o f progress and 
Indian ties to the American landscape. Hence, the prospect of terminating the trust 
relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal government constitutes nothing less than 
the elimination of Indian tribes. Various attempts to eliminate the trust relationship have 
threatened the legal basis on which Indian tribes may continue to exist. Contrasting 
attempts to preserve trust doctrine under a control theory may in turn draw considerably 
from the rhetoric o f Native American environmentalism. Contemporary threats to trust
lOSMertz, "The Uses of History," 678.
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doctrine thus follow a narrative pattern emphasizing notions o f progress which had 
originally been used in its own construction, whereas its defenders employ a similar 
schematic arrangement of space and time in combination with a different value orientation.
The history of Indian law has been described in terms of a cyclical pattern, 
alternating between attempts to protect and to destroy Indian culture and / or 
sovereignty.*®^ For most of American history the protective phases of Indian law have 
involved objectives limited to the survival of Indian tribes as such, and attempts to eliminate 
Indian tribes have generally emerged out of the executive and legislative branches of of the 
U.S. government. The specific history of the AIRFA fits neither of these generalizations, 
though the law itself owes much to the contested nature o f Indian culture. Much of the 
rhetoric associated with the AIRFA echoes themes associated with one or another phase of 
Indian policy, and the concerns addressed by the act itself fall into a range o f issues shaped 
by the continuing alternation of hostile and protective forces in Federal Indian law.
Prior to the late twentieth-century the survival of Indian culture was primarily a 
question about the survival of Indian tribes as discrete political units. Following a century 
of efforts to acquire and limit the space of Indian country, the Federal government adopted 
a strategy that would once and for all eliminate Indian territory along with the political 
integrity o f Indian tribes. This led to the Dawes Act, a law which effectively transformed 
the political objectives and interactional framework of Indian policy. Under the Dawes Act 
the federal government would concentrate its attacks on Indian tribes on cultural patterns 
defining tribal membership, effectively beginning a campaign of internal colonization. 
Rather than acquiring further pieces of Indian territory the federal government would 
eliminate the social foundation of Indian tribes and render the reservation system 
unnecessary. This was a classic example of the implementation of trust doctrine under 
assimilationist assumptions of cultural superiority. The rational warrant for this kind of
'®^C.f. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native American Societies in a 
Modern Constitutional Democracy. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 13-14.
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action was precisely the relationship between ward and trustee outlined originally in the 
Marshall trilogy.
The Dawes Act resulted primarily in economic and cultural devastation for those 
Indian tribes subjected to its implementation.^ It had been intended from its inception to 
force upon Indians a profound change in their way of life. Contrary to the expectations of 
its advocates, however, the Dawes Act did not turn Indians into good agricultural capitalists 
through its forced re-definition of their land claims. The problem with the expectations 
associated with the Dawes Act was articulated quite well during its own era in a report 
attached to the bill by dissenters on the House Committee on Indian Affairs. They charged 
that rationale for the Dawes Act was based on a flimsy social theory, stating that "it does 
not make a farmer out of an Indian to give him a quarter-section of land." ̂  1  ̂They further 
asserted that Indian ideas about communal land ownership would prove too substantial an 
obstacle for the act to achieve positive r e s u l t s , ^  ^2 Hence, this policy attacking notions of 
communal land ownership would succeed only in emiserating the conditions of Indian life, 
but its would not generate acceptance of a commodified sense of land ownership. As Karl 
Polanyi argued, the destruction accompanied by measures such as the Dawes Act is not 
primarily a function of the economic exploitation that accompanies their implementation; it 
is a result of suppressing a cultural system forcibly under the gratuitous expectation that a 
new market perspective will naturally take its place. ̂  13
* *®0n the effects of the Dawes Act, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Assault on Indian Tribalism: The 
General Allotment Law (Dawes Act^ of 1887. ed., Harold M. Hyman, The America's Alternatives Series, 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1975) 28-31. Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the 
American West 1846-1890. Histories of the American Frontier, ed., Ray Allen Billington. (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1984) 268-269.
* **Washbum, 37.
* *2 Washburn, 35-40.
**3polanyi, 290-293.
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With the passage of the Wheeler-Howard Act (or the Indian Reorganization Act) in 
1934 Congress reversed the direction of Federal Indian policy. Under the Wheeler-Howard 
Act the Federal government outlined a policy providing for the permanent survival of 
Indian tribes. By establishing Federal responsibility to protect Indian communal land 
ownership, and by giving Indians some official control o f their own political future; the 
Wheeler-Howard Act served to acknowledge Indians as subjects involved in the shaping of 
their own history. This in itself implied a great deal that is anathema to traditional Indian 
culture, particularly given the economic transformations deemed necessary for the success 
of tribal entities. Tribal governments accepting the provisions of the Wheeler-Howard Act 
were reformed along with the overall stmcture of Federal administration. Implementation of 
the act required individual tribes to accept a democratic form of government, thus replacing 
many o f the traditional forms o f Indian authority.**'^ Some charged that the new 
governments were essentially government managed examples of c o m m u n i s m . **5 Others 
maintain that the tribal governments formed during this era were explicitly designed to 
empower business interests so as to foster land development, often in direct conflict with 
traditional interests.* In any event, the legitimacy of tribal governments formed under the 
provisions of the IRA remains a subject of dispute throughout intra-Indian politics.
The W heeler Howard Act did give Indian tribes a respectable base of power from 
which they could negotiate their own political future. Much that had been gained under the 
W heeler-Howard Act was soon threatened, however, with the end o f the Roosevelt 
administration. Apparently, the lessons of the Dawes Act were not well learned, because 
the Federal government soon returned to a policy o f forced assimilation during the
* *4gee, Rebecca L. Robbins, "Self Determination and Subordination: The Past, Present, and future of 
American Indian Governance," The State o f Native America. 95.
* '^E.g. Ramon Roubideaux, "Con. (in "Debate over IRA)" Native American Testimony. 328-29.
* '^E.g. Robbins, 92-98; Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Indigenous Resistance to Genocide. 
Ecocide and Expropriation in Contemporarv North America. (Monroe, Main: Common Courage Press,
1993) 145-47.
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Termination era o f the nineteen-fifties. Under this policy the Federal government paid any 
Indian tribe deemed self sufficient a lump sum of money and then promptly terminated its 
special relationship with the tribe and its members. The impact o f termination policy was 
far from beneficial, and the Federal government soon moved toward another approach to 
Indian t r i b e s . *  *2  By 1 9 6 8  Lyndon Johnson articulated a principle of self-determination, a 
policy which was reaffirmed by Richard Nixon in 1 9 7 0 .* * ®
Self-determination has a fairly obvious rhetorical significance, but its actual policy 
implications have never been particularly clear. Much as it is generally safe to say that the 
Wheeler Howard Act was beneficial to Indians insofar as it ended the policy of General 
Allotment, the policy of Self-determination is clearly beneficial only insofar as it constitutes 
an end to the termination era. By the late nineteen-seventies the preservation of autonomous 
Indian governments had become a basic assumption of national policy. The specific 
implications of Indian self-determination remain unclear, however, though they have 
expanded beyond the minimal implications of a control theory. Congressional action 
consistent with the policy of self-determination has added a legislative basis for tribal status 
in contemporary Indian policy, but neither this nor the case law affecting Indian tribes rests 
on a secure textual basis in the Constitution. Indian claimants must are therefore particularly 
vulnerable to ideological reconstructions o f their legal standing in a given dispute. The 
status of an Indian tribe remains somewhat tenuous in contemporary Indian law, and the 
rhetoric surrounding Indian policy frequently eclipses the actual policy questions at hand. 
Moreover, the fate of Indian tribes remains subject to alteration by the new legislation, 
placing the rights of Indian tribes as such at the mercy of the continuing democratic 
process. Even as Indian tribes explore new possibilities of self-government, their legal 
status remains a highly contestable source of authority.
"^ S ee  Deloria, Custer. 54-77. 
>>8prucha, 248-249, 256-258.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 7
During the self-determination era Congress has entertained a number o f bills 
addressing Indian interests beyond the mere survival o f Indian tribes as such. The 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act is a prime example of this kind of legislation. It is 
the prospect of appeal to trust doctrine (more appropriately to the prospect of invoking the 
social identity dictated by trust doctrine) which would eventually drive a great deal of the 
interests associated with AIRFA litigation. Yet the significance that Indian tribes play in 
shaping the Federal interest at stake in the AIRFA has never been very clear. Thus, Indians 
attempting to receive Federal relief under the provisions of the AIRFA have frequently been 
unable to invoke the indexical patterns dictated by trust doctrine. The courts generally 
treated AIRFA claimants as individual U.S. citizens rather than as members o f semi- 
autonomous nations invoking federal trust responsibilities. To understand the ambiguous 
relationship between the AIRFA and Federal trust doctrine, one must therefore address a 
range of individualistic themes associated with the Bill of Rights.
Free Exercise and the Balancing Test.
Notions derived from free exercise doctrine had a profound affect on the case 
history associated with the AIRFA. As had been the case with trust doctrine the principles 
governing case law in free exercise disputes emerged out of a historical process, and they 
continue to have a transient existence. This fact is somewhat obscured by efforts to cast 
them as timeless legal principles. Such principles exhibit a certain heuristic value as they 
emerge into legal discourse, but nothing stops the courts from setting these principles aside 
once they prove inconvenient. When the AIRFA became law the courts generally employed 
a formula known as the balancing test in cases dealing with questions o f free exercise. In 
following this procedure a court would weigh the government interest at stake in a given 
case against the religious needs of a litigant claiming a right of free exercise. Under the 
balancing test a good deal of the outcome of a given case clearly hinges on the personal 
judgement of the appellate justices hearing it, a fact which serves only to heighten the
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impact of any personal or structural biases affecting the court's orientation toward minority 
religions. Most o f the cases associated with the AIRFA would involve a pattern of 
reasoning tailored to meet the criteria spelled out in this approach; but these same cases 
would begin to strain the courts' willingness to stand by the balancing test, eventually 
leading the Supreme Court to all but renounce it in the Smith c a s e . *  *9  i n  this respect the 
AIRFA set the stage for the final phase in the history of the balancing test, and the two 
would eventually share the same fate at the hands of the Supreme Court.
The balancing test emerged out of the demise of an earlier distinction between belief 
and action, which had been enshrined by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Revnolds 
V. United States (1878), a dispute involving the Mormon practice of polygamy. In keeping 
with his Mormon faith George Reynolds had taken a second wife, and was accordingly 
charged with p o l y g a m y .  *2® His lawyers argued that no intent to break the law could be 
attributed to Reynolds, because such a marriage constituted a religious duty for members of 
the Mormon Church.*2* The Supreme Court decided against Reynolds, however, and in 
the majority opinion. Chief Justice Waite introduced a distinction between belief and action 
into the subject of religious freedom. Borrowing from the work of James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson, Waite argued that the principle o f religious freedom was intended to 
apply only to questions of belief. Through such a principle; "Congress was deprived of all 
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in 
violation o f social duties or subversive o f good o r d e r .  "*22 Chief Justice Waite moved on
*'^Smith, 494 U.S. 882-890 (1990).
*20Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145-53 (1878).
*2'Reynolds, 98 U.S. 161-62 (1978).
*22There is an interesting poetic feature to this argument inasmuch as Waite's statement of this general 
principle follows a historical analysis of the struggles undertaken by Madison and Jefferson to ensure 
observation of both religious freedom and a separation of church and state in the state of Virginia. Yet, the 
language with which Waite summarizes this relates directly to "Congress," implicitly transforming the 
context of debate from that of the famous Virginia resolution to a dialogue directly relevant to the Supreme 
Court o f the United States. (Note that it was a Federal law which was at issue in Reynolds, given the fact 
that the events in question took place in Utah territory, which would not become a state until January 4,
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to describe laws against polygamy as valid statutes relating to actions rather than 
b e l i e f s .  *23 Thus, the court faced the prospect of accommodating a particular individual's 
actions on the grounds that they had been religiously motivated, a prospect which the court 
easily rejected:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the 
United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse 
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to 
make the professed doctrines of of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in 
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in 
name under such circumstances. *24
The Revnolds decision matches a certain intuitive understanding of the First 
Amendment as a body of principles relating to ideas, and to those conditions necessary to 
ensure the free and safe communication of ideas. The court's distinction between belief and 
action thereby continued a trend towards privatization of religion which can be detected in 
the formulation of the text of the First Amendment itself. In protecting the state from 
practices based on the religious beliefs of individual citizens the Revnolds case further 
enshrined the artificial distinction between the recognizably "religious" beliefs protected by 
the First Amendment and the cosmological principles presumed by the First Amendment 
itself. This distinction between belief and action effectively defined any conflict between the 
State and a religious sect over a religious practice as a secular matter, even when, as in the
1896.) This is not to say that Waite could not have inferred the relevance of this principle to his own case 
from a careful reading of the material relevant to Virginia; but that instead of making such an inference on 
logical grounds he did so through an interactional text, generating a trope in which Madison an Jefferson 
spoke directly to the case at hand. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 164 (1878).
*23Reynolds, 98 U.S. 164-67 (1878).
*24Reynolds, 98. U.S. 166-67 (1878). It is worth noting that while the belief action distinction may have 
emerged out of conflict between the Federal government and the Mormon church over polygamy; this 
distinction did not continue to define the boundaries of Federal interest in the subject. In 1882 Congress 
would pass the Edmunds Act, disenfranchising those who believed in the practice of polygamy as well as 
imposing more substantial penalties for those who practiced it. See Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune 
and None of Mv Own": A New Historv o f the American West. (Norman and London: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991) 174.
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case of the Revnolds decision, a good portion of the rationale for the State's own interest is 
intimately bound up with the development of religious t r a d i t i o n s .  *25
The Court's reasoning in the Revnolds case did more to underscore the potential 
threats posed by an open ended interpretation of Free Exercise Clause than it did to resolve 
them. The distinction between belief and action rendered the Free Exercise Clause 
redundant, given the fact that laws affecting beliefs rather than actions would be covered by 
the Free Speech clause of the same amendment which could be called upon to ensure free 
e x p r e s s i o n .  *26 Only by looking into areas of activity motivated by religious doctrines 
could the courts' give the Free Exercise clause any substantive domain not already covered 
by the protection of expression. The principle announced in the Revnolds case appeared to 
prevent just such an inquiry, thus rendering the Free Exercise clause ineffective as a means 
of protecting Americans from dangerous religious practices.
In 1940 the Supreme Court would begin to venture towards a more substantive 
interpretation of the Free Exercise clause, and thereby renew the potential threat that 
religious freedom holds for "the law of the land." In Cantwell v. Connecticut the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision convicting Jehovas' Witnesses o f violating 
a law prohibiting solicitation without official approval from the State's secretary o f  the 
Public Welfare Council, and in the instance of Cantwell himself; a conviction for inciting a 
breach of the peace. *27 In the majority opinion for the case Justice Roberts would revisit 
the distinction between belief and action produced over a half century earlier by the 
Reynolds court:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. 
One the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance o f any creed or the
*25ln the language of the Court, "Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, 
in most civilized nations a civil contract, and usually enforced by law." Reynolds, 98. U.S. 165 (1878).
*26see Lupu, 938; Stephen L. Pepper, "The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on 
Recent Cases," Northern Kentuckv Law Review. 9 (1982) 265-66.
*27cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 300 (1940).
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practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such 
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted 
by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment 
embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in 
the nature of things, the second cannot be. *28
As in the Reynolds case, the argument presented in Cantwell suggests that the court was 
reluctant to extend free exercise protections to actual religious practices. In declaring the 
Connecticut law prohibiting unauthorized solicitation unconstitutional, the court was careful 
to indicate that laws prohibiting fraud could still be enforced against religious 
organizations. *2® And in declaring that Cantwell himself had not incited a breach of the 
peace, the court merely reviewed the facts of the case and decided that he had not exhibited 
any profane or indecent behavior. *5® The Court did not declare that fraudulent claims or 
indecent behavior would be protected in the event that such behavior constituted a form of 
proselytization; but it did reject regulations pertaining directly to the latter based on vague 
concerns about the prospect of fraud or indecency.
The C antw ell decision did not extend free exercise relief to a broad range of 
religious practices, but the court's willingness to entertain cases involving religious 
practices in itself constituted a radical break from the rationale guiding free exercise cases in 
the wake of the Reynolds decision. Following Cantwell, people would test the Supreme 
Court's willingness to extend free exercise protection to a great variety of activities. So, the 
rationale offered in the Cantwell decision did generate more substantive notions free 
exercise doctrine, leading to an approach that could not be reduced to other provisions 
within the First Amendment. This course renewed the dangers inherent to the Free Exercise 
clause by extending its denotational scope to a broad range of social practices. As the 
Supreme Court began to flesh out the new possibilities suggested in Cantwell, it would
*28CantweIl, 310 U.S. 303-4 (1940). 
>29cantwell, 310 U.S. 304-6 (1940). 
'3®Cantwell, 310 U.S. 307-11 (1940).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 2
also have to find a new means of narrowing the potential scope of free exercise claims; it 
would have to construct a new "gatekeeper doctrine." *5*
The process of defining the Supreme Court's new approach to free exercise began 
in earnest during the early nineteen-sixties . In the 1961 case of Braunfield v. Brown the 
Supreme Court ruled against a free exercise challenge to Pennsylvania's Sunday closing 
laws. The petitioners in this case were orthodox Jews who argued that they should not be 
forced to close their places of business on Sundays, because they were obliged to refrain 
from work on Saturdays in observation of the S a b b a t h .  *52 Enforcement of Sunday closing 
laws against such individuals would force them to choose between operating at an 
economic disadvantage and violating their own religious beliefs. *53 Although the Supreme 
Court did not agree with the petitioners. C hief Justice W arren's majority opinion 
underscored the possibility that such religious practices could find protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause. Citing Cantwell. Warren wrote that freedom of belief was absolute, but 
that the issue at hand involved the more constricted form of protection afforded the practice 
of religion. *54 Warren characterized the chief source of conflict between free exercise 
principles and legislative bodies in terms of indirect burdens generated through legitimate 
public interests. *55 He wrote:
Of course, to hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct which imposes 
solely an indirect burden on the observance of religion would be a gross oversimplification. 
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to 
discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though 
the burdens may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct 
by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance 
the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
* 5 ' Lupu, 937-39 and passim.
* 52Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 600-2 (1961). 
'33Braunfield, 366 U.S. 602 (1961). 
>34Braunfield, 366 U.S. 603-7 (1961). 
>35Braunfield, 366 U.S. 606-9 (1961).
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observance unless the State may accommodate its purpose by means which do not impose 
such a burden.*56
In keeping with this approach the Court decided against the petitioners on the grounds that 
granting exemption to Orthodox Jews would impede the purpose of Pennsylvania's 
Sunday closing laws. *57 Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's estim ate of 
Pennsylvania's interest, arguing that exemptions were quite feasible and consistent with the 
intended purpose of Sunday closing laws. *58 While the Braunfield case produced neither a 
concrete outcome that could be described as an extension of religious freedom, nor a 
complete consensus within the court, it did provide an important step in defining the criteria 
by which the Court would come to evaluate religious practices.
In the 1963 case o f Sherbert v. Vemer the Supreme Court would apply much the 
same criteria to the claims of a Seventh-Day Adventist. In keeping with her own faith Adell 
H. Sherbert refused to work on Saturdays, resulting in termination of her employment at a 
mill in South C a r o l i n a .  *59 When she applied for unemployment compensation she was 
denied benefits on the grounds that she had refused to accept employment without good 
cause.*40 Sherbert had appealed the decision to the South Carolina Supreme Court on the 
grounds that it violated the Free Exercise clause.*4* Writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Justice Brennan would again cite Cantwell, declaring that; "The door of the Free Exercise 
Clause stands tightly closed against any government regulation of religious belie fs  as 
such. "*42 Turning to the Braunfield decision, he wrote; "On the other Hand, the Court has
*56Braunfield, (reference to Cantwell omited), 366 U.S. 607 (1961). 
137Braunfield, 366 U.S. 608-9 (1961).
*58Braunfield, 366 U.S. 614-15 (1961).
139sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 399-400 (1963).
*40sherbert, 374 U.S. 400-1 (1963).
'4>Sherbert, 374 U.S. 401-2 (1963).
*42sherbert (emphasis in original), 374 U.S. 402 (1963).
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rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation o f certain 
overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is in accord 
with one's convictions, [ i t ]  is not totally free from legislative r e s t r i c t i o n s . ' "  *43 Following 
these remarks, Brennan moved on to frame the case in terms quite similar to those used in 
Braunfield:
Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no 
conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach o f state legislation. If, 
therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's 
constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary 
represents no infringement by the State o f her constitutional rights o f free exercise, or 
because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified 
by a compelling state interest in the regulation o f a subject within the State's constitutional 
power to regulate.'*44
Brennan then proceeded to argue that denial of unemployment benefits did in fact constitute 
a burden on Sherbert's right of free exercise, and that South Carolina did not have a 
compelling interest in its unemployment policy, or at least not one that would preclude the 
kind o f exemption sought by S h e r b e r t .  * 4 5  Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court, reversed the 
decision o f the South Carolina Supreme Court, and provided one of the earliest cases 
wherein a religious practice received the protection accorded by the Free Exercise Clause.
The outcome of Sherbert v. Vemer posed a number of vexing problems. Brennan 
may have borrowed from the Braunfield case in constructing the majority opinion for 
Sherbert. but he was not altogether convincing in his attempts to show that the outcome of 
Sherbert was consistent with the earlier decision. Using the position taken by the court in 
B raunfield. that Sunday closing laws could not admit to exceptions without unduly 
straining the government's own interest (a point he had himself contended at the time); 
Brennan argued that Sherbert differed from Braunfield in the empirical sense that such an 
accommodation was indeed possible with respect to South Carolina's policies regarding
*43sherbert, 374 U.S. 403 (1963).
*44sherbert, (reference to NAACP v. Button omited), 374 U.S. 403 (1963). 
>45sherbert, 374 U.S. 403-9 (1963).
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unemployment c o m p e n s a t i o n . *46 Brennan’s rationale effectively cast a key feature of any 
decision regarding free exercise in the form of an empirical question, one which would 
have to be decided on a case by case basis; but this also meant that important aspects o f a 
free exercise case were left to the discretion of the Court itself. W ithout declaring in 
principle what would constitute a "compelling state interest," or how much trouble the 
government could be expected to take in accommodating a right of free exercise, the criteria 
outlined in Sherbert generated a discursive vacuum within the denotational text structure of 
cases dealing with a right of free e x e r c i s e . * 4 7  Implementation of such a criterion would 
therefore call increasing attention to the interactional contributions of appellate justices.
The very requirement that a justice should balance the interests of the government 
against the free exercise interests of a claimant constituted the principle discursive weakness 
o f the balancing test. The notion that justices can actually "balance" such interests is 
nothing more than a rather stylized metaphor, because the literal significance of this term 
would require that some absolute unit o f measure could be used to "weigh" one legal 
interest against another. In actual practice justices faced incommensurable claims in 
virtually every case, however, and hence each actual instance o f balancing invited 
participants to assign their values to the interests at hand. Where diversity of expectation 
existed in relation to a free exercise case, which is assuredly the reason that such cases 
occur in the first place; there is little hope that a principle of law could be founded on the 
personal credibility o f individual justices. In any event, following the introduction of the 
balancing test the case history of free exercise doctrine soon began to fill up with decisions 
backed by little more than common sense appeal and the credibility of appellate justices.
146sherbert, 374 U.S. 408-9 (1963).
*47For example. Justice Stewart agreed with the decision reached in Sherbert. but he argued that the new 
decision could not be squared with the outcome in Braunfield. a fact which he seems to have regarded as a 
virtue. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. 417 (1963). Likewise, Justices Harlan and White rejected attempts to 
reconcile the cases with one another, Sherbert, 374 U.S. 421 (1963).
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The first prong of the balancing test could also be taken to imply a kind of sub­
phase in which the court determines whether or not a given practice constitutes a form of 
religion - as opposed to deciding in one and the same moment that such a practice does 
exist and that it has been burdened by a government policy. Justices have been unable to 
deal effectively with this question on its own terms; however, perhaps because raising 
questions about the religious nature of a practice simultaneously raises the prospect o f 
arbitrary distinctions between religious and non-religious behavior, and because this calls 
upon justices to second guess the sincerity of claimants, Rather than articulate tenuous 
Judgements about the viability of a religious tradition and the sincerity of its practitioners in 
the actual text of a judicial opinion, justices have often conceded the religious nature of a 
given practice only to articulate an argument denying relief on some other grounds. Hence, 
the class of practices acknowledged by the courts to be religious in nature appears quite 
large indeed under the balancing test, but those practices actually afforded free exercise 
protection are generally clustered around prototypical notions of religious belief.
The balancing test emerged as a means o f addressing the indirect burdens that 
government action could place on religious practitioners. In its willingness to review laws 
and policies passed for generally valid purposes the Supreme Court greatly expanded the 
potential scope of free exercise cases. The test itself placed the courts in a position to 
actively structure the relationship between religious practitioners and governmental 
agencies, because it enabled judges to determine when government policies would be 
required to accommodate religious practitioners. This expansion of free exercise doctrine 
matched coincided with an expansion of federal trust doctrine. In at least one respect the 
AIRFA could be seen as the logical outcome of both developments; it explicitly required 
government agencies to weigh their own interests against those of traditional Indian 
practitioners in the process of formulating their own policies. In another respect, however.
*'**C.f. Marc Galanter, "Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point," Wisconsin Law 
Review. (Spring, 1966) 255-64.
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notions of trust doctrine were inconsistent with the balancing test, because trust doctrine 
called for the federal government to express a positive interest in helping Indian tribes 
whereas the balancing test assumed an adversarial relationship between individual claimants 
and governmental policies. The adversarial stance presumed in the balancing test naturally 
reflected the interactional patterns o f a free exercise dispute in which each o f the parties 
were assumed to be at cross-purposes. Application of the balancing test therefore served to 
isolate the legal interests of both parties in a free exercise dispute, and hence its use in 
AIRFA related cases precluded the very prospect that Indian claimants were themselves 
entitled to active government support rather than mere accommodation.
The balancing test differed greatly from trust doctrine in another respect; it 
addressed the institution of religion rather than the overall integrity of a tribe. The values 
most likely to receive protection under the balancing test, those deemed most crucial to the 
free exercise interests of religious practitioners, could generally be isolated from other 
social interests. In many respects such values were closely related to the very sense of 
belief originally set forth in the Revnolds case. The courts would not protect actions which 
were not rooted in religious belief. Hence, those seeking free exercise relief for a social 
practice had to base their case on claims about the religious beliefs reflected in those 
actions. Social practices reflecting political and economic values might not receive 
protection under the balancing test, unless they could be related to the maintenance of a 
religious community.
The 1972 case of W isconsin v. Yoder constituted the most likely precedent for 
tribal litigants pursuing AIRFA-related cases. This case involved a challenge to 
W isconsin's compulsory education laws, stemming from the Amish practice of 
withdrawing their children from public schools beyond the eighth grade. Testimony given 
in the lower courts established that the Amish religion involved adherence to a distinctive 
pattern of living, one that generally required inhabitance within a distinct form of
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community, Lawyers for the Amish respondents Jonas Yoder and W allace M illner 
further argued that attendance in a public school beyond the eighth grade threatened the 
values espoused by the Amish faith, and that such school attendance made it impossible for 
young adolescents to enter into their accustomed places within the Amish c o m m u n i t y .  
The Court ruled in favor of the respondents, claiming that the government interest at stake 
in the case was insufficient to warrant a substantial burden on their right of free exercise. 
On behalf of the Court Justice Burger wrote:
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate 
claims to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however 
strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to 
the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
Burger went on to distinguish between the "religious" motivations of the Amish and those 
issuing from more secular interests (such as those guiding Henry David Thoreau's decision 
to live at Walden Pond).’^^ Granting the Amish position that school attendance beyond the 
eighth grade constituted a serious threat to the practice of this faith, and that an exception 
for Amish children would not prevent the state of Wisconsin from satisfying its own 
interests in public education; the Court then ruled in favor of the respodents.153 Hence, the 
Yoder case provided another precedent for the use o f the balancing test in free exercise 
jurisprudence, and demonstrated the Court's increasing willingness to expand the actual 
protection offered under that test.
In Yoder the court went so far as to protect an entire community and a distinctive 
pattern of living from an otherwise valid state law. This kind o f protection could have
•49wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 209-10 (1972). 
'50Yoder. 406 U.S. 211-12 (1972).
151 Yoder. 406 U.S. 215 (1972).
'52Yoder. 406 U.S. 215-17 (1972).
'53Yoder. 406 U.S. 218-36 (1972).
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potentially brought a wide range of practices under the scope of the Free Exercise clause. 
As a means of narrowing the scope of potential cases, the Court could indicate little other 
than its requirement that such practices must stem from a form of religious belief. This kind 
o f approach effectively raised a number of semantic difficulties associated with the 
significance of "religion" (chapter 3). Justice Douglas charged in his dissent that; although 
the Court had rightly rejected the distinction between belief and action outlined in 
Revnolds. thereby expanding the range of free exercise protections; its own distinction 
between "religious" behavior and that motivated by a mere philosophy of life constituted a 
"retreat" from the broad-minded approach taken in the Seeger decision (see chapter 3). This 
distinction between "religious" behavior and non-religious behavior appeared rather 
arbitrary when dealing with nominally secular philosophies, as in Justice Douglas' dissent; 
but such a distinction had become critical to the balancing test inasmuch as it constituted a 
gatekeeper doctrine, a means of narrowing the scope of prim a fa c ie  claims associated with 
the Free Exercise clause.
Yoder thus established a precedent protecting the integrity of an entire community, 
but that precedent was itself predicated on the possibility of determining that an explicit 
religious value would be imperiled by any government action which threatened that 
community. Thus, it could be as a precedent for cases involving Indian communities, 
providing that they could establish differentiate between the religious values at stake in a 
given claim and those reflecting the economic and political interests of the tribe. The 
prospect of using the balancing test thus seemed plausible to many Indian "traditionalists," 
who saw themselves as the spiritual backbone of tribal communities. In claiming free 
exercise relief, however, Indian litigants acted as United States citizens rather than as 
members o f a semi-sovereign nation. Thus, in many respects the balancing test invited 
judges to isolate the interests advanced by Indian litigants and distinguish them from both 
the interests of the government itself and the communities from which they came. 
Reference to the balancing test thus enabled practitioners of traditional Indian ceremonies to
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represent their interests as plausible cases involving a right of free exercise, but the inability 
to distinguish Indian cases from other free exercise cases ultimately prevented Indian 
claimants from making full use of their trust relationship to the federal government.
As a document applying Euro-American notions of religious freedom to the context 
of Indian-white relations, the AIRFA was influenced by the case law involving both trust 
doctrine and the Free Exercise clause. Each of these two bodies of case law could be used 
to generate plausible scenarios for conflict between Native Americans and federal agencies. 
AIRFA proponents were clearly informed both by the notion that indirect burdens on a 
right of free exercise should be balanced against government interests and the notion that 
the federal government was itself responsible for protecting the cultural integrity of Native 
American tribes. In one respect these notions appeared to complement one another; they 
both led to an expansive notion of Indian religious freedoms. In another respect they were 
inconsistent with one another; each presupposed a different model of the relationship 
between an Indian claimant and a federal agency. Hence, the text of the AIRFA was 
informed by two very different contextualization schemata; two very different notions of 
the dialogue taking place between Indians and federal agencies in American history. What 
remains to be seen is the process by which these contextual models became fused in a 
common rhetoric of religious freedom.
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Chapter II:
Taos Blue Lake and the Rhetorical Foundations of the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act.
The Sun Dance and all other similar dances and so-called religious ceremonies are 
considered 'Indian Offenses' under existing regulations, and corrective penalties are 
provided. I regard such restriction as applicable to any dance which involves . . .  the 
reckless giving away of property . . .  frequent or prolonged periods of celebration . . .  in 
fact any disorderly or plainly excessive performance that promotes cruelty, licentiousness, 
idleness, danger to health, and shiftless indifference to family w e l f a r e . '5 4
-Circular released by the Office of Indian Affairs on April 26,1921.
Since 1906, the Taos Pueblo Indians have hoped that the Blue Lake area would be 
returned to them so that they could enjoy their freedom of unrestricted worship in the 
traditional manner. This bill would assure them their hopes. It would also protect the 
cultural survival of the Taos Pueblo I n d i a n s . '55
-Statement of the Under Secretary of the Interior delivered May 13,1969.
Each of these texts represents the disposition of a federal bureaucracy towards 
behavior tentatively identified as part of an American Indian religion. But whereas the 
Indian Affairs circular of 1921 articulates a general strategy for prevention of that behavior, 
the Interior department's statement of 1969 supports a specific measure for the protection 
of at least one Native American religion, that of the Taos Indians. The two statements differ 
as much in tone o f presentation as they do in their intended consequences. The author of 
the first passage could hardly admit to the religious nature of Indian ceremonies long 
enough to indicate that something should be done to stop them. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the second passage in which the author affirmed the religious character of the 
subject and evoked the principles of a civil liberties tradition in a single phrase. The latter
'54circular No. 1665 (April 26,1921) Quoted in Federal Agencies Task Force, American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Report. P.L. 95-341. Washington, D.C. (August, 1979) 6-7.
'55u.S. Congress^ Senate, Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Taos Indians - Blue Lake 
Amendments. Ninety-First Congress, Second Session, on S. 750 and H R, 471, (July 9 and 10, 1970) 13.
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statement more than departs from the previous ethos of overt religious oppression, it 
articulates a deliberate political interest in the safeguarding o f Taos religion. Hence, the 
statement of 1969 anticipates later attempts to apply the concept of religious freedom to a 
broad range of Native American interests under the AIRFA.
The return of Blue Lake to the Taos Indians of New Mexico was accomplished in 
1970 largely on the basis o f arguments stressing its religious significance. Such an event 
could hardly be conceived in an earlier era when the Office o f Indian Affairs was busy 
putting Indians in jail on the suspicion that they may be practicing just such a tribal religion. 
So long as the prevailing interpretation of trust doctrine remained that o f immanent 
assimilation the prospects of Native American appeal to religious freedom were quite dim. 
The ideological position presupposed by assimilationist policies placed Native American 
culture, if not Native Americans themselves, outside of an "American" community vested 
with a right of free exercise. As extra-Constitutional entities Native American tribes were 
not subject to the Constitutional protections, and so the Free Exercise clause did not seem 
to preclude the government from prosecuting tribal authorities for practicing traditional
Indian ceremonies.'56
The significance of Indian rituals during the assimilation era could be dictated by the 
ostensibly secular goals o f BIA policy. Under these conditions Native American 
ceremonies constituted an obstacle to federal policy, and their nominal inclusion within the 
category of "religion" implied a contrast with prototypically Euro-American forms of 
religion. The Indian Affairs Circular of 1921, for example, hedges about the matter; 
implying that Indian ceremonial practices might be considered religions without actually 
granting that they are such. Such statements treating Indian ceremonies as degraded or 
marginal forms o f religion would later provide a ready gloss for those practices when 
Indians came to assert a positive interest in defending their ceremonial systems. These
156£)eioria, "The Distincrive Status of Indian Rights," 241-45.
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pejorative references to Indian established a crucial historical precedent for identifying 
certain aspects of Native American cultures as matters of "religion." This in turn made it 
possible for Indian tribes to present their ceremonial practices in terms familiar to the 
American public, and it eventually enabled ceremonial practitioners to lay claim to the 
Constitutional protection normally afforded religious institutions.
As the prevailing sense o f trust doctrine evolved into a permanent relationship 
between the federal government and Native Americans, the notion that Indian ceremonies 
constituted a form of religion would lead to substantive claims on the abstract principle of 
free exercise. So long as Native Americans were "Americans" they could not be denied the 
right of free exercise, but the distinct nature of tribal religions along with the distinct legal 
status of tribal governments combined to provide an unusual social context for appeal to 
free exercise. The religious practices of Native Americans were already profoundly affected 
by interaction with the federal government, a fact which initially laid responsibility for the 
free exercise of Indian religions at the feet of the executive and legislative branches of 
government rather than the courts. This ensured that Native American appeals to religious 
freedom would find a different footing within the institutional structure of American law. 
Hence, Native American appeal to religious freedom developed out of an unusual sense of 
both its denotational and interactional implications.
Blue Lake established a precedent for successful appeal to Euro-American notions 
of religious freedom in defense of tribal interests. The Taos Pueblo drew loosely from the 
language of the First Amendment in pursuing this campaign, and hence the tribe did not 
have to address the technical facets of free exercise doctrine in a courtroom. Yet, the return 
of Blue Lake provided a historical precedent which established at least an abstract sense that 
principles of religious freedom could be applied to tribal interests. In presenting its interest 
in Blue Lake as a matter of religious freedom Taos Pueblo employed the notion of religious 
freedom in novel ways, thus presenting an argument that stretched the usual sense of what 
the phrase "religious freedom" could denote in American politics. Moreover, the Taos
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Indians obtained resolution of its case from Congress rather than a court, and Congress 
placed Blue Lake under trust title, thus framing the legal significance of Blue Lake in terms 
of the trust relationship. This unusual case therefore provided an important bridge between 
an era in which Indian tribes were beyond the scope of the First Amendment and an era in 
which the First Amendment would provide the basis for an expansive set o f Indian claims.
Assimilationist Policies and the Suppression of Taos Religion.
The Taos campaign to recover Blue Lake established much of the groundwork for 
later Native American approaches to free exercise, but the Taos Indians were also familiar 
with the kind of legal sanctions once used to suppress Indian religion. BIA policies 
amounting to overt suppression o f Native American religion were in effect from the 
eighteen-eighties to the nineteen-thirties, ending only with John Collier's administration of 
Indian A ffairs.'57 The circular of 1921 merely reiterated a long-standing policy, but it 
came at a time which was particularly stressful to the Indians of Taos Pueblo.'58 In the 
early nineteen-twenties Charles Burke, the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs personally 
confronted the Taos Indians over their ceremonies. In 1924 he travelled to the Pueblo itself 
and denounced their ceremonial practices to the Pueblo elders, commanded them to give up 
their religion, and eventually had members of the tribal council arrested and jailed in a 
conflict over the education of Taos youth.'59 Hence, the 1921 statement from the Office of
*57see Sharon O'Brien, "A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," Handbook of 
American Indian Religious Freedom. 28.
•58r .c . Gordon-McCutchan, The Taos Indians and the Battle for Blue Lake, (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Red 
Crane Books, 1991) 16. The following presentation of background material surrounding the events 
surrounding the Blue Lake controversy will closely follow Gordon-McCutchan's historical account.
'59cu i de Angulo, Jaime in Taos: The Papers of Jaime de Angulo. (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 
1985) 57-62; Gordon-McCutchan, 16-17; John T. Whatley, "The Saga o f Taos Pueblo: The Blue Lake 
Controversy," The Indian Historian. 2 (Fall, 1969) 23; Nancy Wood, Taos Pueblo. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1989) 69.
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Indian Affairs articulated principles of institutional violence associated with earlier phases 
of trust doctrine and with events central to the history of Taos Pueblo.
The imprisonment of Taoseno elders provides a telling example of the state of 
Indian-white relations in the nineteen-twenties, and it illustrates the particular role that 
religion played in conflicts between Indians and federal policies during that era. A great 
deal of this conflict appears to have centered around the prospect of education. The 
boarding schools of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA) had been viewed as instruments 
of assimilation from the moment of their inception; they were as important for preventing 
the transmission of traditional Indian views to children as for any positive instruction that 
might take place within them. *̂ 0 The BIA quite deliberately separated Indian children from 
their homes, their families, and the prospect of using their own languages. In keeping with 
this policy, the BIA took children from the Taos Pueblo to be educated all across the 
country.'6 ' This practice placed particular strain on the maintenance of the kiva societies at 
Taos, because these secret societies had traditionally required up to eighteen months for the 
training of young male i n i t i a t e s . ' 6 2  Members of the Pueblo resisted BIA policies by 
removing Taos youth from schools for the length of time necessary to complete kiva 
training. This in turn led to government officials to imprison the Pueblo town council.
That religion is somehow at stake in this issue can readily be gathered from 
statements about the religious significance of education made by both BIA officials and
•60Deloria and Lytle, 241. 
' 6 'Wood, 70-71.
'62john J. Bodine writes that the initiation period for these males at Taos typically took 6, 12, or 18 
months to complete, depending on the kiva for which they were undergoing training. The significance of 
Blue Lake can already be dimly seen already in this conflict. For the completion of any of these cycles was 
always timed to coincide with an annual migration to Blue Lake. See "Taos Pueblo," Handbook of North 
American Indians, gen. ed., William Sturtevant, Volume 9, ed., Alfonso Ortiz, (Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1979) 262. Elizabeth Brandt provides an alternative perspective on the difference in time spent 
during initiation. She writes that kiva leaders are normally drawn from the ranks of long term initiates, 
those taking a full eighteen months to complete the process of initiation, "On Secrecy and the Control of 
Knowledge: Taos Pueblo," Secrecv: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed., Stanton K. Teft, (New York and 
London: Human Sciences Press, 1980) 123-46 passi/n.
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Native Americans. Along with the communal status o f  Indian land holdings, the BIA 
identified any Native American practices it considered to have religious significance 
impediments to "progress" in the years leading up to the Dawes A c t . '63 This led the BIA 
to target ostensibly religious practices for repressive sanctions, and the provisions of this 
policy were strongly influenced by that same agency's plans for the education of Indian 
youth. Indian Courts had been charged with the punishment of religious offenses since the 
eighteen-eighties, and education clearly played a key role in in defining the provisions of 
these Religious Crimes Codes (RCC). Indians were not only jailed for dances, but for 
interference with the education of Indian youth. Sections 'a' and 'c' o f the codes provide a 
number of clues as to the rationale behind imprisonment Indian offenders:
(a) Dances, etc. -Any Indian who shall engage in the Sun Dance, scalp dance, or war 
dance, or any similar feast, so called shall be deemed guilty o f an offense, and upon 
conviction thereof shall be punished for the first offense by withholding of his rations for 
not exceeding ten days or by imprisonment for not exceeding ten days; and for any 
subsequent offense under this clause he shall be punished by withholding his rations for 
not less than ten nor more than thirty days, or by imprisonment for not less than ten nor 
more than thirty days.
"c) Practices of medicine men. -Any Indian who shall engage in the practices of so-called 
medicine men, or who shall resort to any artifice or device to keep the Indians of the 
reservation from adopting and following civilized habits and pursuits or shall adopt any 
means to prevent the attendance of children at school, or shall use any arts of a conjurer to 
prevent Indians from abandoning their barbarous rites and customs, shall be deemed to be 
guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, for the first offense shall be imprisoned 
for not less than ten nor more than thirty days: P ro v id e d ,  that for any subsequent 
conviction for such offense the maximum term of imprisonment shall not exceed six
m onths.'64
Again one should note that the author of this code could hardly admit to the religious nature 
of the behavior that he had targeted for criminal sanctions. And yet there can be little doubt 
that he had assigned a religious significance to that behavior, a significance underscored in 
the circular of 1921. Here BIA policy cast the significance o f Indian ceremonies and 
spiritual leadership in terms o f a long standing master-narrative about the relationship
'63American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report of 1979,5-6.
'64u.S. Department of the Interior, Report o f the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. (August 27, 1892) 29.
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between civilization and so called primitive superstition.'65 The assumption o f cultural 
superiority implicit within this theme placed any relevant native practices within the 
semantic domain o f "religion," but only by negative juxtaposition with valued religious 
traditions.'66 The language used in these codes therefore provided Native American 
religions with a role comparable to that used by the Marshall court in defining the status of 
Indian tribes, effectively putting into practice an assimilationist theory o f trust doctrine. 
Hence, Indian religion would be understood in the familiar terms of a historical contrast 
between primitive culture and Euro-American civilization, effectively placing Indian 
ceremonies on par with other areas of Indian culture targeted for change. The religious 
significance of Indian dances as well as the practices of medicine men therefore emerged 
out of the indexical patterns of Indian-white relations. Whatever the term "religion" could 
be meaningfully said to denote in reference to Native American culture, the use o f the term
'65james Ax tell writes that early French missionaries did not at first believe Native Americans possessed 
religion, and tended to regard them as superstitious heathens. The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures 
in Colonial North America. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 7-19. See also Francis 
Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians. Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. (1975. New York and 
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976) 43-57. This view of Native Americans was complemented by 
colonial attitudes toward Africans, who formed the prototypical "heathen" for British sensibilities. See 
Winthrop D. Jordan, The White Man's Burden: Historical Origins of Racism in the United States. (London, 
Oxford, and New England: Oxford University Press, 1974) 10-13. The presumption of religious superiority 
towards "primitives " in general combined with visions of secular development under the ideology of 
American imperialism, creating a sense that a growing U.S. could serve as the salvation for Native 
Americans. See William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Wav of Life: An Essav on the Causes and 
Character of America's Present Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative. (1980. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 27-30. About the turn of the century, these presumptions of 
superiority combined with a sympathy for the condition of reservation Indians to create a renewed push for 
assimilation. See, Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians. 1880- 
1920. (1984. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 15. By defining aid to Native American 
communities in terms of a progress in which Indian ceremonial practices were built by definition into the 
bottom end of the scale, policy makers could interpret direct attacks on select aspects of Native life as 
genuinely beneficial reforms.
166use of terms such as "superstition " or "heathen" serve to remove the beliefs and practices to which they 
are applied from the realm of plausible belief systems. In the words of Thomas Hobbes; "Fear of power 
invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed. Religion; not allowed. 
Superstition. And where the power imagined is truelly such as we imagine. True religion. " Leviathan. 124. 
It is this same line of reasoning that leads Axtell to note that the term "superstition" normally serves to 
denigrate someone else's beliefs, 13.
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effectively conveyed a something about the interactional significance of native ceremonies 
as an obstacle to the program of assimilation.
For the BIA religion was only indirectly at issue, as a point of theoretical contrast to 
native practices which were in direct competition with its own policies. Section 'c' of the 
code articulated a policy against "so-called medicine men" and added to this section a list of 
activities which would interfere with the education planned for Indian children and for the 
tribes as a whole. It might perhaps have been more appropriate to speak o f genuine 
"medicine men" and a "so-called school," but in any event it is clear that that the Office of 
Indian Affairs held these practices to be incompatible. Moreover, the high strategic value of 
education is reflected in the comparatively stiff penalty provided for second offenders in 
section 'c'. The BIA's education policy was an important plank in the plan for eradication 
of Indian cultures, and the agency viewed continuation of traditional Indian ceremonies and 
healing practices as obstacles to that end. Hence, BIA's education policy required the 
forced suppression o f Indian "superstitions," resulting in this case in the forcible 
confinement of the Taoseno council members.'67
Over the centuries since the Spanish first came into the Southwest the Taoseno have 
understandably developed a reluctance to communicate information about their religion to
*67The imprisonment of Indians for religious offences involves a kind of performance trope. Commentators 
have generally embedded the imprisonment of the Taos elders in a narrative relating to early BIA policies of 
assimilation. This creates the impression that imprisonment of the Taos elders constituted an instrumental 
activity designed to aid an established authority in efforts to achieve an end value distinct from the 
significance o f  the imprisonment itself. Such accounts thus convey the explicit policy stance of the bureau 
itself in explaining its reasons for imprisoning the Taos elders. Yet, the ability to forcibly imprison any 
practitioners o f traditional Indian ceremonies, ostensibly posed as an instrumental practice, could actually be 
seen as the real end value behind the action. In this respect the imprisonment of Taos elders could be seen as 
a performative demonstration of the cultural superiority assumed in assimilationists policies. In proving the 
capacity for domination of Indian religious authorities, such institutional violence demonstrated, as a 
practical fact, a form of superiority presumed in an assimilationist perspective. Hence, use of force in the 
implementation of BIA policy demonstrated the sense of authority presupposed in forming the policy itself. 
The confinement of Taos authority figures therefore provided a kind of "transcript," to borrow the language 
of Alan feldman, demonstrating Commissioner Burke's sense of the relationship between his agency and 
American Indians. Hence, the denotational texts describing BIA policy at the time may have assigned the 
decision to imprison native practitioners an instrumental value as a means of furthering other goals, but the 
actual implementation of the Religious Crimes Codes would have a more immediate interactional 
significance insofar as the practice itself served to affirm the ideological position defining BIA authority 
over Indians in the first place. C.f. Allen Feldman in Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body 
and Political Terror in Northem Ireland. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 1-9.
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outsiders.'68 This secrecy about sacred matters has therefore had a certain strategic value, 
one which did not emerge with the Office of Indian Affairs. At the time that Elsie Clews 
Parsons studied the Taos Indians the sense of fear associated with information about sacred 
matters had become so pervasive that potential informants feared that death by supernatural 
causes would follow disclosure of secrets.'69 Moreover, Taoseno members found telling 
such secrets faced a more tangible corporal punishment in the form of a whipping and a 
f in e .'70 When a Taos man who had been working on a history of the Pueblo died.
168Naturally, Taos problems with outside Interference In their religion did not begin with the BIA, and the 
behavior of Spanish missionaries must also have added to Taos concerns over the need for secrecy. In the 
eyes of many scholars this long history of abuse explains the secretive nature common to Pueblo 
ceremonial systems. See Gordon-McCutchan, 6; Edward P. Dozier, The Pueblo Indians of North America. 
(1970. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1983) 97; Edward H. Spicer, Cvcles of Conquest: 
The Impact of Spain. Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest. 1533-1960. (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1962) 185-86; John J. Bodine, "Blue Lake: A Struggle for Indian Rights," 
American Indian Law Review. 1 (1973) 25. As It stands now the need for secrecy must be considered a 
major feature of the Taos religion Itself, rather than a function of continued friction with outsiders. The 
degree to which this aspect of Taos culture may be due to past abuses remains an open question, one that 
that Involves far more titan just the specific case of the Taos Indians. See, for instance, Howard Stambor's 
plea for a general study of the Impact of religious oppression on current Indian practices "Manifest Destiny 
and American Indian religious Freedom: Sequohvah. Badonl. and the Drowned Gods," American Indian Law 
Review. 10(1982) 60-62.
Elizabeth A. Brandt offers another Interpretation of Taos approaches to secrecy, stressing the 
function of Internal constraints over control of knowledge rather than concern over the actions of outsiders. 
She argues that the primary reason for limiting the flow of Information to outsiders Is that this flow of 
such Information to outsiders constitutes a loss of control over ceremonial knowledge, leading to the 
prospect that such Information will come back to unauthorized members of the Pueblo and disrupt the 
appropriate patterns o f ritual authority, "On Secrecy and the Control of Knowledge" 123-146 passim.
Of course. It Is possible to stress both aspects of secrecy at Taos. C.f. Carol Chlago Lujan, "A 
Sociological View o f Tourism In an American Indian Community: Maintaining the Cultural Integrity of 
Taos Pueblo," American Indian Culture and Resource Journal. 17 (1993) 104. Concern over actual 
oppression by outsiders coincides with the need to control the availability of ceremonial knowledge within 
the Pueblo Itself. Hence, approaches stressing conflict with outsiders and those stressing control over the 
Internal distribution of ceremonial knowledge are consistent with one another In many respects. Both 
concerns may serve as adequate motivation for the same behavior, and the distinction between them may or 
may not arise depending on the salience of cultural boundaries to any particular situation. In fact, any 
problems related to the need to distinguish one or another form of motivation should Indicate the tenuous 
nature of cultural boundaries, or rather; the contextual status of tropes wherein cultures are Imagined to have 
boundaries.
*69Elsle Clews Parsons, Taos Pueblo. General Series In Anthropology, Number 2. (ed.), Leslie Spier 
(Menasha, Wisconsin: George Ban ta Publishing Company, 1936) 15.
'70parsons, 14. This Is also supported by Merton Leland Miller, A Preliminary Studv of the Pueblo of 
Taos New Mexico. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1898) 42.
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members of the tribe are reported to have burned the text.'7 ' The publication o f Parson’s 
own book on Taos Pueblo caused considerable concern among the Taoseno, possibly 
leading to sanctions against a suspected i n f o r m a n t . '72 Hence, Taos authorities met the 
institutional force imposed by outsiders with institutional sanctions over its own people.
In contrast to the concealment of religious matters in specific areas o f Taos culture, 
another more general response to BIA policies involved a direct clash over the importance 
of religion to native culture. In the atmosphere of general repression prominent during the 
nineteen-twenties community leaders from the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico collaborated to 
produce the following statement:
Our religion to us is sacred and is more important to us than anything else in our life . . . .  
Our happiness, our moral behavior, our unity as a people and the peace and joyfiilness of 
our homes, are all part of our religion, and are dependent on its continuation. To pass this 
religion, with its hidden sacred knowledge and its many forms of prayer, on to our 
children, is our supreme duty to our ancestors and to our hearts and to the God whom we 
k n o w .'73
The passage is most significant in view of the fact that it meets the BIA's policy of religious 
intolerance in its own terms. The statement clearly affirms a stake in religion as such, and 
frankly commits to its continuation through the education of Indian children in traditional 
Pueblo ways. The release of this manifesto was a response to a policy which had already 
labeled and targeted various practices as having a religious significance, and so the 
statement's frankness did not necessarily entail a disruption of concealment strategies. In 
accepting the adequacy of the term "religion" as a description of their ceremonial practices, 
however, the statement bypassed a major source of contention. The word "religion" is itself 
quite heavily loaded in Euro-American traditions, and for the most part it is entirely absent
'7 'Parsons, 16.
'72srandt, 128n.
'73This passage comes from Joe S. Sando, The Pueblo Indians. (San Francisco: The Indian Historian 
Press, 1976) quoted in Gordon-McCutchan, 17. A complete version of the statement was made available in 
1992 in another publication by Joe S. Sando, Pueblo Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo Indian Historv. 
(Santa Fe, New Mexico, Clear Light Publishers, 1992) 92-96.
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in Native American l a n g u a g e s . '74 Such lexical asymmetry may not necessarily indicate a 
significant difference in social morphology, but the articulation o f any Indian political 
agenda in terms of "religion" places such questions momentarily out o f the picture.
Elsie Clews Parsons tells us that on being asked to identify Indian religion a Taos 
native responded by saying that it was "life."'75 Such cryptic statements only allude to the 
kind of problems entailed by the use of the term "religion" in the context o f Indian beliefs 
and social organization. Robert S. Michaelsen writes that "modem western" cultures tend 
to break up various segments of their social systems into isolated spheres o f activity, and 
yet this tendency is lacking in traditional Indian c u l t u r e s . '^6 Whereas religious activities 
are not part of an isolated sphere of traditional Indian culture, use of the word "religion" to 
describe an Indian practice implies a relatively exclusive category of activity. Moreover, 
legal and political norms for dealing with religion in America often rely heavily on the 
ability to distinguish religious activity from other areas of social life such as economics or 
politics. The Pueblo statement attempted to expand the scope of denotational reference 
comprehended by the term "religion" by explicitly relating it to all aspects of Pueblo life, 
thus finessing the awkwardness o f discourse about "Pueblo religions" as such. Having 
formed its response to BIA authority by first conceding to the basic vocabulary of Euro- 
American social organization, the Pueblo Indians could neither operate within the normal 
constraints of that category nor directly address its applicability to their own interests. 
Accordingly the Pueblo statement printed above includes an attempt to redefine religion as a 
category referring to all aspects of life.
'74 The observation of this fact is common-place in scholarship on Indian religion. On its relevance to the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, see Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
Litigation," 49.
'75Elsie Clews Parsons, Pueblo Indian Religion. Volume I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) 
preface.
'76Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Litigation," 49.
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"Religion" certainly represents a plausible gloss for a number of Indian practices, it 
may even be the most appropriate English term available for them; but the usage remains 
problematic. If indeed many Indian practices may be placed in the nominal category of 
"religion," one could not use the customary sense of the relationship between this term and 
other Western categories of social organization as an accurate guide in assessing Indian 
perspectives. Moreover, the commitment to defense of an Indian religion is itself a long 
way from acknowledging the specific significance that religion holds within a civil 
libertarian tradition. Native Americans appeals to a sense of religious freedom are therefore 
likely to denote an odd range of legal interests. The peculiar denotational scope o f Native 
American appeals to "religious freedom" is matched, however, by the peculiar context of 
Indian-white relations, particularly insofar as such claims may be affected by trust doctrine. 
Trust doctrine provided the basis or an immediate government interest in the spiritual 
welfare of Indians, leading initially to abusive policies such as the Religious Crimes Codes. 
When re-framed in terms of the values associated with religious freedom, trust doctrine 
would provide an unusually direct government interest in the welfare o f Taoseno religion. 
Whereas the rhetoric o f religious freedom normally relates to an exclusive set of activities 
and entails a limit to government interests, its use by Native Americans would apply to a 
broad range of activities and tie them to a positive government interest in the form of trust 
doctrine.
Taos officials and their legal representatives fashioned the details of this rhetoric 
through debates over the status of Blue Lake. Over the course of events surrounding Blue 
Lake various lawyers, Taos Indians, tribal members, elders, and other locals acted in ways 
which transformed the tacit logic of Indian-white relations, creating a climate of opinion 
under which Indian "religion" might be understood in a positive light. This rhetoric turned 
on a vocabulary which, like that used in the Religious Crimes Codes, failed to accurately 
represent the social organization o f the Pueblo itself. Complying with terms supplied 
largely by representatives of the federal government, the Taoseno would extend the
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denotational scope of the term "religion" to fit their own interest in Blue Lake, and in doing 
so lay the foundation for future government interest in Native American "Religion."
A Brief History of Blue Lake.
At its beginning the conflict over Blue Lake had little to do with the rhetoric of 
religion much less religious freedom. The issue began and remained in substance a dispute 
over environmental policy toward the lake and its watershed. Initial removal of Blue Lake 
from the tribe's control was not even the result of any special malice by federal officials. 
Whereas the Spanish and Mexican governments had de fa c to  recognized Taos ownership 
over any territories occupied and used exclusively by the Pueblo, the United States 
Government recognized the Taos claims to only about 17,000 acres of land formally 
acknowledged under the Spanish. Since Blue Lake lay outside of the Spanish land grant, 
the treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo left the tribe without legal title to an area which had 
traditionally been left to their c o n t r o l . '^7 So, at the turn of the century the legal status and 
future of Blue Lake lay in an ambiguous position. Continued Taos control over the lake 
became unlikely as Americans grew increasingly more active in the region. Increased non- 
Indian activity in the area of Blue Lake furthermore disturbed the ceremonial practices of 
the Taoseno who had long regarded the lake to be sacred along with its w a t e r s h e d . '78 So, 
by the turn o f the century, events at Blue Lake had become a major source of concern to 
members of the Pueblo.
Members of the Pueblo had expressed their concerns to govemment officials during 
the Roosevelt administration, and federal authorities apparently subsumed these complaints 
under its own concerns over environmental conservation through the creation of forest 
reserves. A mutual concern over the destructive impact of future development provided a
'77gee Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 15 Indian Claims Commission, 666-82 
(September 8, 1965).
'78see Gordon-McCutchan, 9-10.
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reasonable link between the interests of conservationists and those of the Taos Indians. 
This led to the creation of the Taos Forest Reserve in 1906, which effectively negated any 
tribal claims to aboriginal title. W hile this move clearly subordinated the Taos interests in 
Blue Lake to the environmental policies o f the Forest Service it appears that the initial 
Taoseno outlook was positive. The Taos Indians did not not fully understand the legal 
implications o f Roosevelt's action, and they were given to believe the area would be 
managed under principles consistent with their own interests. Moreover, the Forest Service 
initially managed the region so as to protect the area's sanctity for the tribe's own 
p u r p o s e s . '79 So, the creation of the reserve compromised the abstract legal position of the 
Taos Pueblo even as the move offered a tangible source of protection for the lake and its 
watershed.
Whatever informal understandings guided the early policies at the forest reserve, it 
was not long before differences between the interests of the Forest Service and those o f the 
Taos Indians became evident. Under the Forest Service a multiple use policy served as the 
guiding principle o f management, and this entailed both recreational use and careful 
harvesting of the area's natural resources.'80 Whereas the Taos Indians considered any 
commercial use of the sacred Lake and its watershed completely unacceptable, the principle 
ecological concerns of the Forest Service lay in the need to preserve the area's natural 
resources for the purpose of sustained use by a diverse number o f outside interests.'8 ' Far 
from synonymous, it was soon evident that the ecological perspectives of the Forest 
Service and the Taos Indians were diametrically opposed.
Under the sustained yield policies of the Forest service the significance of Blue 
Lake was largely a question of potential development. By structuring an ecological policy
*79Gordon-McCutchan, 10-14. 
' 8®Gordon-McCutchan, 12.
'  8 ' Gordon-McCutchan, 7-9.
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around a concept of natural resources the conservation practices o f the Progressive era 
defined environmental problems in terms of market c o n d i t i o n s . '8 2  The Forest Service 
accordingly brought a centralized planning system which was intended to preserve natural 
resources for future economic u s e . '8 3  Moreover, Forestry policy was often open to 
influence from a range o f commercial interests, and at times this could produce the very 
resource depletion that such policies were designed to p r e v e n t . ' 8 4  The assumption of 
federal control over Blue Lake thus entailed an opportunity for outsiders to begin modest 
commercial exploitation of the area around the lake. In sum, the Forest Service deliberately 
produced changes in the lake environment whereas the Taos Indians had preferred at least 
to prevent artificial changes from taking place.
Contemporary environmentalists as well as Indian activists are quick to call 
attention to the problems associated with progressive era conservationism. Today many 
would characterize conservationist policies as movements toward efficiency, thus 
highlighting the fact that such policies have been largely concerned with the means to better 
use o f resources rather than with preserving an intrinsic environmental v a l u e . ' 8 5  
Environmentalists often employ a distinction between ends and means to distinguish 
themselves from conservationists. Environmentalists (including many Indians for whom 
adherence to an environmental ethic constitutes source of ethnic identity) hold that nature 
has an intrinsic value. Both environmentalists and Indian activists are therefore quick to
'82Arthur F. McEvoy, "Toward an Interactive Theory of Nature and Culture: Ecology, Production and 
Cognition in the California Fishing Industry," The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modem 
Environmental Historv. ed., Donald Worster, (1988. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 219- 
224.
'  830ordon-McCutchan, 6-9; McEvoy, 219-224.
'  840ordon-McCutchan cites at least one incident in which the transfer of land near Blue Lake to the Forest 
Service led prepared the way for a clear-cut. Throughout later debate over the status of the lake the 
possibility of foresting the region remained a serious incentive to the department of Agriculture's position 
that Blue Lake should not go to the Pueblo. 36 and passim.
'85ciayton R. Koppes, "Efficiency, Equity, Esthetics: Shifting Themes in American Conservation," in 
Worster, 232-233.
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condemn any approach to the natural environment that reduces it to "instrumental" 
v a l u e s . '86 Hence, the tensions that emerged between the Taos Indians and the Forest 
Service over management o f Blue Lake foreshadowed many of the larger divisions 
reflected in contemporary debate over environmental ethics.
Distinctions between instrumental and end values generally reflect a kind of 
hindsight, reflecting on practices wherein the initial relationship between means and ends 
seemed u n c l e a r . '87 A sense of history is therefore crucial to the abstract ideological 
position distinguishing utilitarian from end-values. Such a process is particularly evident in 
the history of Blue Lake wherein the initial innovations for dealing with the lake acquired 
implications which increasingly drove a wedge between the interests of the tribe and those 
of Forest Service. The eventual position taken by the Pueblo, that their own interests were 
inconsistent with the management principles guiding the Forest Service, would rest on a 
record o f missed opportunities for agreement between the two parties. It is the actual 
experience of working with the Forest Service which drove the Taoseno to articulate a 
staunch position about the intrinsic value of the lake. The history of controversy over Blue 
Lake has in turn provided an exemplary illustration of the values associated with 
contemporary Indian environmentalism.
In contrast to the Forest Service's visions of development, the Taos Indians were 
opposed to any alteration of the sacred landscape. For the Taoseno the problem at Blue 
Lake was never a question of efficiency. The lake was crucial to Taos cosmology, and 
tribal members made an annual pilgrimage to its banks. This pilgrimage was always made 
in closely guarded secrecy, making it difficult to find ethnographic material describing the
*86cf. Russell Means, "Same Old Song," 19-33 passim; Lynn White Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our 
Ecological Crisis," Science. 155 (March 10,1967) 1203-1207 passim; Donald Worster, "Hoover Dam: A 
Study in Domination," Under Western Skies: Nature and Historv in the American West. (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)71; Charles L. Woodard, Ancestral Voice: Conversations with N. 
Scott Momadav. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) 69-71.
'87chaim  Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John 
Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver, (1969. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971) 275.
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importance of the event. John J. Bodine, an anthropologist who had completed a doctoral 
dissertation of Taos Pueblo, has provided the best explanation for the importance of the 
lake in Taos life. He summarized the Taos interests in Blue Lake in terms of four points; 
The Taos people needed to "control of the entire region" around the lake; the complete 
ecological balance of the area had to remain undisturbed in order to protect plants used in 
ritual; they had to prevent non-Indian presence at secret rituals (because non-Indians would 
act as sources of contamination and diminish the spiritual power of the ceremonies); and the 
tribe needed to protect its religion as an integral part of the Pueblo's c u l t u r e .  *88 These 
general remarks indicate the degree of stress caused by outside presence at Blue Lake, and 
even by the proceedings necessary to impress Taos needs on public officials. Hence, the 
tribe held a vital interest in the lake and its surrounding region, one which could not be 
fully communicated. So long as Blue Lake remained in the control o f the Forest Service 
this vital interest in Blue Lake was protected only by an informal understanding of the sort 
quickly lost in a Bureaucracy such as the Forest service.
In 1910 the assistant commissioner of Indian Affairs, F. H. Abbott, proposed the 
creation of an executive order reservation at Blue Lake using 3,200 acres of public land and 
41,440 acres of national forest. This plan was stifled by the Forest Service, and a second 
attempt was likewise rejected by officials in Indian Affairs anticipating the objections of the 
Forest Reserve. In 1916 Eliot Barker assumed control of the Carson National Forest and 
pursued a vigorous multiple use policy at Blue Lake. He cut trails into the area, stocked 
Blue Lake with fish for recreational harvesting, and forced the Taoseno to allow cattle 
grazing on one side of the lake; thus ending exclusive use of the watershed by the Taos 
I n d i a n s .  *89 Such actions naturally fueled tribal interest in changing the legal status of the 
lake, even as their initial efforts to accomplished this met with failure.
'88Bodine, (1973) 30.
*89see Gordon-McCutchan, 15-16.
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Another threat to the Taoseno came in the wake of United States v. Sandoval, rising 
out o f subsequent attempts to legitimize squatters' claims to Pueblo lands via the Bursum 
Bill.*90 'When the United States assumed control over New Mexico many local residents 
argued that the Pueblo Indians had effectively become United States citizens, (though the 
states of both New Mexico and Arizona continued to deny Pueblo voting rights well into 
the nineteen-forties). *91 For a time this placed the Pueblo Indians in an awkward situation; 
they possessed neither the complete rights of state citizenship, nor the corporate rights 
afforded Indian tribes under federal trust status. *92 In the 1913 case of the United States v. 
Sandoval the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that Pueblo territories did in fact constitute 
Indian lands governed by principals of trust status. *93 This decision provided Pueblo 
lands with much the same protections that had obtained in the original Cherokee land cases, 
effectively preventing the transfer o f individual title to non-Indians. Absent a clear legal 
precedent affirming the trust status of a pueblo tribe, non-Indian residents on Pueblo lands 
could plausibly claim to have secured title to the land on which they lived. The Sandoval 
decision, however, effectively denied many non-Indians legal title to their homes, many of 
which had been occupied by the same families for generations. Local efforts to remedy this 
situation by securing title for the squatters living on Pueblo lands through federal legislation
*99Gordon-McCutchan, 17.
*9*See Willard H. Rollings, "Indian Land and Water: The Pueblos of New Mexico (1848-1924)," American 
Indian Culture and Resource Journal. 6 (1982) 4-5; Daniel McCool, "Indian Voting," American Indian 
Policy in the Twentieth-Centurv. ed.. Vine Deloria Jr. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985) 106- 
16 passim.
*92Rollings, 4-5.
*93The case involved a challenge to Congressional legislation prohibiting sale of liquor on an Indian 
reservation, which the State of New Mexico argued constituted an infringement upon its own police 
powers. Writing for the Court, Justice Van Devanter declared that "The question to be considered, then, is 
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands is such that Congress competently can prohibit the 
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to 
statehood." In answering this question in the affirmative the Court also provided an implicit answer to the 
claims of squatters living on Pueblo lands. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28-49 (1913).
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would in turn threaten the territorial integrity of Pueblo tribes all across New Mexico and 
Arizona.
Taos Pueblo stood to loose a considerable amount o f its lands in the conflict over 
squatters rights. Its leadership had at one time allowed a substantial number of non-Indians 
to live in the area to help defend against raids by other tribes.*94 Estimates as o f 1898 
suggested that the Taos Indians occupied only about half of their actual land grant, placing 
the other half in the hands of Anglo and Mexican squatters. *95 Following the Sandoval 
decision Senator Holm O. Bursum drafted a bill that would have enabled squatters to 
establish title to any lands on which they could prove occupancy since June 10, 1910. *96 
The Senate passed the Bursum bill without a vote, but it was recalled from consideration in 
the House at the request Senator William Borah.*97 The Bursum Bill eventually died in 
subsequent committee hearings, and in 1924 it was replaced by the Pueblo Lands Board. 
The Pueblo Lands Board was authorized to determine whether or not various non-Indians 
had maintained continuous occupancy on Pueblo lands since 1902, and to compensate any 
parties for lands lost over the conflicting claims.*98 in theory the Pueblo Lands Board 
provided a reasonable means of accommodating non-Indians residing in Pueblo territory 
without presenting a direct threat to the integrity of Pueblo lands. In practice the Pueblo 
Lands Board often cheated Pueblos out of valuable resources, and this was particularly true 
of its dealing with Taos.
When the Bursum Bill gave way to the Pueblo Land Act the Taos Pueblo offered to 
concede the claims made by squatters on their land if the Pueblo Lands Board would
*94Miller, 16.
1 9 5 M ille r ,  16.
*96see U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 6 2  (September 11 , 1 9 2 2 ) 1 2 3 2 3 -2 5 .  
*97see U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 6 4  (December 2 1 ,  1 9 2 2 )  8 0 6 -9 .
*98pueblo Lands Act. Statutes at Large. 4 3  ( 1 9 2 4 ) .
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recommend a transfer of Blue Lake from the Forest Service to the Interior Department as an 
executive order reservation. Thus, the Taos Indians proved flexible and persistent in their 
attempts to secure Blue Lake. Ironically, the chairman of the Lands Board saw the Taos 
offer as an opportunity to prevent the annual religious ceremonies at Blue Lake, because the 
transfer of jurisdictions would enable the Interior Department to exercise direct control over 
activities conducted at the s i t e . *99 By this time the ceremonies at Blue Lake had become the 
subject of numerous rumors, creating an atmosphere of general suspicion among outsiders. 
Left to their imagination by the secrecy of the annual ritual taking place at Blue Lake, the 
non-Indian public had dreamed up stories about everything from a history of human 
sacrifice to the practice of communal orgies.200 Public opinion at the time generally 
favored the suppression o f Taos religion. The federal bureaucrats, however, were 
apparently less flexible in their approach to the issue than the Taoseno as the Lands Board 
made no such recommendation; though they did accept the tribe's concessions regarding 
local claims on their land without disclosing the reason for it to the public at large.20* 
W hen the tribe appealed directly to Commissioner Burke for title to the area, the 
Department o f Agriculture, objected out of concerns over the value o f its t i m b e r .202 Thus 
Taos Pueblo forfeited substantial legal claims in an unsuccessful effort to barter land claims 
for control of Blue Lake.
In 1927 Taos lawyers worked out a cooperative agreement for use of Blue Lake 
with the Forest Service. This agreement left control of Blue Lake in the hands of the Forest
*99See Gordon-McCutchan, 18.
200GQj.don-McCutchan, 18; Wood, 72-73; Parsons, 99. Amid all of the controversy over the nature of the 
ceremonies conducted at Blue Lake, John Collier and James W. Young were invited to witness the 
ceremonies at Blue Lake, but they were prevented from completing the entire pilgrimage. Collier's 
experience is related in his book. On the Gleeminp Wav: Navajos. Eastern Pueblos. Zunis. Hopis. 
Apaches, and Their Land: and Their Meanings to the World. (1949. Denver: Sage Books, 1961) 120-128.
201 See Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 15 Indian Claims Commission, 685 (September 
8, 1965).
202gee Gordon-McCutchan, 18-19.
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Service, but it also committed the Forest Service to policies consistent with the Taoseno 
sense of proper treatment of Blue Lake. For example, mining was prohibited by executive 
order for 30,000 acres of the Rio Pueblo Basin. The Pueblo had no mechanisms by which 
to enforce the terms of the agreement, however, and so it broke down over time as a result 
of infractions by the Forest Service. The agreement allowed the Forest Service to take 
measures normally associated with care of national forests, but they took additional steps 
which were insulting to the tribe. The Forest Service allowed numerous visitors to the area 
without informing the tribe, and they constructed a cabin within sight of the lake itself. 
Taos leadership thus began to look for more substantial means of protecting Blue Lake. 
Under the cooperative agreement protection o f this sacred site was contingent on 
bureaucratic policies easily changed through administrative discretion. A more secure 
source of political power would have to come from a source other than the specific policy 
provisions of the Forest S e r v i c e .2 0 3
The Taoseno soon received help from John Collier, the very Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs responsible for the Indian Reorganization Act. Collier had once lived in 
Taos, and he been active in the struggle to defeat the Bursum bill. Before his appointment 
as Commissioner of Indian Affairs Collier had formed the Indian Defense Association, an 
organization active in Senate investigations relating to the activities of the Pueblo Lands 
Board. These investigations revealed that the Board had regularly paid the Pueblos far less 
than the market value for lands lost to squatters.^O'^ In 1933 Congress approved funds 
compensating various Pueblos for the remaining value of lands lost under the provisions of 
the Pueblo Lands Act, and Taos pueblo secured a provision authorizing a fifty year permit
203See Gordon-McCutchan, 20-22.
-®^See Pueblo of Taos v. The United States o f America, 15 Indian Claims Commission, 666 (September 
8, 1965); Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 24 Indian Claims Commission, 406 (February 
10, 1971); Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 24 Indian Claims Commission, 414 (February 
10, 1971).
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for use o f the lake and its w a t e r s h e d . 2 0 5  The permit was finally established in 1 9 4 0 ,  
largely through the efforts of Collier himself, granting the Taoseno limited use of Blue 
Lake and much of its watershed. Relations between Taoseno and the Forest Service were 
heavily strained under this agreement, however, and Taos efforts to obtain portions of 
watershed not included in the permit were blocked consistently by the Department of 
Agriculture. Hence, Collier's solution to the Taoseno's problems at Blue Lake proved 
unsatisfactory; they lead only to further conflict with the Forest S e r v i c e . 2 0 6
In 1946 Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission Act, enabling Indian 
tribes to sue the federal government over a variety of issues including treaty v i o l a t i o n s . ^ ^ 7  
This act authorized only monetary compensation for successful lawsuits, but Taos Pueblo 
made novel use the Commission to secure moral backing for its claims on Blue Lake. The 
Pueblo council authorized its lawyers to take its case before the Indian Claims 
Commission. These lawyers gained a favorable ruling regarding the facts of their case from 
the Indian Claims Commission, but they did not seek to recover any monetary 
c o m p e n s a t i o n . 2 0 8  Instead Taos Pueblo used the findings of the Indian Claims Commission 
to build its political case for restoration of trust title over Blue Lake.209 This strategy 
would eventually prove successful, though it would require an extensive public relations 
campaign.
205see section four of the Statutes at Large. 48 (May 31, 1933) 109-10.
206see Gordon-McCutchan, 23-43.
20'2lndian Claims Commission Act. Statutes at Large. 60 (1946).
208xhe Commission determined that Taos Pueblo possessed aboriginal title to Blue Lake and the 
surrounding region when the United States assumed control over New Mexico under the treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, and that the tribe had retained exclusive use of the region until it was placed under the control of 
the Forest Service in 1906. See Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 15 Indian Claims 
Commission, 666 (September 8,1965); Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 22 Indian Claims 
Commission, 444 (February 18, 1970).
209see Gordon-McCutchan, 44-63.
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"Religion" and the Rhetorical Packaging of Taos Interests.
Blue Lake embodies a concrete value within the Taos universe, representing the 
source of life and the site o f emergence.210 Naturally, the Taoseno can relate Blue Lake to 
a body of abstract values defined in terms their own cosmology. In order to compel 
changes in federal policies affecting the lake and its watershed the Taos Indians had to 
resort to abstract sources of rhetorical value salient to other Americans. Such abstract 
values would have to denote ideas appealing to the American public and to some 
institutional base of authority within the framework of American politics. Taoseno attempts 
to articulate their interest in Blue Lake therefore required both a translation from concrete to 
abstract values and a problematic inference across culture schemes.^!! Likewise, changes 
in the official institutional structure surrounding control of Blue Lake would entail changes 
in the abstract values governing policies affecting the Lake.
The initial transfer of Blue Lake and its watershed to the National Forest Service 
effectively defined the region as a natural resource whose value could be defined by market 
conditions. Forest Service policy differed from normal market conditions, however, in its 
attempts to discount the present value o f Blue Lake for the use of future generations. 
Assumption of control over the lake had initially been attractive insofar as it served to 
centralize authority over and provide a shelter from exploitation by private interests. By 
placing the lake into a forest reserve the Roosevelt administration could therefore be seen as 
offering a shield against aspects of the market system. The policy did little to prevent the 
comodification of resources at Blue Lake, however, though it did provide a forum wherein 
the Taoseno could assert a collective interest in the region and negotiate that interest with 
government officials. When dialogue with the Forest service proved ineffective, the tribe 
attempted to find another means of negotiating the status of Blue lake with outsiders.
2tOparsons, I I ;  Miller, 42.
21  ̂On the distinction between abstract and concrete rhetorical values, see Perelman and Tyteca, 77-79.
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eventually settling on efforts to obtain trust title to the region. This would effectively give 
the tribe direct control over the Blue Lake and its resources, placing them in a position to 
define its significance in terms consistent with their own cosmology, and to dictate the 
values guiding any human interaction with the lake itself. Appeal to religious freedom 
would provide outsiders with a rough sense of the values defining Taos interest in Blue 
Lake and allow the tribe could interact with the lake and its its environment in terms of their 
own cosmology.
If appeal to "religious freedom" did not clarify the exact nature of Taoseno interest 
in Blue Lake, this abstract principle had the negative virtue of excluding many of the things 
to which the Taoseno were themselves opposed. Within the proper context, religious 
values would constitute a limit on market sensibilities for most Americans, and notions of 
religious freedom would be readily understood as a limit to government interest. Therefore, 
appeal to "religious freedom" could successfully imply the conditions o f sanctity and 
secrecy defining Taos interest in Blue Lake, even if the abstract values denoted by the 
phrase itself did not really match those normally used by Taoseno themselves. Moreover, 
the implications of appeal to "religious freedom" had the additional virtue of generating 
potential allies in the non-Indian public. Given the combination of spiritual concerns with a 
specific environmental feature, this strategy had a certain additional appeal to both religious 
and environmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s .2 1 2  So, an appeal to "religious freedom" could generate a 
plausible case for Taos interest in Blue Lake, and the language of this appeal placed the 
Taoseno in a position to gamer much needed support from outside g r o u p s . 2 i 3
2 '  ̂ Gordon-McCutchan, 137.
2^2sonie measure of the success of this campaign can be gathered from the appearance of favorable media 
coverage both before and after passage of the Blue Lake Amendment. See "Taos Pueblo Indians Seek Sacred 
Lake," Herald Examiner. (April 16,1966) B-2; Keith Green, "As History Sees It," Taos News, (April 19, 
1966); "The Indians Need Blue Lake," New York Times. (July 17, 1968); "Restore the Taos Lands," 
Washington Post. (July 30, 1968) A8; Warren Weaver, Jr. "Nixon to Sign Pueblo Bill," New York Times. 
(December 3, 1970); Jack Waugh, "Indians Smile at Last," Christian Science Monitor. (December 4, 1970) 
2; "New Era in Indian Affairs," Time. (December 14,1970) 49.
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The term "religion" remained an imperfect gloss for Taoseno interest in Blue Lake, 
however, and this generated a number of problems for the campaign to obtain trust title. 
Many conservationists, for example, were quite displeased with the notion that Congress 
might set aside a segment of public land for the specific use of an Indian tribe. 
Organizations such as the National Wildlife Organization, the New Mexico Wildlife & 
Conservation Association, Inc., and the Sportsmen's Legislative Action Committee of New 
Mexico opposed the move, arguing for a continuation of established conservation policies 
in conjunction with an exclusive use agreement between the Forest Service and the 
P u e b l o . 214 These organizations voiced a number of concerns, one being that wealthy 
members of the tribe really wanted to use the lake for commercial p u r p o s e s . 2 i 5  Congress 
eventually resolved the prospect that Taos leaders might use Blue Lake for commercial 
gains by arranging to have the lake and its watershed designated a wilderness region even 
as it was given over to the t r ib e .2 1 6  This provision effectively bound Taos interests in the 
Blue Lake and its watershed to behavior consistent with the rationale offered by the tribe in 
support of their case. Yet, many conservation organizations continued to oppose Taos 
efforts until the very end. As Stewart Udall would later comment; "To most 
conservationists, once land was designated as a national forest or a national park it became, 
for them, a different kind of sacred ground . . ."217
214Taos Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (1970) 198-34.
215Tao.s Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (19701 198-34. See also Gordon-McCutchan, 102-103.
21 ̂ Gordon-McCutchan, 155; The act itself reads in part, "The lands held in trust pursuant to this section 
shall be a part of the Pueblo de Taos Reservation, and shall be administered under the laws and regulations 
applicable to other trust Indian lands: Provided, that the Pueblo de Taos Indians shall use the lands for 
traditional purposes only, such as religious ceremonials, hunting and fishing, a source of water, forage for 
their domestic livestock, and wood, timber, and other natural resources for their personal use, all subject to 
such regulations for conservation purposes as the secretary of the Interior may prescribe. Except for such 
uses, the land shall remain for ever wild and shall be maintained as a wilderness as defined in section 2 (c) of 
the act of September 3, 1964 (78 stat. 890). Statutes at Large. 1438 (1970)." Indians-Pueblo de Taos-Lands. 
Statutes at Large. 84, sec. 4b 1681 (1970).
2*7stewart L. Udall, Foreword to Taos Pueblo and Its Sacred Blue Lake, by Marcia Keegan, (Santa Fe.
New Mexico: Clear Light Publishers, 1991) 7.
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The secretive nature o f Taos religion presented another problem to the activists 
working on their case.2i8 Many of the tribe's supporters were unsure how to represent 
this facet of Taos interests. Dean Kelly, from the National Council of Churches wrote that 
discussing the question of secretiveness before a Congressional subcommittee would prove 
counter-productive:
I agree that the details of their ceremonies are the Indians' business and not 
outsiders', but it is not necessary to make more of an issue of it than the Indians do, and 
they have occasionally divulged some details to non-Indians or permitted non-Indians to 
see their ceremonies.
It is unreasonable to expect people to give a 'blank check' to the Indians unless they 
have enough of a glimpse of what is involved to make it convincing. I felt the same until 
the Tribal Council told me enough about their religious uses of the land to give some 
texture to their claims. I would be surprised if the committee found the 'secrecy' argument 
ingratiating. It may be cogent; it is largely true, but it does not tend to elicit cooperation. 
Instead it tends to 'turn o ff even those disposed to help the I n d i a n s .219
One of the tribe's lawyers, William C. Schaab, answered Kelly's concern over Pueblo
secrecy regarding the significance of Blue Lake. Schaab argued in favor of raising the issue
as an important way of explaining its religious significance, and as a way of explaining the
reluctance o f Taos elders to provide detailed information on the s u b j e c t . 2 2 0  Schaab
obtained permission from the Pueblo council to decide whether or not to raise the issue of
secrecy before Congress, and he considered the subject ar too important not to a d d r e s s . 221
Although the need for secrecy would eventually prove to be an important plank of 
the campaign for Blue Lake the issue clearly cut against the tribe interests in many ways. 
The clearest statement on the tribe's religion actually came from a letter written by the 
anthropologist John J. Bodine during the final hearings in 1970. In the letter he explained 
that no particular member of the tribe knew the full extent of their rites and doctrines.
21 ̂ Gordon-McCutchan, 130.
219Dean M. Kelly, to William C. Schaab, esq., 28 March, 1968, Paul J. Bernal Papers. # 46. State Record 
Center and Archives. 404 Santa Fe, New Mexico.
220\villiam C. Schaab, to Dean M. Kelly, 1 April, 1968, Paul J. Bernal Papers. # 46. State Record Center 
and Archives. 404 Santa Fe, New Mexico.
221 Schaab to Kelly.
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because that knowledge is broken up into various discrete offices. He also mentioned the 
existence of a number o f minor shrines around the lake routinely visited by individual 
priests at various times during the year, and that the tribe had been reluctant to reveal the 
full importance of these shrines because that in itself "would cripple their f a i t h . " 2 2 2  Blue 
Lake occupied a crucial place in the ceremonial system practiced at Taos, but its 
significance to that ceremonial system could not be reduced to a single body of doctrines. 
Moreover, ceremonial experts guarded any explicit knowledge that they possessed about 
the details o f particular shrines and ceremonies, because the ritual efficacy o f such 
ceremonies required an element o f secrecy. This placed the Taoseno in an untenable 
position from the standpoint o f free exercise doctrine, because in order to gain federal 
protection for their ceremonial interests they would have to satisfy Congress that they were 
indeed practicing a form of religion at Blue Lake.
Today Bodine's letter serves as the most clear public statement about Taos interest 
in Blue Lake, explaining the reluctance of the tribe to communicate its significance fiilly to 
Congress and demonstrating that this reluctance was itself one o f the reasons why 
Congress should act in favor of the Pueblo. Complete disclosure of the religious tenets 
violated by Forest policy was, according to Bodine, neither feasible, nor consistent with 
the very interests that the Taos Indians were concerned to defend. Bodine's letter itself 
threatened the principle of secrecy governing the ceremonial system at Taos, and he was 
well aware of t h i s .2 2 3  Bodine had been careful to reveal just enough information to help 
the Taos case, and so he appears to have played a positive role in the history o f that 
P u e b l o . 2 2 4  Bodine's letter served to resolve the issue of secrecy in favor of the Taos
222see Taos Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (1970) 299. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional 
Record, vol. 116 (December 2,1970) 39596-8.
222Taps IndlanizJBk£Lakg Amgndments. (1970) 300.
224(1 appears that Taos elders have looked on Bodine's intervention with approval, because he would 
eventually author a pamphlet distributed by the Pueblo to visitors, John J. Bodine, Taos Pueblo: A Walk
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Indians, though it probably did little to alleviate any genuine concerns about the tribe's 
motivations.
Part o f the tribe's rhetorical strategy for casting Blue Lake as an issue involving 
religious freedom lay in the conscious construction of a metaphor describing the region as a 
c h u r c h . 2 2 5  Through reference to a church the tribe's lawyers could effectively touch upon 
a sense o f sacred space familiar to most Americans. Somewhere in the transition from 
abstract space to actual geography, however, this strategy produced some rather 
problematic implications. A number of congressman expressed misgivings about the kind 
o f precedent established in returning Blue Lake to the Taoseno on the basis of an appeal to 
religious freedom. Senator Lee Metcalf, for example, offered the following remarks:
The Blackfeet Indians have this same worship in Glacier National Park and I would 
suggest, if this bill passes in the way it came out of the House, there are Indian tribes all 
over America just waiting at the barrier to have bills introduced to get thousands of acres of 
land that they can justifiably claim has a spiritual relationship to their t r ib e .2 2 6
Many were also concerned about the precedent set by this action as a resolution to a case
heard by the Indian Claims C o m m i s s i o n . 2 2 7  Hence, they asked why Taos religion could
not be accommodated by smaller concessions of land which would have been adequate had
Blue Lake literally represented a "church" to the Taoseno. William Schaab wrote:
Many people, including senator (Clinton P.) Anderson, have legitimately asked 
why the Indians need 48,000 acres for religious purposes. The American concepts of 
'church' and 'shrine' do not clearly reflect the Indians' religious view of the Blue Lake 
area; their frequent use has tended to suggest that the Indians' religious attachment relates to 
small areas within the total watershed rather than to the watershed as a whole. It has also
Through Time. A Visitor's Guide to the Pueblo, Its People and their Customs and their Long History, 
(Santa Fé, New Mexico: Lightning Tree - Jene Lyon, Publisher, 1977).
225Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Litigation, " 65-68.
226united States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs o f the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, Taos Indians-Blue Lake. Ninetieth Congress, Second Session, on H R. 3306, S. 1624 and S. 
1625, (September 19 and 20, 1968) 62. See Also R.C. Gordon-McCutchan, 140-143.
227ja o s  Indians-Blue Lake. (1968) 62. See Also R.C. Gordon-McCutcha:, 140-143.
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been unsatisfactory to explain the Indians' attachment to the land in terms of interference 
with their economic use of the a r e a .228
As can be seen, the very suggestive qualities which made this metaphor attractive to the 
Taoseno effectively inhibited their ability to communicate the full significance that Blue 
Lake and its watershed had in their cosmology. Describing the area as a church allowed the 
Taos Indians to present their interest in terms familiar to a predominantly Christian public, 
but this same metaphor invited a counter-argument inasmuch as the idea of 48,000 acre 
church seemed a bit of a stretch.
Bodine's letter also provided an answer to these concerns, arguing that the Taos 
case was entirely unique in view of the complete reliance of the Pueblo on the physical and 
spiritual integrity of the region around Blue Lake. Bodine argued that Blue Lake constituted 
a unique feature of the Taoseno cultural landscape, and that the Taos claim to Blue Lake 
itself was unique among tribal religions:
I made a very bold statement when I said that if these lands are not returned Taos 
culture would be destroyed. I was asked by my doctoral examining committee in 1966 the 
following question: If you had complete power over the Taos and wished to destroy their 
culture what would you do? I replied unhesitatingly that I would destroy Blue Lake. The 
question may sound facetious and the answer absurd. But neither is ridiculous. You 
(Senator Lee Metcalf) pointed out at the hearings that when property is taken from an 
individual according to our custom he is compensated for his loss with a cash settlement. 
And so we have properly settled most Indian claims. Let us suppose that we decided to 
confiscate all the property owned by the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and 
properly compensated them for it. Would Catholicism cease to exist? Obviously not. As 
most religions are capable of doing, they could erect churches elsewhere. Even more to the 
point is that Navaho Mountain is sacred to the Navaho, just as peaks in Glacier are sacred 
to the Blackfeet, but their entire religion does not depend on those particular shrines and 
therefore they differ from the Taos case. All of Taos religion is dependent on Blue Lake 
and its associated shrines in the 48,000 acres in question. They have no other 'church' nor 
any possibility of constructing one. Therefore monetary compensation for Blue Lake is out 
of the question. It provides them with no alternative whatsoever. There is only one Blue 
Lake just as there is only one M e c c a .2 2 9
Thus, Bodine effectively answered questions about the prospect of monetary compensation 
by distinguishing the Taos claim to Blue Lake from all other Indian claims. Taos Pueblo
228schaab to Kelly.
229 Taos Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (197) 298-3(K).
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could not be adequately compensated for the loss of Blue Lake, but neither could the return 
of Blue Lake to the Pueblo to Taos constitute a significant precedent, because no other 
Indian tribe was so dependent on the spiritual significance of one particular geographic 
feature.
Others answered questions about the precedent set by the return o f Blue Lake to 
Taos Pueblo in moral terms, arguing that it was simply the right thing to do. Morris Udall, 
for example, responded to concerns over precedent by stating simply that "you never set a 
bad precedent when you do what is r i g h t .  "230 The opposition had raised concerns over the 
practical consequences of the precedent, and Udall's statements served to call attention to 
the moral dimensions associated with this same term. Swayed by these and other 
arguments. Congress passed legislation amending the act of 1933 (see above) to place the 
48,000 acres in question under trust title. This legislation presented Richard Nixon with a 
welcome opportunity to demonstrate his goodwill and commitment to an Indian policy 
based on self-determination. He signed the amendment into law on December 15, 1970, 
creating Public Law 91-550. The return o f Blue Lake could have symbolized self- 
determination in one other respect as well, because whatever the merits of the legislation; it 
carried few general implications for Indian policy. In passing the Blue Lake amendment 
Congress did not commit itself to responding in like form to further cases emerging out of 
the Indian Claims Commission, or to any future cases involving questions of religious 
freedom. In the future Congress would have the latitude to reverse its priorities in the face 
of new demands, and this facet in itself quietly answered many concerns over the precedent 
set by Blue Lake.
As an historical event, passage of Public Law 91-550 appeared to set an impressive 
precedent protecting the religious freedom o f Native Americans, but many aspects of this 
event could not be generalized beyond its immediate context. The interactional value of the
23°U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, vol. 115 (September 9, 1969) 24882.
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Blue Lake amendments alleviated many of the burdens normally associated with the 
rhetoric o f religious freedom. The Taoseno called upon abstract notions of religious 
freedom, but they did not invoke the Free Exercise clause. A free exercise dispute would 
have placed Taos lawyers in an appellate court, and effectively placed them in an 
adversarial relationship with the federal government. Instead, the return of Blue Lake took 
the form of a positive government interest entailed by trust doctrine, as reflected in the 
provision that Blue Lake and its watershed would be held in trust for the tribe by the federal 
government.
Notions of "justice" and "religious freedom" may have motivated this legislation, 
but they were not anchored to concrete bases of institutional authority. Those Congressmen 
who voted in favor of the Blue Lake Amendments were not responsible for determining the 
merits of the Taos claims according to a set theory of case law such as the balancing test. 
This gave individual Congressmen considerable latitude to exercise their own judgement 
with respect to the authenticity o f the tribe's self-representations. M oreover, each 
Congressmen would have the latitude to change their priorities in future cases. Any 
Congressmen persuaded in the authenticity of Taos statements about the significance of the 
lake, could simply vote in favor of the provision without demonstrating to an appellate 
court that he had been fair to the opposition or that his decision was in accordance with the 
principles established in past precedent. With passage of the Blue Lake amendment, 
however. Congress appeared to concede a basic point to its wards in Indian country; that 
they too possessed a right of religious freedom, and that Congress had a tangible interest in 
protecting this freedom. Passage of the Blue Lake amendment would therefore serve as a 
key event in the development of free exercise doctrine as it would relate to Indians.
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Chapter III
Religious Prejudice As Principle: The Limitations of a Civil 
Libertarian Approach to Indian Law.
Congress Shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.231
-First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
No Indian Tribe in exercising powers of Self government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and 
to petition for a redress o f g r i e v a n c e . 2 3 2
-Indian Civil Rights Act, 1968.
Today the Blue Lake Amendments are generally considered a successful example of 
legislation protecting the religious freedom of Native Americans. Congress had specifically 
tailored the provisions o f this legislation to meet the needs o f Taos Pueblo, however, and 
so the P.L. 91-550 lacks the open ended consequences o f a more general law or 
Constitutional principle. As a historical event, passage o f P.L. 91-550 signalled a 
revolution in the trust relationship between Indians and the federal government. During the 
assimilationist era the trust relationship effectively defined all conflict between BIA policy 
and Indian traditionalist as secular matters, and thus shielded such policies from application 
o f the Free Exercise clause. Now the trust relationship had been used as a basis for 
protection o f a traditional Indian religion, thus providing a novel remedy for a threat to 
religious freedom. The trust relationship had provided a novel context for arguments 
claiming a right o f religious freedom, and this had enabled Congress to exercise 
considerable discretion in its evaluation of Taos claims. Hence, Congress had been able to
231United States Constitution. Amendment I.
222civ ii Rights-Riots-Fair Housinp-Civil Obedience. Statutes at Large. Title n, sec. 2 0 2 , 94 ( 1 9 6 8 ) .
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finesse the awkward relationship between Indian ceremonies and Euro-American notions 
about "religion."
Long before passage of the Blue Lake Amendments tribal governments had 
themselves begun to face tough questions about the management of religious diversity. The 
notion that a citizen might have rights against his government, and that these included a 
right to practice a religion other than that practiced by his fellow tribesmen, could not easily 
be squared with many Indian notions of tribal membership. Often tribal authorities took the 
position that the heterodoxical practices of individual members posed a serious threat to the 
ceremonial foundations of their social order. Hence, the notion that membership in a 
religious community could be separated from membership in a civil community appeared 
quite foreign to many Indians. This among other things, posed a great deal of difficulty for 
BIA officials and tribal authorities working in the wake of the IRA, as each sought to put 
into practice a theory of government combining elements of both social contract theory and 
Native American traditions.
The relationship between religious an political institutions became a  crucial site of 
conflict for the newly revitalized tribal governments. The growth of the Native American 
Church combined with emerging sectarian conflicts between Christian (or syncretic) 
Indians living on the reservations to create a series of legal conflicts regarding tribal 
authority over religious matters. This would eventually lead to the cases of Toledo v. 
Pueblo de Jemez. decided on March 8, 1954, and Native American Church v. Navajo 
Tribal Council, decided on November 17,1959. In each of these cases, the courts made it 
clear that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the actions of tribal governments. These cases 
helped give rise to new legislation creating the jurisdiction necessary for enforcement of the 
Bill of Rights in Indian country. If these native experiments in free exercise litigation 
proved anything, however, it was that the principles embodied in the Bill o f Rights posed 
an unusual set of problems for Indian tribes. Each of these cases had revealed the intimate 
linkage between traditional ceremonial practices and the authorities of tribal governments.
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W hen Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968 (ICRA) the inability to 
distinguish the institutions of tribal politics from those forming tribal religions made its 
difficult for Congressmen to formulate a strategy for incorporating the First Amendment 
into the jurisdiction of tribal governments. For many tribal governments it would prove 
difficult to accommodate basic American principles o f civil rights, and for the U.S. 
Congress it would prove difficult to accommodate the structures of a tribal government 
while seeking to ensure observation of the Bill of Rights.
Aspects o f conflict surrounding the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 would 
foreshadow later problems associated with the AIRFA. Like the Blue Lake Amendments, 
passage o f the ICRA extended Euro-American notions o f religious freedom into Indian 
territory. In contrast to the example of Blue Lake, however, the ICRA created a standing 
set o f legal principles and thereby provided an open ended prospect for future litigation. 
Congressmen therefore had to contend more seriously with the differences between Indian 
and Euro-American forms of social organization when considering the provisions of the 
ICRA. To complicate matters further, the ICRA played a controversial role in the general 
history of Indian-white relations. Proponents o f the bill had argued that it would constitute 
a major step toward extending civil rights to Native Americans whereas critics have argued 
that passage of the ICRA constituted an attack on tribal customs and a imposition on the 
proper jurisdiction o f tribal governments. O f course, both positions may adequately 
characterize the facts associated with the ICRA, but between them lies a vast difference in 
world views. In any event, passage of the ICRA would underscore a number of problems 
implied whenever Euro-American notions of religious freedom are applied to Indian 
practices.
A quick look at the passages above will reveal one major difference between the 
First Amendment and its counterpart in the Indian Bill of Rights; the latter contains no 
Establishment clause. The passages differ in yet another respect, for the First Amendment 
applies primarily to federal and state jurisdiction (via the Fourteenth Amendment in the
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latter case) whereas the Indian Bill of Rights refers directly to the powers of Indian tribes. 
It would be easy to view the ICRA as though it were merely the tribal equivalent to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, incorporating most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the 
limitations o f tribal authority; but the ICRA poses a distinct set of questions regarding the 
historical trajectory and legal status of Indian tribes as such. It is within this highly 
contested interactional framework that Congress formed the specific provisions of the 
ICRA. The fact remains that the ICRA leaves open the possibility that a tribal government 
may support a form of religious establishment, and in doing so the bill accommodates 
aspects o f Native American social organization seemingly forbidden by an ideological 
orientation normally associated with civil libertarian traditions. The concerns leading to the 
ICRA are worth examining, because they would appear again to haunt Indian litigants 
concerned with the implementation of the AIRFA.
Cultural Presupposition and the Denotational Scope of "Religion" in the First Amendment.
As noted earlier (chapter 2), notions about "religion" in general, and "religious 
freedom" in particular, are only salient in reference to particular patterns o f social 
organization. Hence, legal discourse about "religious freedom" contains a number of clues 
about the role o f religious institutions in America. The courts lack recourse to an objective 
definition of r e l i g io n .2 3 3  Neither is such definition available to the social sciences, which 
is to say that the term "religion" itself cannot be made intelligible as the object of a single 
theoretical r e d u c t i o n . 2 3 4  Yet, a certain degree of ethnocentrism regarding the nature of 
"religion" may seem unremarkable as long as it does not appear outside of the cultural 
context which gives rise to it in the first place. Hence, American courts can generally get by
233Lupu, 957-58.
234rhis amounts to a rejection of the doctrine that religion is itself a complete phenomenon which could 
not be reduced to areas of human experience. See, for example, Robert Segal and Donald Weibe, "Axioms 
and Dogmas in the Study of Religion," Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 57 (1989) 591-605 
passim.
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with using notions about religion tailored to the experience of a predominantly Christian 
public. When dealing with distinctly non-Christian traditions the courts sometimes equate 
religion with Christianity, thereby leaving such traditions beyond the scope o f the First 
Amendment; and sometimes they use Christianity as a kind of prototype on which to model 
its approach to other r e l i g i o n s . 2 3 5  Hence, the best case scenario for unusual free exercise 
claims involves a metaphorical understanding of the issue wherein Christianity supplies the 
source, or phoros, of the court's tropical u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 2 3 6
Perhaps the best example of such reasoning comes from the 1968 case of United 
States V. Seeger. Here the United States Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a provision for conscientious objector status included in the Selective 
Service Act of 1948. This provision restricted the status of conscientious objectors to those 
with a belief " . . .  in relation to a Supreme B e in g . " 2 3 7  Justice Clark wrote the majority 
opinion for the case, which included this rather interesting rationale:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme Being' rather 
than the designation 'God' was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and 
b e lie f so as to embrace aJI religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical views. We believe that under this construction, the test of belief'in relation to 
a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place 
in the life of the possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who 
clearly qualifies for that exemption. Where such beliefs have a parallel position in the lives 
of their respective holders we cannot say that one is 'in relation to a Supreme Being' and 
that the other is n o t .2 3 8
235Lupu, 958.
236rhis is a reference to a common distinction in metaphor theory. Inasmuch as metaphors involve the 
tropical use o f a word, a turning o f its sense into something other than its common usage, one must 
observe a distinction between the normal sense of the term and that which informs its metaphorical usage. 
In Cognitive theory, the former is referred to as the target domain and the latter the source domain. See 
George Lakoff, Women. Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind. (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 380-96. Drawing on Aristotelian models, Perelman an 
Tyteca refer to the normal sense of a term as the theme and the source of the tropical understanding the 
phoros, 373. It is worth noting that the relationship between source and target domain in cultural semantics 
{phoros and theme according to rhetorical models) is also implicit in analogical reasoning. This semantic 
distinction may therefore appear in either the premise structure of an argument (analogy) or in the phrase 
structure of a sentence (metaphor).
237United States v. Seeger, 85 U.S. 850 (1965).
238seeger, 85 U.S. 854(1985).
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Notwithstanding the Court's poor reasoning, this passage does provide an excellent 
example of the use of analogical reasoning in a First Amendment c a s e .2 3 9  Here the Court 
essentially determined the religious nature of Seeger's own beliefs by drawing an analogy 
between those beliefs and those expressly covered by the statute in question, beliefs which 
might be expected from those of Jewish or Christian faith.
In one respect the Seeger case represents a poor example of the use of analogical 
reasoning in free exercise cases, because the Supreme Court's analogical interpretation of 
the phrase "belief in relation to a Supreme Being" directly contradicted the literal sense of 
the phrase itself. The Court had viewed the statute in question as an attempt to achieve a 
practical goal, the exemption of religious beliefs in general from military duty. The Court 
then based its interpretation of the phrase in question on an analogy between the function of 
Theism in reference to the exemption clause and the role that Seeger's own beliefs might 
also play in reference to the same goal. In explaining the functional intent of the phrase the 
Court had implicitly taken issue with the language of the statute in question. The Court had 
essentially argued that the explicit language of the statute in question was more narrow than 
it needed to be. Hence, the analogical reasoning used by the Court in Seeger actually 
facilitated a complete transformation of the sense of "religion" included in the original 
statute.
239(t is easy enough to see how the court could construe the rational purpose of the provision in question 
as a mere attempt to exclude spurious claims to conscientious objection, but there are a variety of different 
approaches to intentionality; all of which are problematic for one reason or another. Here the court has 
attributed an instrumental purpose to Congress, which is a rather narrow sense of intentionality; one which 
does not address the language of the statute itself. A popular legal textbook, for example, includes the 
following study question in its treatment of the case; "Isn't the Court's description of what Congress meant 
. . .  exactly the opposite of what Congress said?" William Cohen and John Kaplan, Constitutional Law: 
Civil Libertv and Individual Rights. Second Edition, University Casebook Series, (Mineola, New York: 
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1982) 451. One would imagine that most of students reading this text would 
answer that question in the affirmative.
It is not at all uncommon to find that a  given reading of legal text has been constructed around 
ideological assumptions pertaining to an intentional state (c.f. Elizabeth Mertz, "Linguistic Ideology and 
Praxis in U.S. Law School Classrooms, " Pragmatics. 2 [1992] 325-43 passim). Likewise, the particular 
bias in favor of a narrow instrumental model of intent is also widely prevalent throughout legal circles, and 
it may be attributed to a kind of linguistic unifunctionalism. See Weissbourd and Mertz, 648-55 and 
passim.
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The courts need not always contend with legislation including such explicit 
definitions of the term "religion." Most free exercise cases involve a claim about religion 
emerging from a source other than the legal statutes involved in the case. Indirect burdens 
on the free exercise of religion typically involve legislation containing no explicit references 
to religion. In such cases it is the free exercise claimant who raises the issue of religion, 
and this leaves the courts room to define the scope o f meaning of "religion" as they see fit. 
Hence, the courts are generally free address the scope of free exercise principles through 
analogical strategies like that used in Seeger. but without facing the obstacle posed by of 
explicitly narrow statutory language. At times such analogies have proven crucial to the 
interests of minority religions, but there is considerable irony in the fact that protection for a 
minority religion may rest on a proximity between its conventions and those o f more 
popular religious traditions.
One may gather from the preceding that the courts do not merely exhibit a kind of 
intellectual inertia when dealing with minority faiths, but that their ability to conceive the 
interest at stake in a minority religion is contingent on structural analogies between that 
religion and those more commonly practiced in America. In one respect, this involves 
questions about the implications of such an analogy. In another respect, this involves 
pragmatic questions about the prospect of fitting a minority religion into an interactional 
role envisioned within popular notions of American social order. Both constraints serve to 
skew the legal significance of the term "religion," providing different aspects of nominally 
religious behavior with a greater or lesser degree of protection under the First Amendment.
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The Establishment Clause and the Cosmology of the Constitution: A Persistent Paradox.
The prospect that a given set o f cosmological precepts may not be considered 
"religious" does not always, or merely, indicate that the practice will fail to receive the 
protection of the Free Exercise clause. It may also mean that a given set of cosmological 
principles will escape the notice o f the Establishment clause. The cultural order 
presupposed in government proceedings will itself contain a folk model of the universe. 
Hence, the cultural presuppositions implicit in the text of the United States Constitution as 
well as any other government document or political speech will contain indexical references 
to a form of cosmological order (natural rights, first principles, social contracts, etc.). 
Thus, it is fair to ask if the Constitution does not itself presuppose a form of religion, even 
as it forbids the establishment of religion? And it is worth inquiring as to whether or not 
there are any consistent distinctions between the kind o f cosmology presupposed in 
documents and proceedings related to the First Amendment itself and the kinds of 
cosmological order discussed in such proceedings under the heading of "religion?"
Many assume that there is some layer of religious practice that is not covered by the 
Establishm ent clause on the United States Constitution. Such notions are strongly 
associated with master-narratives pertaining to the "original intention" behind the 
Constitution. According to such theories the "founding fathers" did not intend for the 
Establishment clause to forbid any general form of support for religion, but that the 
Establishment clause was originally designed to prevent the establishment of a state 
church.240 Advocates of this position, known as "non-preferentialism," typically maintain 
that non-sectarian forms o f government support for religion are not proscribed under the 
Establishment clause. Non-preferentialists therefore maintain that government is free to aid 
religious causes in general provided that it does not favor any particular sect over others.
240 See, for example, Russell Kirk, The American Cause. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957) 41 ; 
Francis A. Schaeffer, A Christian Manifesto. (1981. Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1982) 31-39; 
Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. (New York and London: The 
Free Press, 1990) 94-95.
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Under this theory the federal government would be free to incorporate religious prayers 
into its functions (as it does indeed), for example, though it could not prevent individuals 
from conducting prayers o f their own. Hence, the non-preferentialist position provides a 
narrow construction to the sense of religion in the text of the Establishment clause and that 
implicit in the Free Exercise clause.
It is difficult to see how the text o f the First Amendment could produce this 
asymmetric notion of religion. As Justice Rutledge argued in his dissent for the the case of 
Everson v. Board o f Education the same term covers both of the religion clauses in the 
First Amendment. It is therefore inconsistent to read the Free Exercise clause as a provision 
affecting "religion" in general while treating the Establishment clause as a proscription 
against the relatively narrow prospect of a state c h u r c h . 2 4 l  The term "religion" denotes an 
equally abstract value in both clauses of the First of Amendment, and yet the need to 
ground any government practice in a cosmological framework seems to require a relatively 
narrow construction of the Establishment clause. Hence, the denotational scope of both 
religion clauses in the First Amendment refer to "religion" in the abstract, even though the 
interactional significance of each clause may be somewhat different.
The courts are not the only institutions to find that abstract notions of religion have 
proven to be clumsy. The social categories used to differentiate between one religion and 
the next appear to follow conventions developed in order to handle the sectarian disputes 
characterizing various Christian denominations. Individual religions are typically defined in 
terms of beliefs, which is to say that a religion is characterized as a set of propositions - the 
truth o f which is vouched for by its adherents. The difference between Theism and 
Atheism, for example, can be characterized as a dispute over the truth o f the proposition 
that "God Exists," (or that "a Supreme Being Exists," for those adhering to the precedent
241 Everson v. Board o f Education of Ewing TP, 64 S. Ct. 519-520 (1947). Others have attacked the 
historical accuracy of non-preferentialist rhetoric. Leonard Levy, for example, demonstrates that early 
American concerns over the establishment of religion could not be reduced to the question of a state church. 
The Establishment Clause. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, and London: Collier Macmillan 
Publishers, 1986) passim.
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established in Seeger.) Such an approach effectively characterizes individual religions in 
terms of a personal orientation towards statements denoting something about a 
cosmological order. As a body of doctrines, each religion embodies an argumentative 
stance about cosmological themes. Each religion is therefore comprehensive inasmuch as it 
provides a place for all possible objects of discourse, and yet each religion is also exclusive 
inasmuch as it is inconsistent with alternative cosmological systems. Hence, the ability to 
differentiate one religion from another emerges rather paradoxically out of the conventions 
of polemic discourse.
A number of problems, both practical and theoretical, can be seen to stem from this 
tension between the reductive scope of a religious system and the prospect of a general 
theory dealing with the variety of individuated religions. Clifford Geertz, for example, 
began his famous essay on religion with the following selection from George Santayana:
Any attempt to speak without speaking a particular language is not more hopeless 
than the attempt to have a religion that shall be no religion in particular . . . Thus every 
living and healthy religion has a marked idiosyncrasy. Its power consists in its special and 
surprising message and in the bias which that revelation gives to life. The vistas it opens 
and the mysteries it propounds are another world to live in; and another world to live in- 
whether we expect ever to pass wholly over into it or no-is what we mean by having a
religion.242
Having thus, indicated the exhaustive scope of any particular religious discourse, Geertz
proceeds to articulate and expound upon a general theory of religion, thereby reducing the
great variety of religious discourse to a single paradigm. He writes:
(1) A system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting 
moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of 
experience and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of facticity that (5) the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely r e a l i s t i c .2 4 3
242ciifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essavs bv Clifford Geertz. (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc. Publishers, 1973) 8 8 . The original passage is taken from George Santayana, "Reason in 
Religion," The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress. One Volume Edition, Revised by the 
author in collaboration with Daniel Cory, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955) 180.
243Geertz, 90.
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Of course, Geertz presupposes a distinctive order of reality inherent to the conditions of his 
own discourse at the same time that he describes "religion" as a body of symbols defining a 
distinct order o f reality. Geertz calls our attention to the layer o f symbolic discourse 
associated w ith religious propositions, but the discursive conventions used in 
disseminating his views index an order of reality that one might also consider a form of 
religion.244 One may notice for instance that his focus on the symbolic nature of religion is 
particularly consistent with modem notions of social organization in which "man has 
created God," so to speak. Such a position has indeed been spelled out in the form of an 
explicit set of religious doctrines, that of Secular Humanism.245 So Geertz's definition of 
"religion" is potentially self-referential, though this does not make his account incoherent. 
One need not attribute any personal agenda to Geertz himself; the point is that he has 
adopted a language which presupposes facets of a specific world view, and that world view 
may at times conflict with the religions that Geertz himself seeks to describe.
A similar set of reflexive structural features creates a substantial problem for the 
appellate courts dealing with First Amendment cases. The courts must protect the religious 
freedom of American citizens while presuming the principles of a cosmological order which 
could itself be described as a religious perspective. Perhaps the problem would not be so 
distressing were it not for the fact that the First Amendment serves both to affirm a right of 
religious freedom and to preclude its establishment as well. This entails a conceptual 
dilemma in that the affirmation of religious rights necessitates a working definition of 
"religion," but any bias contained in a working definition of religion could be construed as 
a covert establishment of religion. Hence, the courts must somehow maintain a distinction
244c.f. John R. Farella, The Main Stalk: A Synthesis of Navaio Philosophy. (Tucson. Arizona: 
University of Arizona Press, 1984) 6.
245see, for example, Paul Kurtz, ed.. The Humanist Manifestos I & U, (1973. Buffalo, New York: 
Promethius Books, 1984) passim. Note that the claim made above is not that the definition offered by 
Clifford Geertz is intended as a piece of Humanist philosophy, but that the assumptions which make his 
approach to religion possible are not without cosmological implications, implications which have been 
spelled out in other contexts as a form of religion.
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between the "religion" contemplated under the First Amendment and the potentially 
"religious" perspectives implicit in the principles of the First Amendment jurisprudence.
The exclusion of "religion" from government activities may itself provide a clue into
the cosmological order presupposed in American constitutionalism. As a critical part of
American social order much of the historical and cultural implications of this principle are
commonly taken for granted. Leonard Levy, for instance, writes,
. . .  the establishment clause functions to depoliticize religion; it thereby helps to defuse 
potentially explosive situation. The clause substantially removes religious issues from the 
ballot box and from politics. Mr. Dooley, Finnley Peter Dunne's irrepressible Irish wit, 
whom Justice Frankfurter called 'a great philosopher,' said of church and state: 'Rellijon is 
a quare thing, be itself it's all right. But sprinkle a little pollyticks into it an' dinnymit is 
bran flour compared with it. Alone it prepares a man for a better life. Combined with 
poly ticks it hurries him to it.'246
The establishment clause appears in this passage as a limitation on the possibility of 
arbitrary connections between religion and the government; a check against corruption of 
both the state and the clergy. Yet, the assumption that such connections are themselves 
arbitrary is itself a crucial commentary on the cultural order informing the construction and 
implementation of the Constitution. Granting the assumption that no substantial meaning is 
lost to the area of religion by removing official connections to politics, the Establishment 
clause appears to be a fantastic innovation in the development of human freedom. Where 
this assumption is not valid the principle itself negates an essential component of religious 
freedom. Thus, depending on the religion in question, the Free Exercise and Establishment 
clauses of the First Amendment may serve contrary interests.
The fabled separation of church and state in American life would have a substantial 
impact on areas of discourse in which religious authorities might be expected to have a say 
in government policy. So, the exclusion of religion from political discourse may serve as 
an index o f political interests inconsistent with religious authority. The terms of the First 
Amendment may reflect a comodified sense of land tenure and labor relations, for example.
246Levy, ix.
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indexing a social order regulating public life according primarily to market values.247 
When Taos Pueblo asserted both a political and a religious interest in Blue Lake, for 
example, this violated the cultural sensibilities of Congressmen accustomed to land claims 
defined according to economic values. One could interpret their subsequent complaints 
about a 48,000 acre church, as a reflection of the vested interests of commercial enterprises 
such as logging (see above). This is not to say that such complaints do not reflect genuine 
value propositions about the role that religion should play in American society; it is only to 
suggest that such propositions also reflect the relatively limited role that religion already 
plays in American society. The Constitution can therefore be read as a blueprint for the 
economic enterprises of a colonial elite, but more importantly, it may also be read as a 
document presupposing a world view which was already quite distinct from that implicit in 
Christian ceremonies.
In contrast to the industrial and political revolutions o f Europe; a place wherein 
market values had to compete for a time with the claims of the church, nobility, and a host 
of related institutions; little stood in the way of economic development in North America. 
Whereas the French and British experienced the growth of Capitalism as a complex series 
of internal reforms, their counterparts in North America had merely to dispossess the 
n a t i v e s . 2 4 8  This left Americans in an ideal position to fashion a political system based 
largely on bourgeois social theory, itself a rationalization of bourgeois social p r a c t i c e .2 4 9
247c.f. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. (1957. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) 68-76.
248c.f. E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848. (New York: New American Library, 1962) 
182-183.
249on the relationship between social contract theory and the the actual conditions o f bourgeois social 
organization, see C.B. Macperson, The Political Theorv of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. 
(1962. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 1-106 passim; Marshall Sahlins, Culture and 
Practical Reason. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 50-54; Marshall Sahlins, 
Stone Age Economics. (New York: Aldine, 1972) 1-39 passim.
On the relationship between such theories and American political discourse, see for example, Robert N. 
Bellah, "The Revolution and the Civil Religion," Religion and the American Revolution, eds., Jerold C.
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The Constitutional perspective on the relationship between religion and government reflects 
a historical subordination of both to market values. The presumption that links between 
religion and the State constituted an arbitrary and dangerous political arrangement signals 
the degree to which colonists had already grown accustomed to a public life free of direct 
links to religious authority.
So, it appears that the separation of religious authority from the practice of 
government is itself an index of the degree to which religion has become a privatized area 
of American social practice. And yet, this separation of religion from government does 
create a certain amount of tension for most Americans, and in practice the division has 
never been complete. Alexis de Tocqueville once observed that:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government o f society, but it must 
nevertheless be regarded as the foremost of political institutions o f that country; for if it 
does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of free institutions. I do not know 
whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their religion, for who can search the human 
heart? but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican
institutions.250
Along a similar vein of thought Will Herberg suggests that; "America seems to be at once 
the most religious and the most secular of nations."25i The Reverend Billy Graham must 
have been pointing to much the same thing when he suggested in somewhat more 
derogatory terms that modem Western culture "has become a mixture o f paganism and 
C h r i s t i a n i t y ."252 Although each of these remarks are framed in reference to something 
along the lines of an essential national character (a theoretically disreputable venture 
indeed), they may yet describe something important about the discursive conventions of
Brawer, Sidney E. Mead, and Robert N. Bellah, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976) 55-73 passim; Michael 
Parenti, Democracy for the Few. (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1988) 54-68 passim.
250Alexis de Tocqueville, Alexis De Tocqueville on Democracy. Revolution, and Society: Selected 
Writings, ed. John Stone and Stephen Mennell, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) 93.
25'W ill Herberg, Protestant. Catholic. Jew: An Essav in American Religious Sociology. (1955. Garden 
City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960) 3.
252Billy Graham, World Aflame. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) 42.
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American politics. The formal separation of religion and government has not prevented 
Americans from combining the two in a variety of informal patterns of discourse.
Official government institutions may even invoke explicit religious themes from 
time to time. The phrase "In God We Trust" is printed on United States Currency, for 
example, and both Congress and the Supreme Court open with a prayer. Such obvious 
references to religious themes constitute a kind of civil religion, a set of institutions that has 
proven very difficult for Constitutional theorists to g r a s p .2 5 3  This concept comes from the 
writings of Robert Bellah, who defines "civil religion" as a "transcendent reality" which 
informs "the life of every p e o p l e . " 2 5 4  Bellah argued that institutions o f government 
presuppose a form of cosmology, thus illustrating that such instances o f official religious 
rhetoric reflect a systematic feature of political discourse. The invocation of quasi-religious 
themes may therefore constitute a ritual performance every bit as powerful as one might 
expect to find in a sectarian church.
Explicit references to religious themes are but the tip of the iceberg when it comes to 
civil religion. Most political rhetoric carries an abundance of cosmological imagery, but this 
imagery is normally implicit in government proceedings. The very notion that humans are 
endowed with "natural rights," for example, serves to project the dimensions of bourgeois 
social practice onto the universe itself. Such notions effectively transform the interactional 
framework of American government into cosmological principles. The very distinction 
between the civil religion normally implicit in government procedures and explicit sectarian 
religion can therefore be eliminated by shifting the focus of analysis from sectarian disputes 
to the significance o f a national agenda. Vine Deloria has written that in the context of
Yehuda Mirsky, "Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause," Yale Law Journal. 95 (1986) 
1237-1257 passim.
254Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial. Second Edition, 
(1975. Chicago And London: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 3 and ix. See also Robert N. Bellah, "The 
Revolution," in Religion and the American Revolution. 53-73 passim; Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. 
Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion. (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980) 3-23 passim.
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Indian-white relations American civil religion presence a crucial rational for the white 
presence on this C o n t i n e n t . 2 5 5  He attributes the apparent compromise between secular 
institutions and sectarian theology to the denominational framework which informs many 
discussions o f civil r e l i g i o n . 2 5 6  it is only in comparison with explicit sectarian disputes 
that civil religion takes on the appearance of an unthreatening, non-denominational religious 
sentiment; but for a nation's enemies civil religion is serious business. What differentiates 
the significance of civil religion from that of sectarian denominations may in the end be no 
more than a relative absence of polemic debate over its tenets, a condition which normally 
leaves the cosmological significance of American government in the background of political 
discourse.
Native and Immigrant Cosmologies in American Law.
The interactional framework of American civil religion does not readily reflect the 
experience o f Native American social life. Hence, the prototypical notions of citizenship 
informing American Constitutionalism do not speak directly to the concerns raised by many 
American Indian political activists. Vine Deloria argues, for example, that one must 
distinguish between "political minorities" which are arbitrarily formed as part of a political 
process and "permanent minorities" which are defined in terms o f biological criteria or 
radical differences in culture (black people, Indians, women, etc.).257 The social contract 
theory enshrined in the Constitution is explicitly designed to protect political minorities, 
whereas history has demonstrated that other categories of minority status have a longevity
255gee Vine Deloria, "Completing the Theological Circle," Religious Education. 71 (1976) 278-87 
passim; Robert S. Michaelsen, "Red Man's Religion /  White Man's Religious History," Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion. 4(1983) 675-78.
^^^Deloria, "Theological Circle, " 287.
2^^Vine Deloria, "Minorities and the Social Contract, " Georgia Law Review. 20 (1986) 917-919.
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independent o f the specific checks and balances o f American L a w . 2 5 8  Likewise, the 
members o f such "permanent minorities" face dramatic forms of oppression not fully 
contemplated under the normal functions of social contract t h e o r y . 2 5 9  The functional 
significance of minority status differs according to the social and historical parameters 
which give rise to it, whereas social contract theory (America's civil religion) presupposes 
that the problems facing minorities are a function of individual interests. Hence, American 
Constitutional theory has been slow to address political interests defined by ethnicity and 
gender, and today the difference between these conceptions of minority status often defines 
the difference between Liberal and Conservative political agendas.
As members of Indian tribes Native Americans also occupy a role which cannot be 
reduced to that of either a "permanent" or a "political" minority. Trust doctrine emerged out 
of a case history rather than a Constitutional document, providing the political authority of 
Indian tribes with an obscure textual basis (see chapter I), one that would be unfamiliar to 
most Americans. So, whereas Indian tribes constitute a substantial form of American 
government, the specific role that they play in defining the political interests of individual 
Native Americans remains unclear to the American public. Therefore, Native American 
issues relating to these semi-autonomous political entities are vulnerable to rhetoric which 
positions them in terms of a typical debate between liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . 2 6 0  Indian 
gambling is often portrayed as a kind of affirmative action program, for example, rather 
than a function of tribal jurisdiction (most gambling regulations are state laws). This 
asymmetry between the legal rationale for tribal interests and the significance that such 
interests take in popular debate cannot but work to the detriment of many Indian tribes. 
W hereas the courts can be expected to observe the institutional role that tribes play in
258Deloria, "Minorities," 919-930. 
259Deloria, "Minorities," passim.
260c.f. Vine Deloria, the chapter "The Red and the Black," in Custer Died For Your Sins. (1970. Norman 
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988) 168-196.
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defining certain issues connected with Native American life, popular rhetoric frequently 
ignores this distinction; and this rhetoric may have a significant impact on executive policies 
and legislative decisions. Thus, the legal identity made possible under trust doctrine does 
not speak to the context o f every political dispute involving Native Americans. Tribal 
governments do occupy a significant place in American political law, but they do not 
occupy a significant place in the American legal imagination.
Tribal politics contrast with the political assumptions of mainstream America, and 
those assumptions are not without canonical expression in American state papers as well as 
the writings o f key political theorists and the "founding fathers." This has often made the 
reality of tribal politics appear inconsistent with the precepts of American government; both 
in the sense that many Americans find it inappropriate for the government to treat people in 
collective terms, and in the sense that the rationale offered by many Indian tribes for their 
own practices frequently conflicts with Euro-American norms of government. The same 
juxtaposition of cosmological systems has often made it difficult for Native American tribes 
to cope with many of the norms of government imposed on them through the oversight of 
BIA officials. The notion of individual rights poses a threat to the specific cosmological 
order implicit in tribal patterns of government. Tribal practices generally lack the discursive 
conventions characteristic of Euro-America's sectarian rivalries, and so it should come as 
no surprise that tribal social structure generally lacks the conventions separating religious 
and political institutions. Hence, the formation of government structures capable of 
protecting individual rights, including the right o f free exercise, presupposed social 
distinctions not generally observed by tribal authorities. Such distinctions would slowly 
become a part o f Indian life, however, as democratic institutions became a part of 
reservation politics.
Federal support for tribal government under the IRA brought with it pressure to 
observe secular conventions of government; Council hearings, tribal courts, official 
budgets, etc. All of these institutions constitute a set o f rituals unconnected to the
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cosmological systems implicit within ceremonial systems normally observed by individual 
tribes. O f course, each Indian tribe could build its own ties between the newly formed 
secular institutions o f government and its own cosmological system.26i And with the 
elimination o f the Religious Crimes Codes each tribe could continue to articulate its 
cosmological system through traditional rituals. In practice Indian tribes generally pursued 
both approaches, leading them to observe two different sets of ceremonial systems: a set of 
rituals associated with the nominally secular practice of government, and a set of rituals 
associated with explicit mythological themes of tribal mythology. The ability to generate 
discursive ties between these systems of ritual organization may be sufficient to provide 
each Indian government with a cosmological significance salient to its own culture, 
generating a series of tribal civil religious, so to speak; but the development of distinct ritual 
systems had already generated the foundations for separating Indian social life into distinct 
spheres of "religious" and "political" activity. Thus, under the influence of Euro-American 
notions of government Indian tribes came to possess a form of "religion," that is; a set of 
practices that could be juxtaposed with other aspects of Indian social life.
Religious Freedom and Tribal Governments in the Early Twentieth-Century.
Tribal cosmologies differ from those expressed in Euro-American religions 
inasmuch as those adhering to a tribal cosmology need merely participate in the rituals of 
the tribe rather than attest to the truth of a select body of disputed doctrines. As these Native 
American cosmologies came to be viewed as forms of religion this difference in 
participation would lead to sects with a distinctive body of membership. The membership 
in a tribal religion generally continued to correspond with the political membership of the 
tribe itself, making it easier to draw links between the tribal religion and its official
261cf. Loretta Fowler, Arapahoe Politics 1851-1978: Symbols in Crisis of Authority. (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982) passim; Loretta Fowler, Shared Symbols. Contested 
Meanings: Gos Ventre Culture and History. 1878-1984. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) passim.
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government institutions. This in turn made it more difficult to deal with religious deviation 
among the members o f a given tribe, because such differences in practices could not be 
dismissed as a dispute between sects unconcerned with the welfare of the tribe itself. To 
question the ceremonial practices of an Indian tribe was therefore to question its political 
authority. Quite understandably, tribal officials have often viewed heterodoxical religious 
practices as direct threats to the people whom they represent.
When a few residents of Taos Pueblo took up the ritual practice of ingesting peyote 
(around 1910), for example, they met with near immediate resistance from the tribe's own 
religious authorities. These authorities (the Town Council, the Governor, and the 
Lieutenant Governor of the Pueblo) argued that peyotists would neglect their ceremonial 
duties in the kivas, disrupting the natural cycle of rainfall and threaten the existence of the 
tribe i t s e l f . 2 6 2  Such differences among the membership of the tribe itself seemingly 
constituted a serious threat to the Taoseno universe, just as had been the case with the 
external conflict with the BIA and the Forest Service. John Collier would eventually 
arbitrate the dispute, leading to a compromise in which the "peyote boys" agreed to keep up 
with their kiva duties in addition to any practices associated with the controversial d r u g .2 6 3  
Collier's approach to the conflict illustrated a concern for the religious freedom of 
individual Taoseno, but the event also illustrated that such religious freedom constituted a 
threat to the ceremonial foundations of the tribe itself. In the end compromise was possible 
only because the practices at issue could be viewed as something other than mutually 
exclusive religious propositions, a fact owing to the difference between Indian and Euro- 
American "religions." It was not to be the last time that support for tribal self-government 
conflicted with the freedom of conscience belonging to individual Indians.
262see Burton C. Dustin, Pevotism and New Mexico. Farmington, New Mexico: Vergara Printing 
Company, 1960) 8-16; Omar C. Stewart, Pevote Religion: A History. (1987. Norman and London: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1990) 202-209.
263£)ustin, 8-16. Note that prior to the Collier administration Taoseno authorities found ready support from 
Commissioner Edmund Burke over the need to suppress peyotism at Taos; Stewart, 208.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 2
The practice o f ingesting peyote, or Lophophora williamsii, has its origins among 
native peoples o f Central America such as the Aztec and H u i c h o l . 2 6 4  The top of this 
variety of cactus is normally dried out yielding something often described as a "button," 
and these "peyote buttons" contain several different alkaloids which are the source of a 
variety of hallucinogenic a f f e c t s .2 6 5  The natural habitat of this cactus extends into only a 
small portion of the United States, being entirely contained within the borders o f  T e x a s .2 6 6  
Yet, today the famed buttons are regarded as a kind of sacrament by members of the Native 
American Church practicing throughout North America. The contemporary form of peyote 
rituals can be traced to the practices of Kiowa, Commanche, and Caddoan natives settled in 
Oklahoma during the late nineteenth-century who popularized a pattern of rituals associated 
with the use of the peyote in North A m e r i c a . 2 6 7  Peyotism spread from these tribes 
throughout North America, creating a novel form of religion as well a novel set of legal 
disputes involving tribal, state, and federal officials.
Peyotism is a proselytizing faith, and its spread throughout the Indian population of 
North America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generated a pattern of 
religious diversity unfamiliar to most tribal authorities. Peyotism incorporated nativistic 
themes, but the practice of peyotism did not match the particular ceremonial framework 
traditionally associated with any particular tribe. Hence, the appearance of peyotism at any 
particular reservation posed a novel problem to tribal authorities unaccustomed to sectarian 
differences. As peyotism grew into something of a pan-Indian religion it met with 
considerable opposition from tribal, state, and federal officials. Federal attempts to pass a 
national anti-peyote ordinance stimulated the incorporation of an official organization
2^W eston LaBarre, The Pevote Cult. Fifth Edition, (1938 Norman and London: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1989) 7; Stewart, 16-30.
265LaBaue^ 7
266stewart, 10.
267Lagar^g 7 .9 . Stewart, 30-42.
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known as the Native American Church in 1 9 1 8 .2 6 8  And while attempts to suppress 
peyotism at the federal and state level have frequently been associated with a general 
concern over the drug's narcotic affects, tribal efforts to proscribe its use generally dealt 
with the ceremonial significance of peyote religion as a potential threat to traditional 
ceremonial systems.
The Native American Church met with particularly staunch resistance on the Navajo 
reservation. Navajo authorities arrested two peyotists in 1938 and charged them with 
"possession of dope on the Navajo R e s e r v a t i o n . "2 6 9  Jacob C. Morgan, then chairman of 
the Navajo tribe, marshaled subsequent efforts to prevent the spread of peyotism on the 
reservation, leading to a 1940 ordinance proscribing the use or possession of peyote on the 
Navajo r e s e r v a t i o n . 2 7 0  The introduction of peyote rituals into the Navajo Reservation was 
not the only innovation then facing the tribe. In passing the ordinance the Tribal Council 
expressed a similar concern over changes then taking place in the Squaw Dance part of a 
ceremony known as the Enemy Way, and debate over the significance of peyote appears to 
have been colored somewhat by general concerns over the integrity of the entire Navajo 
ceremonial system.27l Such concerns were directly reflected in the wording o f the law 
itself:
WHEREAS its use is not connected with any Navajo religious practice and is in 
contradiction to the traditional ceremonies of the Navajo people;
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that as far as the Navajo people are concerned 
peyote is harmful and foreign to our traditional way of l i f e .2 7 2
268stewart, 222-25.
269stewart, 295; David Aberle, The Pevote Religion Among the Navaho. Second Edition, (1966. Norman 
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982) 110.
270stewart,295-97; Aberle, 110-113; Peter Iverson, The Navaio Nation. (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1981)39; Garrick Bailey and Roberta Glenn Bailey, A History of the Navaios: The 
Reservation Years. (Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, 1986) 226-227.
271 Aberle, 112.
272Navaio Tribal Council Resolutions. 1922-1951, (n.d. Mimeo., Window Rock, Arizona: 107-8. Quoted 
in Aberle 113.
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The ordinance went on to prescribe a sentence of up to nine months of labor a n d /o ra  fine 
of up to $ 100.00 for anyone convicted of possession on the Navajo R e s e r v a t i o n .2 7 3
Navajo response to the Native American Church placed BIA officials in a tenuous 
position, illustrating the paradoxical effects o f a policy designed to support tribal 
governments while ensuring that the actions o f tribal authorities were consistent with 
democratic principles of government. Unlike previous Commissioners, John Collier 
viewed the practices associated with peyotism as matters involving freedom of conscience. 
Such a view could not have been more inconsistent with that of Navajo Council-members 
who were trying to protect the ceremonial foundations of the Navajo community. Collier 
deferred to the discretion of the tribe over the use of its own "police powers" and 
recommended approval of the ordinance.274 He later stipulated, however, that no federal 
employee (including Navajo policemen) could be used to enforce it.275 Hence, the 1940 
ordinance remained on the books, but received only sporadic enforcement even after Collier 
had left his position as Commissioner of the BIA. The Navajo Tribal Council held further 
hearings on the matter, and members of the Native American Church sought to reassure 
Council-members that their actions would not conflict with traditional patterns of Navajo 
ceremonial organization.276
During the nineteen-fifties the Native American Church sought with the aid of the 
American Civil Liberties Union to have the Navajo ordinance overturned as an infringement 
on the right of free exercise. In 1959 the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
delivered what was to be the final word from the courts on the issue. Justice Walter A. 
Huxman wrote the opinion o f the Court in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal
273Navajo Tribal Council Resolutions, in Aberle, 113. 
274stewart, 296-97; Aberle, 114.
275 Aberle, 114.
276stewart, 297-303; Aberle, 113-119.
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Council. Citing Felix S. Cohen's influential Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Huxman 
established that (1) Indian tribes originally possessed all the powers o f a sovereign state,
(2) Conquest of Indian tribes negated "external powers" of sovereignty such as the power 
to negotiate treaties with foreign nations but left the internal powers of self government 
intact, and (3) the internal powers of tribal government were subject to change through 
explicit means such as treaties or l e g i s l a t i o n .2 7 7  Having thus recounted the basic tenets of 
Marshal's theory, Huxman wrote:
No law is cited and none has been found which undertakes to subject the Navajo tribe to 
the laws of the United States with respect to their internal affairs, such as police powers 
and ordinances passed for the purposes of regulating the conduct of the members of the 
tribe on the reservation. It follows that Federal courts are without jurisdiction over matters 
involving purely penal ordinances passed by the Navajo legislative body for the regulation
of life on the reservation.278
Thus, the case before the Tenth Circuit Court failed to meet the criterion spelled out in the 
third prong of Cohen's narrative, leaving the matter solely at the discretion of tribal 
authorities. Having thus established that no specific law provided his court with jurisdiction 
to hear the case, he would go on to dispense with the First Amendment claims of the Native 
American Church in like manner:
No case is cited and none has been found where the impact of the First Amendment with 
respect to religious freedom and freedom of worship by members of Indian tribes has been 
before the c o u rt.. .
No provision in the Constitution makes the First Amendment applicable to Indian nations 
nor is there any law of Congress doing so. It follows that neither, under the Constitution or 
the laws o f Congress, do the Federal courts have jurisdiction of tribal laws or regulations, 
even though they may have an impact to some extent on forms of religious worship.279
Thus, the court made it clear that no general appeal to the First Amendment would be
sufficient to gain free exercise relief for the Native American Church, at least not from
actions taken by the Navajo Tribal Council.
277Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d 133-34 (Tenth Circuit, 1959). 
278jyjative American Church, 272 F. 2d 134 (1959).
279Native American Church, 272 F. 2d 134-35 (1959).
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The Native American Church would eventually settle its differences with Navajo 
authorities, but the decision reached in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council 
would call public attention to the case law regarding provisions of the Bill of Rights in 
cases involving tribal authorities. The dispute theoretically involved questions about 
freedom of conscience and the integrity o f tribal institutions. Viewed in such terms, it 
would have been very difficult to see how a federal court could fail to uphold the values of 
the First Amendment, but of course the court itself did not have the luxury of approaching 
the First Amendment from such a decontextualized vantage point. Huxman had in effect 
demonstrated his court's own lack of authority to hear the case, and hence denied the 
interactional pattern necessary to consider the merits of any free exercise case dealing with a 
tribal ordinance. In this respect, the Tenth Circuit decision would take its place in a string 
of cases denying the relevance of the Bill of Rights to matters involving tribal authorities.
The idea that the Bill of Rights did not apply to tribal jurisdiction followed directly 
from the principles of trust doctrine. Trust doctrine and the related principle of plenary 
power effectively gave Congress the authority to do as it liked with Indian tribes, but it also 
required explicit legislation from Congress for each such encroachment on Indian 
sovereignty. This requirement even applied to Constitutional principles, and so until 
Congress had passed legislation applying the Bill of Rights to American Indians they 
would remain without any of the Constitutional protections enjoyed by other Americans. In 
Talton V. Mayes, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply 
to legislation passed by the Cherokee N a t i o n .2 8 0  in Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine 
Ridge the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth 
Amendments applied to tribal legislation regarding taxation.28i And in Toledo v. Pueblo 
de Jemez. The District Court of New Mexico ruled against a free exercise complaint quite
280ralton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
281 Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge, 259 F. 2d 553 (Eighth Circuit, 1958).
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similar to that brought by the Native American Church against Navajo a u t h o r i t i e s . 282 i n
this case Protestant members of the Pueblo had argued that its authorities;
denied them the right to bury their dead in the community cemetery; denied them the right to 
build a church of their own on Pueblo land; prohibited them from using their homes for 
church purposes; refused to permit Protestant missionaries freely to enter the Pueblo at 
reasonable times; deprived some of them of the right to use the communal threshing 
machine which threatened the loss of their wheat crop. They (the protestant plaintiffs) also 
allege that the Pueblo threatened them with the loss of their birth rights, homes and 
personal property unless they accept the Catholic r e l i g io n .2 8 3
In this passage one can see the influence of Catholic and Protestant churches 
reproducing old sectarian disputes in Indian territory, but more importantly one can also see 
the Pueblo's own struggle to maintain a kind o f ceremonial integrity in the context of a 
small interdependent community (not to mention the vulnerability of Protestant members to 
official coercion in such a community). Pueblo Indians had long since learned to 
accommodate their own ceremonies and those of the Catholic Church, but the introduction 
of Protestant views into the tribe generated a new pattem of sectarian disputes; and this free 
exercise challenge to the tribal authorities at Jemez threatened to make such dissidence a 
fundamental right and create an official place for such squabbles in the future. Only the 
absence o f appropriate jurisdiction prevented this fundamental change in Pueblo social life, 
and the specific finding that it lacked such a jurisdiction by the District Court o f  New 
Mexico provided yet another precedent demonstrating the irrelevance of the federal Bill of 
Rights to actions taken by tribal authorities throughout the United States. Huxman cited 
each of these rulings in the opinion rendered for Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal 
Council, building up a case history supporting his own approach to the i s s u e .2 8 4
282xoledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D. New Mexico, 1954). 
283ioIedo, 119 F. Supp. 430 (1954).
284Native American Church, 272 F. 2d 134 (1959).
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The American Indian Civil Rights Act: Cosmology and Compromise.
If a case history demonstrating the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to tribal 
jurisdiction could be seen as a warrant for a judicial decision denying Native Americans a 
right o f free exercise, this same case history could also be seen as a reason for passing 
legislation. Much as the decision in Crow Dog precipitated efforts to extend the long arm of 
Anglo law onto the reservation, the decision in Native American Church sparked efforts to 
ensure tribal respect for civil rights through federal legislation. The subject was the focus of 
hearings for seven years before a Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights run by 
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina. Testimony before the subcommittee demonstrated 
that substantial abuses were occurring throughout America's tribal courts, many of which 
were attributed to the lack o f training and financial resources provided to the Indian court 
system.285 Indian witnesses told Congress about a range of alarming practices ranging 
from illegal extradition o f Native Americans to off-reservation authorities to court 
procedures which in effect forced a witness to testify against h i m s e l f . 2 8 6  Such graphic 
testimony pertaining to the abuse of Indian prisoners combined with the realization that 
Indian courts were not obliged to answer for these abuses to any higher jurisdiction, 
creating a substantial case for new legislation.
Ervin originally submitted eight bills and one resolution on the subject of Indian 
civil rights to the Senate, including one provision which would have literally incorporated
285wunder, 133-34. Some of the more graphic evidence o f abuse by both Indian and state officials came 
from field hearings. For example, see testimony gathered at Sacaton, Arizona in U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Constitutional Rights of the 
American Indian. Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session, (on November 25,29, and December 1, 1961) 
357-420; See also testimony conducted at field hearings in Denver, Colorado; Pierre, South Dakota; and 
Minot, North Dakota in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights o f the Committee 
on the Judiciary, Constitutional Rights of the American Indian. Eighty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 
(on June 1,2, and 6, 1962) 512-810.
286por these specific examples see Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Constitutional Rights of the American Indian. Eighty-Seventh Congress, First 
Session, (on November 25,29, and December 1,1961) pages 371-72 and 366 respectively.
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the federal Bill of Rights into the jurisdiction of the tribal a u t h o r i t i e s . 2 8 7  Ervin's proposals 
drew harsh criticism from Native Americans concerned that such constitutional scrutiny 
would prove anathema to the political authority of native "theocracies," lead to challenges 
over the criteria used to define tribal membership, overtax the limited resources of tribal 
courts with additional procedures, and force those courts to over-emphasize the value of 
"confrontation and punishment" in dealing with legal d i s p u t e s . 2 8 8  i n  response to these 
concerns Ervin amended his proposals creating a single bill, known as the "Indian Civil 
Rights Act" or the "Indian Bill of Rights," which comprised six of the seven provisions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Titles II-VII). Title II o f the ICRA includes most of the 
provisions o f the Bill of Rights, though not - as noted before; the Establishment clause. 
There are other differences between the ICRA and the Bill of Rights. For example. Title II 
omits aspects the Fifth and Sixth Amendment as well as the entire provisions of the 
Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments in their e n t i r e t y .2 8 9  For the most 
part, however, passage of the ICRA established a legal framework sufficient to protect the 
civil rights of Indians from tribal authorities.
Ervin attached his proposal to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and argued 
convincingly for its passage. The same case history cited by Justice Huxman in support of 
the decision in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council provided Ervin with 
material supporting the need for an Indian Bill of Rights. He entered his own version of 
this case history into the Congressional record, adding remarks about additional cases 
relevant to the subject and devoting a significant portion of his remarks to the Native 
American Church and Toledo cases. Ervin's remarks included references to State v. Big
287wunder, 135-36.
288wunder, 136.
289civ ii Riphts-Riots-Fair Housing-Civil Obedience. Statutes at Large. Title H, sec. 202,94-95 (1968). 
For a detailed comparison of the of the provisions contained in the federal Bill of Rights and those of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, see Wunder, 136-39.
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Sheep, an early peyote case which received an unfavorable ruling from the Supreme Court 
o f Montana.290 He also cited the case of Glover v. United States in which the District 
Court of M ontana had denied a petition for habeus corpus in relation to a drinking and 
driving conviction on the Flathead Indian Reservation.^^) Ervin contrasted these and other 
cases pertaining to tax laws and tribal membership with Colliflower v. United States, a case 
which in his terms "virtually stands alone in upholding the competence of a federal court to 
inquire into the legality of an Indian c o u r t . " 2 9 2  This single example provided Ervin with 
the proverbial exception that proves the rule. The Colliflower decision made it possible for 
him to contrast a long string of cases of which he disapproved with a single case upholding 
constitutional values, thus effectively articulating his own sense of value through the 
narrative form of a misbegotten case history. Only one court in all the land had been able to 
defend the civil rights of an Indian facing the wrath of a tribal court based on constitutional 
principles, and it was up to Congress to come to the rescue.
Such a case history provided ample fodder for a political decision motivated by 
much an historical ideology by now familiar to the history of Indian-white relations. Ervin 
had framed the significance of his bill in terms of a projected historical narrative:
In introducing these proposals, I wish to emphasize that these bills should not be 
considered the final solution to the many serious constitutional problems confronting the 
American Indian. A system of law and order for the Indian tribes of America which is in 
keeping with the rights and privileges other Americans enjoy, will take years to develop.
290u.s. Congress, Senate, Senator Ervin of North Carolina, Congressional Record, vol. 113 (May 23, 
1967) 13474. Note that State v. Big Sheep, was decided in 1926, not 1962 as indicated in the 
Congressional Record, And that the controlling principle of case law in dealing with the Free Exercise 
clause was still defined under the belief action distinction introduced under Reynolds (see chapter 1). This 
fact was cited by the court in Big Sheep, indicating that the claim had dim prospects even in the absence of 
jurisdictional questions. State v. Big Sheep, 243 Pacific Reporter, 1073 (Supreme Court of Montana, 
January 26, 1926).
291 The motion for a writ of habeus corpus charged that the defendant had been convicted without legal 
representation, but given the fact that the case took place on an Indian reservation the District Court ruled 
that he had no right to representation, at least not one that could be enforced by a federal court. See 
Congressional Record. 113 (May 23, 1967) 13474; Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Montana, 
Missoula Division, 1963).
292congressional Record. 113 (May 23, 1967) 13474.
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The substance of these bills, however, is an exceedingly important and necessary part o f 
this g o a l . 2 9 3
Presented in these terms the proposals would prepare the way for a future in which Indians 
enjoy the same "rights and privileges" as other Americans, effectively providing a happy 
solution to the plot formed in a dismal case history. Thus, Ervin characterized the conflict 
in terms o f individual actors all o f whom were basically "Americans," thus effectively 
eliding any questions about the relationship between Indian tribes and other government 
entities. This sense o f the historical context behind the ICRA was clearly informed by the 
world view described earlier as a form of American civil religion, a cosmology filled by 
individuals vested with natural rights. And the historical significance of Ervin's proposals 
could be derived from a narrative role projected into the future. Passage of the ICRA would 
reverse the trend cases denying federal Courts jurisdiction to protect the civil rights of the 
American Indian, providing a glorious chapter in the progress of freedom, a theme 
appealing to both liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . 2 9 4
At stake in the passage o f the ICRA was the ability to create a legal foundation for 
popular sentiments that the principles of American jurisprudence were significantly 
implicated in the relationship between Indians and their tribes. In a sense the Colliflower 
decision had been predicated on a similar contextualization strategy. Justice Merrill 
Dunaway wrote the opinion for the court in Colliflower. arguing that because Indian courts 
act in effect as a kind of federal agency, and as such; they are bound by the terms of the
293congressional record. 1 13  (May 2 3 , 1 9 6 7 )  1 3 4 7 3 .
294xhe final text of the ICRA did not extend full Constitutional protections to Native Americans, due 
largely to the fact that its only provision for enforcement lay in a writ of habeus corpus. See Statutes at 
Large. Title II, sec. 2 0 3 , 9 5  ( 1 9 6 8 ) .  This would allow individuals imprisoned by tribal authorities to obtain 
their freedom in the event that their rights had been violated under the terms of the ICRA, but it would not 
provide a remedy for civil claims emerging from tribal practices. It initially appeared that the courts might 
miss this fact when the district court of Arizona ruled that the Navajo tribe had acted improperly in 
banishing a white lawyer from the reservation. See Dodge v. Nakai, 2 9 8  F. Supp. 17 (D. Arizona, 1 9 6 8 );  
Dodge V . Nakai, 2 9 8  F. Supp. 2 6  (D. Arizona, 1 9 6 9 ) .  In 1 9 7 8 , however, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled against a Santa Clara woman who claimed that her rights had been violated when her children had been 
denied membership in this patrilineal tribe. The Supreme Court thus clarified that the ICRA provided no 
relief for such claims insofar as they did not involve criminal proceedings. See, Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 4 3 6  U.S. 4 9  (1 9 7 8 ) .
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federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . 2 9 5  Read as such the interactional significance of a tribal court cannot 
but implicate the moral responsibilities of the federal courts and every American. Hence, 
the rationale for both the Colliflower decision and the Indian Civil Rights Act was rooted in 
a need to enforce the cosmology of Western style constitutionalism on the actions of tribal 
authorities. But whereas the Colliflower decision reflected an idiosyncratic position that the 
federal courts already possessed the ritual authority to enforce this position, support for the 
ICRA was predicated on the need to create that authority in through federal legislation. 
Federal legislation is itself a form of ritual authority, and as Mertz has illustrated (see 
chapter 1); it is the proper such of ritual authority for advances into indigenous territory 
within the boundaries of the United States. Prior to the passage of the ICRA both Ervin's 
position and that of Justice Dunaway could be dismissed as little more than a poetic trope, 
but with the passage of this act it would become a poetic trope backed by federal law.
From the preceding remarks it appears that the campaign for an Indian Bill of 
Rights shares some of the features of a sectarian dispute, at least insofar as the images used 
to support the bill were derived from a fundamental sense of cosmological order. Federal 
and tribal authorities did not share a common set of assumptions about the social 
composition of legal authority and its relationship to a natural order, and had this been the 
case neither Toledo nor the Native American Church cases would have occurred. The 
campaign to pass an Indian Bill of Rights differed from a sectarian dispute, however, 
inasmuch as it was not a function of theoretical polemics; supporters of the ICRA sought 
direct control over the practices o f Native American courts rather than theoretical 
concessions about the shape of the universe. ICRA supporters did not frame their 
differences in terms of an abstract dispute over the religious beliefs.. For those tribes
295colliflower v. Garland, 3 4 2  F . 2 d  3 6 9  (Ninth Circuit, 1 9 6 5 ) .  Note also that a similar line of argument 
had been attempted in connection to Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council. The defendant's in 
this case sued then Secretary o f the Interior, Stewart Udall, arguing that his approval the anti-peyote 
ordinance constituted an abridgement of the First Amendment. This attempt to address federal involvement 
in a tribal anti-peyote ordinance, failed, however, when the court ruled that no federal officials had actually 
endorsed the ordinance itself, James Oliver et. al. v. Stewart Udall, 3 0 6  F . 2 d  8 1 9  (Tenth Circuit, 1 9 6 2 ).
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whose political authorities were deeply rooted in a cosmological order other than that 
presupposed in a civil libertarian tradition, however, the act had all the potential 
implications of an attack on their world view. The ICRA would force Indian tribes to adopt 
an orientation towards legal matters derived from an entirely different vision of social 
organization and cosmology.
Congress dealt with the conflict between the prospect of an Indian Bill of Rights 
and the religious concerns of Indian tribes, at least to the extent that it chose to omit an 
Establishment clause from the provisions of the ICRA.296 This decision made sense in 
view of the fact that a distinction between "religious" and "political" practices remained 
foreign to many Indian tribes (particularly the Pueblos). And yet, the decision is also 
something o f a paradox, given the fact that concern over tribal actions limiting free exercise 
had played such a key role leading up to the ICRA in the first p l a c e .2 9 7  The principles 
behind the Establishment clause and the Free Exercise clause are frequently combined in 
master-narratives explaining the significance of the First Amendment. Indeed, it is quite 
common to speak o f them as though they constituted a single provision dictated by a single 
principle. And this is precisely what one might expect, given the fact that the cosmology 
implicit in American constitutionalism serves to isolate sectarian disputes, envisioning 
"religion" as something that can be divorced from "politics." Thus, many would argue that 
prohibition of an established religion is itself a cmcial guarantee against infringement on the 
right of free exercise. Hence, the omission of an Establishment clause constitutes no small 
concession to the interests of tribal cosmology.
So, it appears that Congress recognized the degree to which a total separation of 
religious and political institutions would undermine the ritual foundations of Indian
29&See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 
1982) 667; Robert S. Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 
1978," Journal of the American Academv of Religion, LU (1984) 95; Michaelsen, "American Indian 
Relgious Freedom Act Litigation," 51-52; Pevar, 242; Wunder, 136, 138.
297xjiis is a point raised by Cohen, 667n.
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government as such. But to the extent that the ICRA does contain a version of the Free 
Exercise clause the bill does require Indian tribes to work with some definite notions about 
"religion," thus generating a conceptual isolation between a specific set o f rituals and other 
aspects of social life. To the extent that tribal court's must be able to define "religion" in 
order to protect free exercise they must be able to distinguish it from non-religious practices 
in order to narrow the prospects for free exercise litigation. This same sort of distinction 
would provide the state and federal courts of the United States with enough trouble once 
they began to deal with the AIRFA, but for now the problem was passed off on to tribal 
institutions. Hence, the ICRA does serve to generate a set of distinctions foreign to the 
workings of tribal cosmology.
The simple omission of an Establishment clause provided a important compromise, 
because had Congress insisted on such a clause it would have in effect canceled the 
authority of many tribal institutions. Such a compromise could be made to the extent that it 
functioned only within the context of tribal jurisdiction; but the pattem of events leading up 
to passage of the ICRA nevertheless reveals an underlying conflict between Indian 
cosmology and the social categories used in constitutional thought. The presumption by 
federal authorities that the conflict related to political matters cast the difference between 
these systems in terms other than the sectarian conflicts defining matters of "religion." For 
many Indians this was and continues to be an arbitrary distinction.
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Chapter IV:
Sacred Geography and Historical Ideology in the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act.
When the domestic ideology is divided according to American Indian and Western 
European immigrant, however, the fundamental difference is one o f great philosophical 
importance. American Indians hold their lands - places - as having the highest possible 
meaning, and all their statements are made with this reference point in mind. Im m ig ran ts  
review the movement of their ancestors across the continent as a steady progression of 
basically good events and experiences, thereby placing history - time - in the best possible 
light. When one group is concerned with the philosophical problem of space and the other 
with the philosophical problem of time, then the statements of either group do not make 
much sense when transferred from one context to the other w ithout the proper 
consideration of what is h a p p e n i n g . 2 9 8
Vine Deloria, Jr., God is Red: A Native View of Religion.
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 came up for a vote before Congressmen 
familiar with a brand o f civil rights activism strongly associated with desegregation efforts 
following the 1953 case of Brown v. Board of Education. This notable case had given birth 
to the famous statement that "Separate educational facilities are inherently u n e q u a l . " 2 9 9  
That concise principle would capture the imagination of civil rights activists for years to 
come and define the terms of national debate over civil rights long after support for 
affirmative action programs had replaced opposition to Jim Crow laws as the primary cause 
o f liberal activism in America. Had the Supreme Court merely decided in Brown that the 
system of school segregation at issue had in fact perpetuated inequality, history might have 
followed a very different course; but instead the Court declared that segregated schools 
were "inherently unequal," thus displaying a kind of moral certitude regarding the case
298vine Deloria Jr., God is Red. (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1 9 7 3 )  7 5 -7 6 .  
299Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 3 4 7  U.S. 4 9 3 - 9 5  (1 9 5 4 ) .
1 3 5
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before it through reference to a universal principle.300 The text o f the Brown decision 
therefore seems to have offered the notion that separate facilities were "inherently unequal" 
as a principle of faith.^o* And indeed this was a principle of faith that many were willing to 
adhere to, as subsequent thought would decontextualize the notion into the basis for an 
expansive philosophy of civil rights.
Despite the rhetorical stance taken by the Supreme Court in Brown, its decision was 
a historically specific response to a historically specific form of persecution. The Court's 
famous pronouncement may have been well suited to the context of civil rights activism in 
the nineteen-fifties and sixties, but only a perverse inattention to historical context could 
equate the moral significance of desegregation with that of later opposition to affirmative 
a c t i o n . 202 An equation between either of these issues and the interests associated with 
reservation life would seem even more implausible. And yet such an equation had been 
made in 1968, (and it would again be made in 1990). Senator Ervin, himself a 
segregationist, had championed the ICRA through rhetoric familiar to the civil rights 
movement (and to conservatives supporting assimilation of Native Americans), but his 
efforts actually preceded the major voices of an American Indian civil rights m o v e m e n t .2 0 3  
Radical Native American political activism would reach its peak of public attention during
390Recourse to the a-prioristic language implied by the phrase "inherently unequal" may be read in this 
respect as a kind of affect display, signalling the surety of the court about its Judgement. Whereas the 
notion that separate facilities are constitute an "inherently unequal" institutional arrangement would seem to 
form a universal proposition easily applicable to a broad range of subjects, the interactional significance of 
the phrase is perhaps best read as an index of the court's moral certitude in the context o f the Brown case 
itself. C.f. William Labov's work on the affective significance of adverbial quantifiers, "Intensity, "
Meaning. Form and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications, ed., Deborah Schiffrin, (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1984) 48-67 passim.
301 See J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration 1954- 
1978. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) 34-35. Wilkinson notes that members of the the Supreme 
Court had expressed fears that a decision declaring segregation wrong in theory could be undermined in 
practice, 24. He also notes that many defenders of the Brown decision have been reluctant to undertake any 
proof that Southern segregation was in fact harmful to Blacks, viewing this as an obvious fact, 34-36.
302c.f. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech: And it's a Good Thing. Too. (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 60-69,78.
303gee Wunder, \24-46 passim.
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the nineteen-seventies; and its leadership would pursue a set of interests entirely distinct 
from those which defined the struggle over d e s e g r e g a t i o n . 2 0 4  Such activists often found 
themselves at odds with both liberal and conservative political philosophies and the 
constant preoccupation with equality that had grown to characterize debates between them.
Whereas early civil rights activists had pushed for a kind of equality (effectively 
framing their political identity in terms consistent with social contract theory), and later 
efforts would focus on problems associated with a  more permanent minority status; Indian 
activists typically presented a strong case for separatism throughout the nineteen-seventies. 
In this regard Native American political activism could potentially be equated with later 
developments in civil rights struggles such as the "Black Power" movement, except that its 
own agenda was generally predicated on a distinct set of political relationships associated 
with tribal sovereignty. The trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal 
government effectively provided certain Indian claims to differential treatment under the law 
with a stronger legal footing than had been the case for their largely Afro-American 
counterparts. Thus, a good deal of Indian activism centered around interests defined in 
varying degrees by tribal institutions, and many activists developed a rhetorical position 
consistent with the basic ideological framework of trust d o c t r i n e .2 0 5
Whereas the Marshall court had generated the legal foundations of trust doctrine out 
of rhetoric which placed a positive value on the future and defined the space of Indian 
territory as an obstacle to that future; contemporary Indian activists sought to defend the 
space of Indian territory from the oppressive march o f American imperialism. The 
rhetorical dimensions of either position rested on a largely identical descriptive sense of 
American history, one constituting a meta-historical thesis, or "philosophy o f  h i s t o r y . "2 0 6
204wunder, 144-46; Deloria, Custer. 168-96.
205Mertz, "The Uses of History," 678-81; Wall, "Space, Time and Cultural Landscape," passim. 
206c.f. Lowith, \ - \9  passim; Hayden White, 1-25, 101-120 paw/m.
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Such a meta-historical thesis (that "U.S. history is progress / imperialism") could be 
employed as an implicit narrative theme prefiguring each of the empirical events dealt with 
in a given utterance or text. In this respect the rhetorical stance taken by many Indian 
activists has not differed much from the structural pattem employed by Marshall, but they 
have inverted the values associated with assimilationist versions of trust doctrine. Indian 
political activists typically sought to impress upon others the distinctive virtues of an Indian 
land ethic, fashioning a pan-Indian spiritualism out o f images such as "Mother Earth."20? 
Hence, pan-Indian rhetoric transformed the space of Indian territory, once presented as an 
obstacle to American progress, into a sacred bulwark against economic exploitation of the 
American landscape. By reversing the values attached to the structural framework of 
Indian-white relations in this manner, Indian activists began to develop a master-narrative 
providing them with considerable symbolic capital for use in a broad range of political 
conflicts.
In his book, God is Red. Vine Deloria, Jr. articulated the prospects of a distinctly 
Native American theology and illustrated the significance of that theology through an 
historical commentary on the political ethos of American Indian activism. A Hunkpapa 
Dakota with degrees from both seminary and law schools, Deloria had been the executive 
director o f the National Congress of American Indians; and his work has consistently 
reflected a strong concern for both the legal and spiritual dimensions of Indian life.208 
Originally published in 1973, God is Red served to define the much of the religious 
thought found in subsequent Indian activism. In the second edition of God is Red, 
published in 1994, he would recall:
307see Gill. Mother Earth. 129-50 passim.
308On his life and relationship to the early years of American Indian activism, see Vine Deloria, Jr., "This 
Country Was a Lot Better Off When the Indians Were Running it." Red Power: The American Indians' 
Fight For Freedom, ed., Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., (1971. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1985) 235-47.
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In 1972 when I was writing the first version of this book, I sought to emphasize the role 
that spaces and places play in our human religious experience.
From the invasion of Alcatraz in 1969 to the occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973, 
I felt that the various Indian protests had a much deeper meaning than simply securing 
additional lands for reservations. At the bottom of everything, I believed then and continue 
to believe, is a religious view of the world that seeks to locate our species within a fabric of 
life that constitutes the natural world, the land and all its various forms of life. As long as 
Indians exist there will be conflict between the tribes and any group that carelessly despoils 
the land and the life it supports. At the deepest philosophic^ level our universe must have 
as a structure a set of relationships in which all entities participate. Within the physical 
world this universal stmcture can best be understood as a recognition of the sacredness of
places.209
Deloria's conviction that Indian activism had its roots in a distinct philosophy of religion 
was in many respects a self-fulfilling prophesy. To the extent that he and others concerned 
with Indian political rights characterized their political agenda in such terms, they 
successfully refashioned an ostensibly political conflict into an ostensibly religious debate. 
And this seem s fair enough, given the artificial grounds on which Am erican 
constitutionalism separates religion from politics into distinct spheres of social activity. 
Much of Deloria's position is an essentially accurate appraisal o f the interests defining 
Indian activism (a kind of self awareness, to the extent that he himself was interested in the 
cause o f Indian rights); but his position also betrays a kind of rationalization of the 
categories o f Indian-white relations. At times he seems to load the significance of an entire 
environmental ethic into the terms "space" and "place," thus characterizing a presumably 
universal structure of relations between all entities in terms more familiar to to the dynamics 
of human territorial consciousness. In this manner his attempt to describe the interactional 
schema relating people to the environment is skewed by an interactional schemata in which 
humans are the major actors and the environment is confined to the role of objective 
consciousness.
Deloria's writings contain many passages attributing a deep spiritual significance to 
the environment, but his message is hindered by reliance on the spatial categories defining
209Deloria, God is Red. (1994), 1-2.
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Indian t e r r i t o r y . 2 1 0  Given that contemporary federal control over Indian life is normally 
defined in terms of spatial consciousness (as federal jurisdiction over reservation lands), 
Deloria's attempts to situate the significance of Native American environmentalism in terms 
o f "space" and "place" conveys a specific set of legal implications; but this strategy does 
have its limitations. It is easy to see how a general respect for the environment could lend 
support for a political agenda designed to safeguard or expand the territory of an Indian 
reservation; but it is difficult to see how the defense of such a territory would prove an 
adequate response to the threat posed by an American public "carelessly despoiling the land 
and the life it lives on." Thus, Deloria's position exhibits a kind of ambivalence regarding 
the dimensions of political conflict between Indians and whites. His commentary moves 
freely back and forth between the terms of a general dispute over the significance that the 
environment "should have for us all," so to speak, and the particular significance that it 
takes for Native Americans given the role provided them within the structure of Indian- 
white relations.
Deloria's more general statements generate a (by now familiar) pro-Indian Master- 
narrative. He and other Indian activists have successfully used this master-narrative to 
confer an abstract significance to the concrete circumstances o f numerous political disputes 
involving Native Americans. Each particular battle over an Indian policy can then be seen 
as another event in a long history o f conflict between Indians and whites over the proper 
significance of the American landscape. According to Deloria Euro-Americans have 
essentially forsaken the spiritual dimensions of their own interaction with nature and are far 
more interested in pursuing a historical vision in which the environment is confined to the 
domain of utilitarian values. Thus, it is left to Indians to speak on behalf of the natural 
order, report on the proper dialogue between man and nature, and illustrate such a dialogue 
through their own actions. Deloria's philosophy o f history allows him to situate any
310see also Vine Deloria, The Metaphysics of Modem Existence. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1979) passim.
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particular victory for a Native American cause within a broader sense o f historical 
teleology, thus portraying it as a kind o f victory for the environment with which (or 
whom), he maintains, they have a special relationship. According to such a view the major 
political interests o f Native Americans are defined by a distinct set of political relationships 
and an equally distinctive pattern o f environmental praxis. There is little place for "equality" 
in this rhetoric, and a good deal that celebrates difference.
Deloria's works reflected the general sense o f an emerging brand of political 
activism, and he sharpened the terms through which its advocates could address a larger 
audience. Cultural differences formed a key theme in the rhetoric used by Native American 
civil rights activists, and a healthy respect for the environment generated the most 
recognizable of these differences. By affirming an orientation towards the environment 
which was understood to be inconsistent with the terms o f Euro-American social 
organization. Native American activists forced environmental issues into the arena of 
discourse about civil rights. Many young activists demanded the right to interact with 
nature in terms defined within their own sense of cultural order, and they drew frequent 
support from elder practitioners of "traditional Indian religions." Thus, it should come as 
no surprise to find that environmental issues would play a significant role in the politics of 
Indian rights.
It should also come as no surprise that the category of "religion" would serve as a 
key theme through which Indians could articulate their own distinctive patterns of 
interaction with the environment to a broader American public. The Taos campaign for 
control o f Blue Lake had already prepared many of the themes defining this role. 
Americans were by now familiar with a general sense that Indian culture involved a kind of 
religious devotion to the environment; and Congress had already supplied a legislative 
precedent defining this ethos as a kind o f free exercise interest, at least to the degree that it 
could be related to specific features of the natural environment. Moreover, the principle 
compromise included in the ICRA, its omission of an Establishment Clause, further
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illustrated Congressional willingness to accommodate cultural differences insofar as they 
affected religion. Thus, notions of "religious freedom" came to form a privileged rhetorical 
theme through which to gloss unusual Native American interests, particularly those 
pertaining to the environment, as an issue involving civil rights.
Federal lands outside of the reservation system also served as strategic site for 
conflict between federal agencies and Native Americans, particularly for conflict falling 
under the heading of "religion." Political conflicts which could be located within the space 
of a reservation could usually be addressed in terms of trust doctrine, and to the extent that 
such issues involved living conditions on the reservation it was often more productive for 
activists to focus on this affect than any questions of religious freedom. Enforcement of 
federal policies on federal lands outside of the reservation system, however, posed an 
altogether different set of problems. Indian tribes could not claim direct control over the 
resources contained within such territories, but they could invoke trust responsibilities as 
an argument in favor of specific federal policies.
Contemporary notions of trust doctrine were already defined largely in terms of 
spatial concepts - as a matter of federal jurisdiction over Indian territories; and so by calling 
attention to resources located on off-reservation federal lands Indians could expand the 
spatial parameters relevant to trust doctrine while still working within the language of its 
basic rationale. Such arguments called upon the federal government to exercise control over 
its own territories in a manner consistent with Native American interests. A number of 
Indian tribes had a variety of plausible interests in aspects of federal policy affecting 
management of public lands, because the very public status of such territories had long 
enabled Indians to continue ceremonial practices in remote and undeveloped regions of the 
American landscape. As the general public made more and more use of such regions and 
environmental legislation mounted, however, many Indians found it increasingly difficult 
to practice traditional rites in customary places. A number of concrete interests could
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therefore be directly related to an emerging pattern o f dialogue with federal authorities over 
principles of land management.
Throughout the early nineteen-seventies Native American religious leaders sought 
to negotiate with federal officials concerning the enforcement of laws affecting Native 
American ceremonial practices. In 1977 Senator Abourezk, chairman of the Senate Select 
Committee on Indian Affairs, began to hold hearings to discuss the matter with tribal 
leaders. On December 15, 1977 Abourezk introduced Senate Resolution 102, the product 
o f these hearings, into the Senate on behalf o f him self and ten other Congressmen 
(Senators Humphrey, Kennedy, Inouye, Matsunga, Hatfield, Stevens, Gravel, Goldwater, 
Domenici, and Bartlett). On February 14, 1978 Senators Udall and Blouin introduced a 
companion measure for consideration o f the House o f Representatives (House Joint 
Resolution, 738). These measures would eventually take form as the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act which was signed into law on August 11,1978.
In manner respects passage of the AIRFA appeared to follow the precedent set 
earlier by the Blue Lake Amendment of 1970. For those Congressmen who had been 
concerned about the precedent set by Blue Lake, however, passage of the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act must have been a complete nightmare. The AIRFA was a general 
policy statement presenting an open ended range o f possible applications, and by this time 
it was obvious that several tribal entities asserted a definite religious interest in a significant 
portion of public lands. Thee claims would eventually strain the credibility o f the federal 
policy-makers, the courts, and the general American populace. People would soon learn 
that the American landscape possessed a num ber o f sacred sites, and that this might 
interfere with federal water projects, private logging operations, perhaps even personal 
vacation plans. Thus, in 1978 Congress faced precisely the sort of scenario hinted at so 
darkly in debates over the status of Blue Lake. Under the AIRFA various courts and federal 
policy makers would face a number of unusual free exercise claims, many of which dealt 
specifically with the use of public lands. So, in passing the AIRFA Congress had to
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construct a vision of how principles of religious freedom might be applied to those who 
asserted a spiritual interest in the American landscape.
Senate Joint Resolution 102: the AIRFA Goes to Congress.
Congressional authorities fashioned a discursive role for the AIRFA out of 
ideological patterns familiar to the history of Indian-white relations. Much as the ICRA had 
been presented as an extension of rights properly belonging to all Americans, thus invoking 
a sense of history dominated by images of methodological individualism; the case for 
passage of the AIRFA was always presented in the shadow of the Free Exercise Clause o f 
the First Amendment. The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs 
prepared a report which accompanied S. J. Res. 102; it included a brief statement 
describing the purpose of the bill. "The intent of Senate Joint Resolution 102" it reads "is to 
insure that the policies and procedures o f a variety of federal agencies are brought into 
compliance with the constitutional injunction that Congress shall make no laws abridging 
the free exercise of religion."^^ ’ The report would follow this statement of purpose with a 
discussion of its historical context. This historical commentary served to situate the act 
itself within the relatively narrow context of recent events in federal policy; it also situated 
the act in the context of broader questions about the social and historical relationships 
between Indians and whites. The narrative begins;
Native Americans have an inherent right to the free exercise of their religion. That right is 
reaffirmed by the U.S. Constitution in the Bill of Rights, as well as by many state and 
tribal constitutions. The practice of traditional native Indian religions, outside the Judeo- 
Christian mainstream or in combination with it, is further upheld in the 1968 Indian Civil 
Rights Act.312
2"U .S . Congress, Senate, Native Americans' Right to Believe and Exercise Their Traditional Native 
Religions Free of Federal Government Interference. Report to accompany S. J. res. 102 submitted by James 
Abourezk, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second Session, Report No. 95-709. (1978) 2.
2'2Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2.
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By affirming that Indians had an "inherent right of free exercise" the report served to 
naturalize the significance of its own cultural categories, and by linking this inherent right 
with the texts of the Constitution and the ICRA the report generated a historical master- 
narrative in which Congress had increasingly recognized these "inherent rights" (as 
opposed to an equally plausible master-narrative in which Congress gradually imposed the 
terms of methodological individualism onto the institutional framework of tribal affairs),
This commentary provided everything that would follow in the text of the report 
with a solid rationale, one in keeping with the terms of American civil religion. In passing 
the proposal Congress would in effect make sure that Indians received normal protections 
due them as well as any other Americans under the First Amendment. Yet, this same 
rationale could and did serve as a substantial limitation on the significance that the bill 
would take in public policy, a limitation which served to mitigate claims rooted in the 
interactional patterns of trust doctrine. If the "intent" of the AIRFA was to provide Indians 
with a constitutional protection due other Americans, then as many would come to argue; it 
must not provide them with any protection other than those enjoyed by every other 
American. This would prove to be a crucial stumbling block for AIRFA litigation given the 
highly unusual nature o f practices for which Native Americans sought government 
protection.
Following its remarks on the First Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act 
Abourezk's report would go on to assert that infringement of Native American rights to the 
free exercise of religion had become a widespread practice among federal agencies.^^^The 
report further asserted that such infringements were the result of attempts to enforce 
otherwise sound pieces o f legislation which had been passed without considering their 
impact on Indian religious traditions.^ The report next cited three principle areas cf
2t3Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2. 
2 (^Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2.
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conflict between native American religious practices and federal policies. The first of these 
involved access to sacred sites and cemeteries located on federal and state l a n d s . 3 i 5  Next 
the report cited a number of conflicts relating to the possession of substances and objects 
associated with Native American rituals; restrictions on the use and possession of plants 
and substances such as the hallucinogenic peyote (but also sweet grass and pine needles 
confiscated on the suspicion that they might be some form of narcotic), profane treatment 
of medicine bundles by customs officials (such bundles are normally opened only under 
ceremonial conditioned and by proper religious authorities), and confiscation of eagle 
feathers and body parts belonging to other endangered species used in Indian ceremonial 
garb (as well as the feathers of common species of birds confiscated by officials suspecting 
that they might have belonged to endangered species.^ Finally, the report called attention 
to federal interference in Native American ceremonies as a problem in itself; both through 
failure to police ceremonial grounds properly within federal jurisdiction, and through direct 
interference such as creating an intrusive presence at "ceremonies which require strict 
i s o l a t i o n .  "3 1 7  Thus, the report sought to address a broad range of interests associated with 
Indian ceremonial practices under three general headings, sacred sites, sacred objects, and 
sacred events (ceremonial practices).
In finishing its summary of conflict between the religious practices of Native 
Americans and the actions of federal agencies by referring to direct federal interference with 
ceremonies, the report called forth images of deliberate religious oppression. This abstract 
reference to deliberate government oppression of a religious tradition carried an unusually 
graphic significance in reference to Native American subjects, given that such practices had
^l^Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2-3. 
21% eport to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 3-4.
217Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102,4. Note that the report's reference to Federal presence at 
ceremonies requiring isolation alludes to the FBI surveillance practice of circling Sun Dance grounds in 
South Dakota in a helicopter. In at least one instance, occurring in 1975, the FBI is reported to have landed 
its helicopter and held elder members of the Sioux tribe at gunpoint. See also, Sewell, 431.
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been official BIA policy as late as the nineteen-twenties. This allusion to contemporary 
abuse o f police power also ensured that Congressmen would identify with at least one 
instance of a prototypical free exercise complaint out o f a list otherwise composed of 
questions about bureaucratic policies. After condemning such deliberate interference, the 
report moved on to reaffirm that the majority of conflicts between Native Americans and 
federal officials had been the result of laws which incidentally impaired the free exercise 
interests of the f o r m e r .3 1 8  The solution, according to Abourezk's report on Indian Affairs 
was to reassess the application of these laws to Native American religious practices. What 
traditional Native Americans needed was not so much a reprieve from an oppressive 
government policy as a new set of general policy guidelines administering the specific 
policies of various federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interests of tribal 
religious authorities.
The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs recommended several amendments 
to the original legislation, two of which they considered substantial. They asserted that 
"Native American religious leaders" should be consulted in order to establish the nature of 
any interests addressed through the AIRFA, and stressed that Native American practitioners 
should constitute the proper source o f such information rather than "Indian experts, 
political leaders, or any other n o n - p r a c t i t i o n e r .  "319 The Committee also recommended the 
inclusion of language directing administration officials to "implement" any changes in 
federal policies through "Executive a c t i o n . "320 The committee members did not merely 
want the Executive branch to reevaluate its policies, they wanted to ensure that changes 
relevant to the religious freedoms of Native American practitioners would actually take 
place.
318Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102,4-5. 
319Repoit to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 1-2, 5. 
320Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 6.
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Perhaps the first hint of conflict over the meaning o f the AIRFA came from a 
statement issued by Larry L. Simms, an attorney working for the Office of Legal Council. 
Simms argued that any provisions requiring implementation of changes necessary to protect 
Native American rights; " . . .  might be read to modify existing statutory law or to dispense 
with the usual balancing of the right to religious freedom against other societal interests. . .  
It might also be read to require that religious freedom protected by this resolution be 
accorded a position not accorded to non-Indian religious freedom under the first 
am endm ent."321 This raised two separate concerns, Simms argued; a potential conflict 
with the Establishment clause of the Constitution, and the possibility that the AIRFA would 
modify substantial areas of federal law and "preempt" a number of State laws affecting 
Native American religious p r a c t i c e s . 3 2 2  Thus, Simms argued that the act should contain 
language stipulating that after réévaluation of federal policies the executive branch should 
implement only changes consistent with existing statutes and make recommendations to 
Congress regarding any legislation deemed necessary to alter existing statutes on behalf of 
relevant Indian p r a c t i c e s .3 2 3  He also wanted a provision explicitly denying that anything in 
the act could be construed to alter existing provisions of State and federal l a w .3 2 4  Such 
provisions would effectively prevented the AIRFA from directly altering many of the 
agency practices which had given rise to the bill in the first place, though they would left 
intact the possibility that such laws could be altered by more specific legislation in the 
future.
The Senate Select Committee did not adopt Simms' proposed changes, but his 
argument did serve to underscore some of the ambiguities contained in the act itself.
321 Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 10. 
322Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 10. 
323Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 10-11. 
324Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 11.
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W hereas the resolution was purportedly "intended" to guarantee that Indians would be 
accorded a right of free exercise comparable to that enjoyed by other Americans; its specific 
provisions seemed to go beyond that. Yet nothing in the proposed bill could be used to 
determine precisely how far Congress intended to go in order to meet the unusual needs of 
Native American religious practitioners. By requiring the executive branch to reevaluate and 
implement changes in federal policies the bill generated a number o f open questions 
regarding its own significance. Did it require modification of the Endangered Species Act, 
for example, or would Native Americans found in possession of eagle feathers still be 
subject to imprisonment? In this initial form (and in its final form, for that matter), the 
AIRFA left this decision up to the discretion of federal policy makers. And whereas S. J. 
102 did not explicitly deny that it required substantive changes in federal and state laws, as 
Simms had proposed; neither did it specify the means by which any necessary changes 
might be enforced. On April 3, 1978 the main text of the Senator Abourezk's report was 
entered into the Congressional record, and Congress passed S. J. Res. 102 with all of its 
attendant ambiguities without debate by means of a voice v o te .3 2 5
House Joint Resolution 738: A Little Spat and an Unfortunate Phrase.
House Joint resolution 738 was essentially identical to the resolution introduced 
into the Senate, except for one minor amendment adding the word "traditional" to a phrase 
contained in the bill.326 Representative Udall o f Arizona presented the main text of 
Abourezk's report on S. J. Res. 102 within his own report to accompany H. J. Res. 738, 
adding that the proposal would not incur any additional cost to the government of the
325u.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 124 (April 3, 1978) 8365-66.
326u.S. Congress, House of Representatives, American Indian Religious Freedom. Report to accompany 
H.J. Resolution 738 submitted by Morriss Udall, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second Session, Report No. 95- 
1308. (1978) 1.
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United S t a t e s .3 2 7  On July 18, 1978 House Joint Resolution 738 came up for a vote, but 
the bill met with unexpected opposition on the floor of the House. Representative Udall 
framed the case for this proposal in terms of the asymmetry between Christian and Native 
American religious traditions:
Mr. Speaker, this country is primarily a Christian country with a large Jewish 
population and substantial numbers of people practicing various other European and Asian 
religions. Were we to consider legislation which adversely impacted upon these religions 
and infringed upon the first amendment right to the free exercise of religion, we would, 
from our own knowledge and background be aware of that impact and would modify the 
legislation to eliminate the offensive language.
But the traditional religions of our native American people are not our religions and 
we are unaware o f practices, rites, and ceremonials of these religions (sic). We have, in the 
past, enacted legislation where we have unknowingly brought about the infringement of the 
religious rights o f the Indians.
Administrative regulations implementing certain laws have, again unknowingly, 
denied certain religious practices of the Indian people.
It is stating the obvious to say that this country was the Indians long before it was 
ours. For many tribes, the land is filled with physical sites of religious significance to 
them. Can we not understand that? Our religions have Jerusalems, Mount Calvaries, 
Vaticans, and Meccas. We hold sacred Bethlehem, Nazareth, the Mount of Olives, and the 
Wailing Wall. Bloody was have been fought over these religious s i t e s .3 2 8
Udall's comments are interesting in a number of respects. In the remarks presented above
he had openly addressed the prospect of a general bias in favor o f Jewish and Christian
religions, and by presenting this bias as a kind of cultural artifact he had successfully raised
the question without accusing anyone of overtly bigoted behavior. In a sense he had
touched on a kind of structural bias that is indeed implicit within a good deal of legal
reasoning dealing with questions of religious freedom. He even responded to the problem
in plausible terms by constructing an analogy between the unusual interests associated with
his bill and religious sensibilities more recognizable to his fellow Congressmen. And by
continually stressing the lack of malice on the part of federal officials Udall's argument
helped to frame the prospective legislation as a matter of internal policy revisions,
reassuring his fellow representatives that H.J. 738 would not lead to major constitutional
327Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 738, 5.
328u.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record, vol. 
124 (July 18, 1978) 21444.
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confrontations. Udall moved on to suggest, however, that the practice of including sacred 
sites in wilderness areas and national parks constituted a "callous," if also an "unwitting" 
practice under existing p o l i c y .329
Following his initial remarks on sacred sites Udall proceeded through a haphazard 
list o f  comments regarding H. J. 738. Udall proceeded to comment on the religious 
significance that animal parts, including those o f endangered species, played in many 
Indian r e l i g i o n s . 3 3 0  He also gave assurances that it was "not the intent" of his bill to 
countermand laws generally beneficial to the American p u b l i c . 3 3 i  He also introduced into 
the record a statement from the Department of Justice indicating its support for the bill, 
given that it was not "intended" to alter any existing l a w s .3 3 2  Udall had himself requested 
an amendment striking a phrase requiring implementation o f changes deemed necessary to 
accommodate the religious practices of Native American p r a c t i t i o n e r s .3 3 3  So, i t  was clearly 
his own sense that the bill did not require overt changes in existing federal laws, whereas 
the ADRFA's main sponsor in the Senate, James Abourezk, had strongly resisted efforts by 
administration officials to limit its significance in such a m a n n e r .3 3 4  Already surprised by
329Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
330Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
331 Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
332Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444. Note that the letter itself refers to the report that 
accompanied S.J. Res. 102, and indicates the satisfaction of the department that the prospective bill would 
neither provide Indians with protection beyond that of other Americans nor alter existing laws. The Letter 
was signed by Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General.
333Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
334u.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, American Indian Religious 
Freedom. Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, (February 24 and 27, 1978) 127-41. Ellen Sewell points 
out that whereas Udall merely indicated that the act did not "change" existing laws the administration wanted 
to ensure that the AIRFA would not "affect" existing laws. She writes that; "The difference between the 
congressional and administrative language is one of nuance. Presumably the Act does not change' existing 
law, either because Indians theoretically already possess the rights the Act protects, or because, as a policy 
statement, it is to be carried out in conjunction with other laws. However, creating awareness of religious 
rights and accommodating them would change the way the laws were carried out, and would thus affect' 
existing law, without changing' it,"434-35n.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
152
the sudden need to argue in favor of H. J. 738, Udall further underscored his own sense 
of the bill's limited meaning in subsequent debate (and whether this position was merely a 
function o f his own limited sense remains an open question).
Representative Cunningham of W ashington led the attack on House Joint 
Resolution 738. He began by disclaiming that he or any of his colleagues had any intent to 
deny the religious freedom of any American citizen, but he went on to ask why was the bill 
n e e d e d . 3 3 5  Cunningham reminded the House that members of the Supreme Court had 
once denied members of the Mormon Church the right to practice polygamy despite its 
religious significance to t h e m .3 3 6  Next he turned his attention to the sense o f legal identity 
defining an "American Indian" as it would relate to the AIRFA:
Every time we address the problem of treaty Indians , and these are the only native 
Americans who have these alleged special rights, what we are doing is to compound the 
problem we have with respect to reinterpreting the Constitution as far as equal protection 
under the law is concerned, with no special class of U.S. citizen over another U.S. citizen.
Mr. Speaker, I would respectfully yield to the chairman (Representative Udall) if he 
would care to answer. What is the definition o f an American Indian?337
These remarks exhibit a familiar slippage between issues involving Native American tribal
sovereignty and those involving more familiar public debate over civil rights. Indeed
Cunningham appears to have insinuated that legislation benefiting "treaty Indians"
constitutes a kind of affirmative action program to which he would clearly be opposed. He
thus took the special status afforded Indians by treaties to be a genuine threat to an
egalitarian vision of American social order, but he chose to elide questions about the
historical derivation of this status. (It is incidentally not quite accurate to suggest that
treaties are the only basis for special Native American rights, given that official recognition
335Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 21444.
336Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 21444. Here it is worth noting that 
Cunningham was alluding to a legal precedent declaring that the principle of free exercise applied to beliefs, 
but not to actions. This principle of case law had long since been overturned by the Supreme Court (see 
chapter 1).
33?Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 21444.
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of an Indian tribe takes a variety of forms.) Indeed the presupposition that Indians are U.S. 
citizens (a position long since authorized by Congressional legislation), and that this is the 
most salient aspect of anyone's identity in a debate over civil rights, in itself constituted a 
major transformation of the principles of Indian law. This assumption effectively inverted 
the logical presumption, established under trust doctrine, that Indian tribes retained 
authority over internal matters barring specific federal legislation stating otherwise. 
Cunningham also inverted the historical trajectory of Indian-white relations insofar as he 
seemed to imply that Indians had been treated as full-fledged American citizens, until 
someone (presumably a liberal) had decided to treat them differently. Cunningham thus 
rewrote history in the process of assigning AIRFA proponents the burden of demonstrating 
what Constitutional principle authorized Congress to treat Indians as a special class of 
citizens. Whereas Indian tribes are normally presumed to possess rights independent of 
U.S. citizenship until Congressional legislation indicates otherwise, Cunningham presented 
such "alleged special rights" as the product of an over-zealous (and overly liberal) civil 
rights agenda.
Not withstanding the ideological tangent implied in Cunningham's remarks, he did 
ask a fair question; who would count as an Indian for purposes of the AIRFA? Udall 
responded by declaring that provisions defining the legal status of Native Americans were 
detailed in numerous other instances of legislation dealing with Indians, but he said that; 
"for the purpose of this little sense of Congress resolution, it is anyone who undertakes to 
practice religion and calls himself a native American and has these kinds of religious 
r i g h t s .  "338 In this statement Udall had embedded a vague reference to the technical sense 
of "Indian-ness" used in legal and political contexts. Representative Cunningham, ignored 
this vague reference and appeared to interpret the answer as an open invitation to any ethnic 
non-Indian to adopt the posture of a practicing American Indian traditionalist.
338Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 21444-45.
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Cunningham pressed the matter of Indian identity even further, asking; "Mr. 
Speaker, would the chairman concur that if  one of our Members should say that he is 
practicing the American Indian religion, he would be authorized ingress to and egress from 
private property and/ or would be authorized to use peyote?" 339 This rather crude line of 
inquiry served to underscore Cunningham's own rhetorical stance in more ways than one. 
While Cunningham raised the prospect that ethnic non-Indians might be able to claim the 
special status due an Indian, his question presupposed that the AIRFA would directly affect 
the property rights of a private citizen. This enabled him to refashion the interactional 
framework inscribed within the resolution into a stereotypical civil rights dispute between 
liberal and conservative notions over the general significance o f minority status. For 
Cunningham the major actors in this drama were not federal agents and members of semi- 
autonomous tribal governments, but individual Americans each endowed with the same 
rights as any other. He thus framed his own opposition to the bill in terms o f a rigorous 
(and rigorously formalist) defense of equality before the law.
As with any complex question, the attempt to answer Cunningham's inquiry was 
doomed to produce an implausible answer, and Udall's response was no exception:
We will make him (Rep. Cunningham's would-be Indian Congressmen) an 
honorary member of the Navaho Tribe if he wants to take that kind of position. However, I 
suppose that in the same way in which someone can embrace the Jewish faith or the 
Catholic faith, if someone honestly and sincerely wants to embrace the American Indian 
native way of religious ceremony, I suppose a person can do that if he chooses.
The joint resolution on page 3 specifically talks about the traditional religions of the 
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and native H a w a i i a n s .3 4 0
Cunningham's question had presumed that the AIRFA would give Indian claimants a right 
to enter private property, and by answering this question in its own terms Udall tacitly 
essentially granted the presumption. More importantly, his response also produced a 
number of telling absurdities relating to the legal identity of Native Americans. In this
339Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 2 1 4 4 5 . 
340Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 2 1 445
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5 5
utterance Udall had effectively illustrated the degree to which the provisions of the AIRFA 
confounded ethnic, political, and religious categories. As a bill regarding questions of 
religious freedom the AIRFA invited a notion o f "Indian-ness" defined after the pattern of 
Euro-American religious traditions, a prospect that would render the category quite fluid 
and thereby invite the kind o f pretense with which Cunningham was so c o n c e m e d . 3 4 i  Yet, 
a good portion of the rationale for this bill actually rested on the political relationships 
which bound the federal government to oversee Indian tribal practices. From this 
perspective it would have been absurd to suggest that the rights conferred by the AIRFA 
could be applied to a significantly larger set of individuals than those already belonging to 
tribes covered by trust doctrine. Ultimately, Udall could do little more than indicate that the 
bill should affect the "traditional religions" of various Native American peoples, but this 
merely begged the question; what is a "traditional Native American religion?"
The exchange between Udall and Cunningham had illustrated a number of the 
problems implicit in the bill which would later plague its implementation. The proposal
341 The problem here lies in the fact that such "traditional" Native American religious practices are not 
defined in terms of beliefs or faiths; one does not enter into these cosmological systems by affirming a set 
of denotational text sentences. Most of the traditions targeted by the AIRFA for protection would derive 
their membership from those who had a recognized place in an Indian community, often determined by 
inclusion in the appropriate tribal role. Whereas the Euro-American practice o f defining religious differences 
in terms of an ongoing dispute over doctrine implies the prospect of changing a religion by deciding that its 
tenets are true, no such profession of faith would be sufficient for many Native American ceremonial 
systems wherein membership in the religious community is closely tied to the political and economic life 
of a specific tribal community.
This has subsequently proven to be a serious concern for many Native Americans, given the rise of 
various New Age sects and do it yourself brands of spiritualism prone to borrowing from Native American 
traditions. Many Indians have seen this as a direct attack on their religious traditions, a kind of theft, so to 
speak. Given the discourse patterns of Euro-American theological disputes, this kind of reaction to a 
potential convert would seem absurd as the primary discursive significance at issue in such arguments 
would always be a question of truth evaluation. But the discursive patterns used in Native American 
ceremonies are defined by other means. Many Native Americans have reacted to the theft of this symbolic 
capital as a threat to their communities. See for example, Andy Smith, "For All Those Who Were an Indian 
in a Former Life," M s 44 (November /  December, 1991) 44-45 passim-, Alice B. Kehoe, "Primal Gaia, 
Primitivists and Plastic Medicine Men," and Christian F. Feest, "Europe's Indians," in The Invented Indian: 
Cultural Fictions & Government Policies, ed., James A. Clifton, 313-32 passim-. Ward Churchill,
"Spiritual Huxterism: The Rise of Plastic Medicine Men," Fantasies o f the Master Race: Literature.
Cinema and the Colonization of American Indians. (Monroe Maine: Common Courage Press, 1992) 215-30 
passim; Ward Churchill, Indians Are Us? Culture and Genocide in Native North America. (Monroe Maine: 
Common Courage Press, 1994) passim; Wendy Rose, "The Great Pretenders: Further Reflections on 
Whiteshamanism." in The State o f Native America, ed., M. Annette James, 403-22.
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could be read in terms o f at least two different forms of identity; that defining membership 
in a religious faith, and that defining membership in a tribal system. Udall's rather flippant 
suggestion that adoption into an Indian tribe might resolve the tension between these 
alternative notions o f "Indian-ness" thus reflected a probable desire to have it both ways. 
Yet, he could offer no genuine context in which such a measure would have been 
appropriate, and so he employed the deictic marker "we" as an imaginary authority for such 
a pronouncement. This usage was completely vacuous, because no-one in Congress was in 
a position to make anyone a member of an Indian tribe. Earlier that very year the U.S. 
Supreme Court had declared that tribal authorities had the right to determine their own 
m e m b e r s h i p . 3 4 2  And Congress could neither be sure that tribal authorities would maintain 
a tight reign on their membership, nor that they would embrace those who had sincerely 
adopted a Native American form of r e l i g io n .3 4 3
Once again it appeared as though the category of "religion" shaded rather quickly 
over into political matters insofar as it was applied to Indian subjects, a prospect 
inconsistent with Euro-American notions of religion. The problem had emerged in relation 
to both Blue Lake and the ICRA, but in each o f these cases Congress had been able to 
accommodate the distinctive qualities of Indian cultures through context specific measures. 
The Blue Lake Amendments had dealt with only one specific case, and the omission of an 
Establishment Clause in the ICRA could only affect the already limited jurisdiction o f tribal 
authorities; but the AIRFA would put in place an abstract statement o f policy principles 
capable of generating an open-ended set of legal conflicts involving direct federal 
jurisdiction. Representative Udall had fashioned an imaginary discursive framework in 
which the political and religious dimensions of Indian-ness could be addressed as one, but
342santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
343The Navajo Tribal Code itself, for example, does not offer any provisions for adoption into the tribe or 
assumption of an honorary Navajo status. Representative Udall's comments not-withstanding, the tribal 
code expressly discounts any interest in such practices. Navaio Tribal Code. Volume 1. Title 1 Through 10. 
(Oxford New Hamshire: Equity Publishing Corporation, 1962) Title I § 22.
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he could not ground that image in a plausible context involving real people (much less 
"real" Indians).
The House opposition the AIRFA took full advantage of the vagueness o f H. J. 
Res. 738 as well as uncertainties implicit within Udall's own statements. Representative 
Wydler asked if there was a list anywhere of the sites that Indians might want to visit as 
part of their r e l i g io n .3 4 4  Udall attempted to counter by claiming that no such list was kept 
for "Baptists, Episcopalians, or Catholics," thus appealing to a sense of fair play and 
equality before the law; but this merely served to underscore the weakness of his own 
a n a l o g y .3 4 5  Wydler immediately added that "Baptists go to their churches; they own their 
churches," thus underscoring the fact that the AIRFA addressed interests quite different 
from those normally expected under the rubric of "free e x e r c is e ."346 To the House 
opposition H. J. Res. 738 constituted a form of differential treatment insofar as it could 
affect the use of public lands, and they clearly viewed this as an affront to the general 
patterns of American land tenure. Thus, thrown on the defensive Udall offered 
reassurances that the bill applied only to federal lands and that it would not affect anyone's 
private p r o p e r t y .3 4 7  in language that would haunt Native American practitioners for years 
to come, he explained that the bill "had no teeth in it," and that it was a Resolution which 
merely expressed the sense of C o n g r e s s .3 4 8  Thus, Udall's most persuasive point in favor 
of his own bill seemed to be a disclaimer indicating that the issue was merely a symbolic 
gesture. In later disputes Udall's comments to that effect would provide others with 
evidence that the AIRFA was always intended to be a toothless paper tiger. After some
344Representative Wydler o f New York, Congressional Record. 21445. 
345Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 21445. 
346Representative Wydler of New York, Congressional Record. 21445 
347Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 21445. 
348Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 21445.
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additional debate the House passed H. J. Res. 738; with 396 voting in favor of the 
resolution, 20 opposing it, and 16 abstentions.
The AIRFA in Itself: An Implausible Entity at Best.
On August 11, 1978 then President Carter signed the AIRFA into law. On the 
following day he issued a statement declaring that; "It is a fundamental right o f every 
American, as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution, to worship as he or 
she pleases. This act is in no way intended to alter that guarantee or override existing laws, 
but is designed to prevent government actions that would violate these constitutional 
p r o t e c t i o n s . " 3 4 9  Thus, administration officials settled on the weakest possible 
interpretation o f the AIRFA, one for which they had argued throughout the legislative 
process. President Carter's disclaimer combined with the statements by Representative 
Udall to provide some of the most public commentary on the significance of the act itself. 
Consequently, when various courts and federal agencies used these pronouncements to 
fashion a sense of the legislative intent behind the AIRFA the resulting interpretation of the 
act would generally carried little weight.
The written text of the AIRFA changed little through the course of Congressional 
debate. In its final form the AIRFA included two major provisions and a long preamble. 
The preamble to the AIRFA affirms that the free exercise of religion is an inherent right 
protected by the First Amendment, that the United States has generally benefitted from the 
number of religions flourishing under its protection, that religion constitutes an important 
part of Native American cultures, and that "traditional American Indian religions"were an 
important aspect of "Indian l i f e .  "350 The preamble also declares that; "the lack of a clear 
and consistent federal policy has often resulted in the abridgement of religious freedom for
349American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. Appendix A.
350preamble, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978).
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traditional American Indian r e l i g i o n s .  "351 Much as in Abourezk's original report, the 
AIRFA attributes the abridgement of Native American religious freedom to enforcement of 
otherwise sound pieces of legislation, and it singles out sacred sites, sacred objects, and 
religious ceremonies as the key sources of conflict between Indians and federal 
a g e n c i e s . 352 Thus, in many respects the preamble to the AIRFA generates the same 
narrative pattern that had been used to argue for passage of the act itself.
Through the AIRFA, its preamble seemed to suggest, an increasingly benevolent 
federal government would begin to enforce a set of rights which naturally belonged to 
Native Americans. Such a natural right could be read in the usual terms of social contract 
theory, implying that the AIRFA dealt with Native Americans as individuals endowed with 
no special rights as Native Americans. And yet, the many references to the role that religion 
played in traditional Indian culture could be taken to suggest that the natural right belonged 
to larger social units, thus implying that the "inherent rights" in question were specifically 
those rights reserved to Indian tribes under trust doctrine. The language of the AIRFA itself 
could therefore be used to suggest at least two contrary interpretations; one involving the 
political interests of tribal organization, and one involving the freedom of conscience 
presumably owed every individual.
The ambiguity im plicit within the AIRFA's preamble facilitated alternative 
interpretations of its implications. This in turn made it possible to interpret the pragmatic 
implications o f the Act's main provisions according to very different principles. The two 
main provisions in the AIRFA read as follows;
R esolved by the Senate and  H ouse o f  Representatives o f  the United States o f  Am erica in 
Congress assembled. That henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect 
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and 
exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native 
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred 
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
351 Preamble, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978). 
352preambie, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978).
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Sec. 2. The President shall direct the various Federal departments, agencies, and 
other instrumentalities responsible for administering relevant laws to evaluate dieir policies 
and procedures in consultation with native traditional religious leaders in order to determine 
appropriate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native American religious cultural 
rights and practices. Twelve months after approval of this resolution, the President shall 
report back to the Congress the results of his evaluation, including any changes which were 
made in administrative policies and procedures and any recommendations he may have for 
legislative a c t i o n .3 5 3
The absence of any provisions regarding enforcement in the AIRFA certainly bore witness 
to the truth of Morriss Udall's statement that the act had "no teeth." This absence further 
made it possible for administration officials charged with the implementation of the AIRFA 
to argue that the it carried few specific legal implications. And yet the AIRFA conveyed 
plausible legal obligations for federal agencies as an official statement of public policy. As 
Ellen Sewell writes:
The law does not directly protect religious practice, but states a policy to protect religious 
practice. Therefore the Act would be violated not by administrative interference with Indian 
religion alone, but by administrative failure to pursue the policy of protecting religion. 
Therefore any demonstration that the law was violated would presumably have to show not 
only that religious practice was restricted, but also that the policy of protecting religion had 
not been p u r s u e d . 3 5 4
Thus, it appears that the immediate practical effect of the AIRFA was actually quite similar 
to the arrangement which placed Blue Lake in the hands o f the Forest Service. An 
admittedly unusual set of ceremonial practices had been entrusted to the protection of 
bureaucratic authorities, leading ultimately to a notion that questions about religious 
freedom had been given over to the inherently unstable discourse of public policy. Given 
that the AIRFA was primarily a policy statement, however, it was still not clear just what 
kind of policy the act called for.
Ellen Sewell divides the range of debate over the AIRFA into three plausible 
interpretations. "At a minimum," she argues, the act required responsible authorities to
353section 1 and 2, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978) 
emphasis in original.
354sewell, 437.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
consider Indian needs in the course of implementing their normal p o l i c i e s .3 5 5  This would 
create a kind o f procedural right, meaning that; "A complainant could show a statutory 
violation if  an agency had interfered with an Indian religious practice and had never 
considered the issue when planning its course of a c t i o n ." 3 5 6  She argues that the law is best 
viewed as requiring more than this; at least to the extent that it . . mandates 
accommodation to Indian religion when at all f e a s i b l e . " 3 5 7  "Under this reading of the 
law," she continues, "a complainant could show a statutory violation by showing that 
religion was restricted and that the agency could have pursued a practical alternative less 
restrictive to religion without significant sacrifice to other g o a l s .  " 3 5 8  Finally, she argues 
that the AIRFA does invoke the principles of trust doctrine, and that this could be taken as 
an indication that Congress was making its usual trust responsibilities to Indian tribes 
legally e n f o r c e a b l e . 3 5 9  This last option would render the usually metaphorical significance 
of the "ward" / "trustee" relationship in terms of a decidedly more literal significance, in 
affect providing Indians with a cause o f action in the event that federal agencies failed to 
actively pursue the new policy to "protect and preserve" traditional Indian religions.
Any theoretical position about the significance of the AIRFA corresponds to a 
different sense o f the interactional relationship between an Indian "complainant" and a 
federal agency in the context of a court of law. Each of these micro-structural indices 
(complainant, federal agency, and court) would receive a different macro-structural 
inflection according to the differences between each of the positions outlined by Sewell. 
For, each legal dispute involving the AIRFA would raise questions about the relationship
355sewell, 4 3 7 . 
3 5 6 s e w e ll ,  4 3 7 . 
357sewell, 4 3 7 . 
3 5 8 s e w e ll .  4 3 7 -3 8 . 
3 5 9 s e w e l l ,  4 3 8 .
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between Indians and the federal government, or rather; each argument over its policy 
implications would presuppose answers to questions about the relationship between 
Indians and federal authorities. Thus, each of these positions refers to a plausible set of 
indexical relationships that might or might not obtain in a court of law, depending on the 
will of its participants (or at least the will of a judge or jury). When complainants actually 
did begin to take federal agencies to the courts in order to press for policies more favorable 
to their own religious practices a good deal of the rhetoric contained in those proceedings 
would involve subtle manipulation of some rather sweeping historical master-narratives.
President Carter's statement took the weakest possible construction of the AIRFA 
(as opposed to the weakest plausible construction outlined above), one which reduced it to 
a symbolic gesture with no direct implications for public policy. This reading belied the 
terms of the AIRFA itself insofar as the act included provisions designed to create changes 
in federal policy, but the reading had a strong appeal insofar as it tied the significance of the 
act itself to orthodox notions of American constitutionalism This approach generally hinged 
on a sense of political relationships defined through social contract theory; a position 
wherein practicing Indian traditionalists constitute a political minority whose interests are a 
function of individual rights, and the government's interests (as well as the court's) are a 
function of the need to ensure that all individuals are afforded equal protection under the 
law. A moderate construction of the AIRFA (i.e. an approach based on the weakest 
plausible construction described by Sewell) would characterize it as a measure designed to 
shore up the substantive problems of a more permanent minority (practicing Indian 
traditionalists) by creating a positive government interest in off-setting the problems which 
they would naturally face in a generally hostile social environment. The strongest 
construction of the AIRFA would presume that the most salient aspect of an Indian 
complainant under the provisions of the AIRFA stems from a specific relationship to some 
tribal sovereignty. Having framed a given case under this last set of terms, a court would 
have to decide whether or not the AIRFA constituted explicit government consent to be be
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held accountable for any failure to live up to the terms implied by trust d o c t r i n e . 3 6 0  This 
would effectively mean the difference between the second and third plausible readings of 
the AIRFA described by Sewell, each being predicated on the same set o f political 
relationships.
Of course, the particular facts of a given case would not always match any of these 
master-narrative patterns (practicing Indian traditionalists were not always members of a 
tribe, for example), but the vast majority of legal disputes dealing with the provisions of the 
AIRFA were actually consistent with any of the preceding approaches. Recourse to such an 
ideological position therefore provided litigants with a powerful tool through which they 
could contextualize most any dispute and thereby generate the terms of an argument 
favoring a given legal outcome. This process involved the derivation of a principle of case 
law from a broad range of possible legal precedents through a selection process guided 
only by ideological preconceptions about the prevailing social order. This process lent 
special weight to a distinction between two alternative visions. "Case law dealing with 
Indians is Janus-faced:" writes Sewell "one face is that of Indian law, and the other, the 
face o f relevant substantive law, which is applied ignoring the Indian or tribal status of a 
p a r t y . "361 Such a major division between the plausible contextualization strategies 
available to litigants combined with the ambivalent textual footing of the AIRFA itself 
(calling on the authority of both free exercise principles and trust doctrine) to ensure that the 
legal implications of the act would remain largely unstable. Ideological presuppositions 
about the legal status o f Indian identity would consistently over-determine the conclusions 
reached by legal authorities charged with interpretation of the AIRFA, and insofar many 
courts chose to focus primarily on case law dealing with the First Amendment when
3 6 0 s e w e ll ,  3 8 -4 9 .
361sewell, 4 6 6  (footnote omitted).
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dealing with the AIRFA they superimposed the terms used in popular debate over equality 
and differential treatment onto the context of Indian-white relations.
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report : Now About that Red Deitv Again.
Immediately following passage of the act the federal government had a chance to set 
the tone for these discussions when it evaluated its own policies and reported them back to 
Congress. In keeping with the second of the AIRFA's provisions, a special task force was 
formed under the leadership o f Cecil D. Andrus, the Secretary of the Interior, in order to 
study prospects for implementation of the act. The task force published its findings in a 
report delivered to Congress in 1979. By this time it was clear that access to federal lands 
posed the most significant threat to existing policy, and even questions about treatment of 
sacred objects (Pine needles, eagle feathers, animal pelts, etc.) frequently implied many of 
the same questions as were found in sacred site cases. Hence, the report treated notions 
about federal land management policy and Native American sacred geography as the 
prototypical instance of a prospective issue involving the AIRFA. The task force positioned 
these questions in the context of trust doctrine, thus providing federal agencies with ample 
authority to provide Native Americans with differential treatment; but it also constructed an 
artificial image of what all of this would entail.
The introductory essay contained in the 1979 report reveals a great deal about the 
approach taken by the task force to questions about sacred geography. Part of the task 
force's strategy for dealing with that question can be gleaned from the historical overview 
contained in this essay. The 1979 report also contains references to a folk theory o f culture 
change that serves as an implicit response to fears about excessive Indian claims on public 
lands. Both the abstract social theory and historical narrative contained in this document 
elaborate on the contextualization cues already implicit within the AIRFA itself as well as 
Senator Abourezk's report explaining S. J. 102. The task force effectively used them to 
narrow the scope of Indian activity covered by the act along a temporal axis, and in so
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doing the task force also narrowed the potential space o f Native American sacred 
geography that would be recognized under the AIRFA. Through the report the task force 
seemed to be saying that the actual claims made by Indian traditionalists would not generate 
a significant burden on public policy because; 1) any such claims would be limited to 
specific sites, and 2) no new claims would occur. Thus, the task force endeavored to 
reduce the scope of legitimate claims to a finite set of definite places, and to preempt 
spontaneous native assertions of religious interest with a theory tying legitimate claims to 
known historical traditions.
Before addressing any questions about change in Indian country the task force first 
dealt with a more reflexive issue, addressing changes in public policy towards Indian 
religion. The report contains several passages about centuries of deliberate repression of 
Indian r e l i g i o n . 3 6 2  This bleak narrative covers events such as use of the Requiremento. 
William Bradford's comments on the slaughter of the Pequots, and the development of 
Religious Crimes Codes (RCC) listed under Courts of Indian O f f e n s e .3 6 3  i n  revisiting the 
history o f the RCC, a topic culminating its discussion of Euro-American oppression, the 
task force report generated an imaginary dialogue between the proponents o f the RCC and 
those of the AIRFA. For, the historical ideology which produced the RCC measured 
prospective changes in Indian practices against negative value judgements about generalized 
notions of Indian culture (See chapter 2). The AIRFA report itself places the RCC in its 
own historical narrative as a pivotal moment after which progressive changes would take 
place in federal policy, leading ultimately to a positive orientation toward Native American 
cultures. Hence, the master-narrative principles implicit in each policy contrasted sharply 
with one another, both in their evaluation of Indian culture and their sense of general 
trajectory of American history; but viewed from the standpoint taken by the task force the
362American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. (P.L. 95-341. Washington D.C. August, 1979) 1-7. 
363American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 1-7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 6
provisions of the RCC were both cruel and quite fortunately dated. The AÎRFA report was 
therefore an answer to the RCC; both in the sense that it afforded Indian religious traditions 
their proper respect, and insofar as it pertained to an event that would follow the RCC in a 
master-narrative sequence weighted towards positive evaluation of later historical events. 
The AIRFA report thus voiced the interests associated with the Religious Crimes Codes in 
its text, only to answer those interests in its own terms.
This imaginary dialogue with the stance taken in the Religious Crimes Codes helped 
the task force generate a specific sense of the interactional significance of the AIRFA. The 
major actors in policies associated with the RCC had been federal agents acting under the 
authority of the ward-trustee relationship defined in trust doctrine. The AIRFA had itself 
invoked trust doctrine in its own text, and its implementation would require a sense of 
federal authority different from that implied by the phrase "religious freedom." So, whereas 
the task force clearly opposed the values informing BIA policy under the Religious Crimes 
Codes, it generated its own authority through a narrative describing the relationship that 
had obtained between Indians and the BIA under the RCC. Because the AIRFA hinged on 
roughly the same body of legal doctrine that had formerly been used to justify past policies 
o f oppression, a discussion of those policies served ironically to help define the 
interactional relationship needed for enforcement of its provisions. Not withstanding its 
references to the Free Exercise Clause, a principle generally informed by notions of 
methodological individualism; the text of the AIRFA asserted a positive government interest 
in protecting Indian religion. By recalling government abuse of Native American religions 
the historical narrative in the report thus served an indexical function, defining its notions 
about Indian religious freedom in the context of trust d o c t r i n e . 3 6 4  This in turn serves to 
remove the question of Indian religious freedom from the domain of individual tolerance 
and pro-minority liberalism and to place it firmly in the context of Indian-white relations.
364American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 7; C.f. James Boyd White, 89-112, and passim.
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After is discussion of the RCC the narrative contained in the task force report 
provided tangible examples of the federal government's turn toward a more benevolent 
stance toward Native American culture. As with the oppressive policies o f the nineteen- 
twenties, the task force's historical vision placed the federal government in a key position 
to influence the kind o f changes that might affect traditional Indian religions. The report 
offered examples like the return of Blue Lake as visible signs that the trust relationship may 
work in favor of Native American interests, and that federal policy was moving in that 
d i r e c t i o n . 3 6 5  i n  this narrative it was the federal government, rather than its Indian wards, 
which would grow increasingly more enlightened by the passage of history.
Whereas the master-narrative implicit within the policy framework o f the RCC 
framed federal Indian policy in the context of progress and assimilation, that of the 
Religious Freedom Act suggests an increasingly benevolent federal administration. In both 
cases, however, some generalized notion o f Indian culture or Indian religion were 
necessary to lend credibility to, and guide implementation of government policy. For the 
task force this theory took the form of a comparison between "world religions" and "tribal 
r e l i g i o n s . " 3 6 6  The task force characterized world religions as "commemorative" religions, 
indicating that they were founded in a particular historical e v e n t .3 6 7  The report contrasts 
this with tribal religions which it describes as "continuing" religions, indicating the absence 
of a historical tradition separating the foundation of the religion from its present day 
p r a c t i c e s . 3 6 8  According to the task force native practitioners of a tribal religion therefore 
operate by definition without any significant sense of history.
365American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 7. 
366American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 8-12. 
367American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 9. 
368American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
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This dichotomy has numerous predecessors in social and religious thought, though 
it is probable that the task force drew directly from Vine Deloria in writing the report.369 
The sense of the spatio-temporal dimensions of Indian religion contained in the report 
echoed Deloria's position on the subject in God is Red. The report assumed that continuing 
tribal religions are older than commemorative religions.370 They went on to argue that 
continuing tribal religions differ from commemorative world religions in that they are not 
based on established truths, because such doctrines are less important for continuing 
religions than ceremonial practices.371 The task force inferred from this that; ". . . no 
institutions can arise in (tribal) religions," and that "Only one interpretation (of the religion) 
is possible in each generation."372 Apparently tribal religions also differ from world 
religions in their notion o f creation. World religions regard creation as an accomplished 
fact, according to the task force, whereas tribal religions view creation as a continuous 
process.373 The report therefore concluded that religious freedom for Native Americans 
entails a " . . .  right to maintain relationships with the natural w orld .. ."374
Having read this much, one might suspect that tribal religions were more dynamic 
than world religions, but the authors of the report did not see it that way. They stated in the 
report that " . . .  it would be the rarest of events for a new ceremony to be introduced (into a 
tribal r e l i g i o n ) .  "375 it is difficult to determine how the task force inferred this fact from the 
characteristics that they themselves had assigned to tribal religions, but the statement does
369Robert Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 108. 
370American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
371 American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
372American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
373American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 11.
374American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 12.
375American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 12.
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anticipate one of the recommendations included in the report. To minimize conflict between 
tribal religions and commercial interests the task force stated:
The major sites of Native American religious ceremonials are already well known, 
and any future controversy must revolve around known sites, not any additional sites that 
might come into being. No tribes that are presently constituted and possess a living 
religious tradition can be expected to move beyond those ceremonials and rituals they are 
using already. The known shrines and sites originate in creation and migration traditions, 
which by their very nature are foreclosed for the remainder of this w o r ld .3 7 6
This qualification ensured the plausibility of accommodating claims to sacred sites, but it
did so at the risk o f arbitrarily discriminating between different Indian claims. By insisting
that traditional Indian religions are inherently static, the task force was able to provide a
rationale for distinguishing legitimate from non-legitimate claims on the basis of historical
continuity. Hence, the report suggested that contrived religious claims could easily be
exposed and it argued that they should naturally be r e j e c t e d .3 7 7
The confidence expressed in the report that fraudulent claims to sacred sites could 
easily be distinguished from real ones appears to have been sadly mistaken. Moreover, the 
report's own narrow vision o f Indian culture may have contributed to this problem by 
reinforcing stereotypes of Indian behavior. As Michaelsen later pointed out, the notion that 
claimants might not be Indian enough could easily work against them in pursuit of access to 
a sacred s i t e .3 7 8  The task force's own distinctly a-historical sense of tribal religions 
endorsed an abstract form of this prejudice inasmuch as it created a notion of social stability 
that no truly "continuing religion" could hope to achieve. According to its theory a new 
sacred site would not be Indian enough to warrant consideration under the AIRFA.
The report's treatment of tribal views on creation would seem to belie the assertion 
that creation stories cannot produce a new interest in a sacred site. If creation is continual, 
then how can a creation myth be so remote from present concerns? Faced with such an
376American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 89.
377American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 91.
378Robert S. Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Litigation," 63-64.
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unconvincing argument, David White and Robert Michaelsen issued scathing critiques of 
the task force's approach to the issue, arguing that tribal religions were far more dynamic 
than had been alleged in its r e p o r t .3 7 9  Both authors further argued that the task force was 
overly confident about its own ability to establish the range o f existing sites, because 
sacredness often entails secretiveness in a tribal r e l i g i o n . 3 8 0  W hite even argued that 
limiting application of the AIRFA to specific sites constituted an unwarranted reduction on 
the part of the task f o r c e .3 8 l  As Deloria had himself illustrated Native American interaction 
with the environment had global as well as local /  site specific implications; but the report 
had narrowed its own treatment of the subject to the latter. It underestimated the scope of 
geography sacred to Native Americans as much as it underestimated the vitality of their 
religions. As Michaelsen argued ". . .  Tribal religions appear (in the report) as museum 
pieces, static entities which have little or no relation to the world about them t o d a y . " 3 8 2  
The report serves in this manner to make the AIRFA appear less threatening, but it does so 
by articulating a limited view of the activities which could legitimately be considered part of 
an "Indian religion."
W hatever the theoretical accuracy of the terms "continuing religions" and 
"commemorative religions" as applied to the Native and Euro-American traditions in 
themselves, it is clear that their use in the report derives a good deal of its significance from 
the history of Indian-white relations. The ideological stance implicit in trust doctrine defines 
the role that Indians play in American history in terms of spatial concepts, and government 
policy based on trust doctrine has always been predicated on an impoverished sense of
379David R. M. White, "Native American Religious Issues . , .  Also Land Issues," 39-44 passim; 
Michaelsen, "The Significance o f the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 106-109.
380[)avid White, 42; Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 108.
381 David White, 42.
382Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 107. Note that the 
image of a museum piece implies an impoverished sense of both space and time inasmuch as such an object 
would insulated from the dynamics of history and presented in an isolated visual for the benefit o f a viewing 
public.
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history as it relates to Indian culture. Likewise the significance that history plays in 
reference to "world religions" in the report is clearly overdetermined by the claim to 
historical agency made by any government policy under trust doctrine. The task force's 
references to "commemorative" religions pertain directly to (Jewish and Christian) 
traditions closely identified with its own membership. In fact the task force seemed to 
recognize that it derived its own ritual authority from a kind of world religion, because the 
report clearly identifies "commemorative" religions as the source of government authority 
in the recognition of "natural l a w . "3 8 3  Thus, the task force report itself identified the link 
between its notions about world religion and the cosmological precepts of American civil 
religion, precepts which defined its own interests in safe-guarding a right o f free exercise. 
So, all questions about the theoretical accuracy o f the dichotom y betw een 
"commemorative" and "continuing" religions aside; the distinction carries an indexical 
function insofar as it is clear that federal authority is rooted in a "commemorative religion," 
and Native American tribal cosmologies are consistently translated into the form of a 
"continuing religion" insofar as they relate to federal policy. Hence, the interaction between 
Native Americans and federal officials could be seen in terms of the report as an interaction 
between adherents to a "commemorative" world religion and those of a "continuing" tribal 
religion.
The task force had articulated both a historical narrative and a social theory 
purportedly describing the interests of Native American religious practitioners, and each of 
these turned out to be self-referential. Through its Introduction and Historical Overview, 
therefore, the report served to recontextualize the subject of Indian religious freedom in 
terms o f trust doctrine, but it did so at the cost of caricaturizing the very interests AIRFA 
proponents had sought to protect. In denying that Native American religions had a sense of 
history the report came perilously close to denying that they had a future as well. Deloria's
383American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 11.
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original distinction between world and tribal religions elided a number of questions about 
the dim ension of history implicit in many Native American t r a d i t i o n s . 3 8 4  And in its 
acceptance of Deloria's theory the task force effectively set aside any political concerns not 
fully comprehended under that theory. By construing Indian traditionalism in terms of a 
pristine and timeless set of traditions, the report failed to acknowledge the historical agency 
that many Indians hoped to assert with the aid o f the AIRFA. Many were hopeful that 
implementation of the act would play a positive role in shaping the future of Indian tribal 
customs. This was unfortunately not the understanding that emerged from those charged 
with planning its implementation.
Conclusion: The AIRFA Comes Apart.
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act report of 1979 had not done much to 
resolve the fundamental ambiguities contained within the act itself. The AIRFA had not 
specified any particular measures to be taken by federal agencies, and the report had not 
resolved the matter. Furthermore, the contextualization patterns used in the report 
contrasted with those expressed by Representative Udall and President Carter in passing 
the AIRFA. So, it remained unclear to whether the AIRFA should be read as a function of 
federal policy interests in Indian welfare or as a recognition of the right of free exercise, a 
principle normally envisioned as a limit on government interests. Federal agencies were 
more concerned with policy objectives defined long before passage of the AIRFA; and so 
they typically responded to it by providing for minor concessions to Indian traditionalists, 
and by arguing for the least significant interpretation of the act itself when pressed into legal 
disputes over their policies.
384see Raymond Fogelson, "Interpretations of the American Indian Psyche: Some Historical Notes," ed., 
June Helm, The Social Context of American Ethnology; Proceedings of the American Ethnological 
Society. (1985) 23.
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A num ber of diverse agencies declined to participate in task force hearings 
indicating that policy planners foresaw little to no potential conflict between themselves and 
practicing Native American t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s . 3 8 5  Participating agencies generally reviewed 
their policies and accommodated Indian practices insofar as the latter did not conflict with 
any significant policy goals. For example, the U.S. Customs Service opened a dialogue 
with the American Indian Law Center and the Native American Rights Fund as well as 
individual representatives from a number o f Indian tribes and religious traditions, thus 
improving comm unications between themselves and practicing Native American 
t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s . 3 8 6  This in itself solved a number of problems by clarifying procedures and 
ensuring that Indians were able to take full advantage of existing policy provisions; but the 
Customs Service was unable to completely resolve questions regarding the examination of 
medicine bundles or treaty rights involving duty free passage across the U.S. - Canadian 
b o r d e r .3 8 7  More importantly none of the major agencies concerned with the management 
of federal Lands (the Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Land 
Management) adopted specific changes in their policy procedures; though each incorporated 
incorporated language expressing concern for Native American cultural values in their 
general statements of p r o c e d u r e . 3 8 8  Clearly the notion of religious freedom made an 
anticlimactic appearance as a function of bureaucratic policy. The stage was set following 
publication of the 1979 report for legal conflict over the meaning o f the AIRFA, and Indian 
traditionalists consistently lost this conflict.
385see American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 19-21.
386American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 36-38.
387American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 38.
388American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. (Forest Service) 26-27, (Bureau of Land Management) 
33, and (National Park Service) 35; see also Steven C. Moore, Sacred Sites and Public Lands, in Handbook 
of American Indian Religious Freedom, ed., Christopher Vecsey, 84-87.
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It had never been particularly clear whether or not the AIRFA was intended as a 
means of fulfilling the government's responsibilities to its Native American wards or as a 
means of limiting the negative impact that government policy would have on the 
practitioners o f traditional Indian religions. The difference had remained unclear so long as 
debate over the AIRFA took place in the context of legislative and executive committees, 
but subsequent legal disputes involving the AIRFA required that someone decide on one or 
the other interpretation of the act. The courts consistently sided with federal agencies on 
thus matter, and they interpreted the AIRFA as a mere reiteration of the First Amendment. 
This generally led the courts to adopt the balancing test as a means o f deciding AIRFA- 
related cases, and undermined the ability of AIRFA claimants to invoke federal trust 
responsibilities. The courts therefore modeled the relationship between Indians and the 
federal government in terms of a conflict between individual freedom of conscience and 
oppressive government interests rather than a claim to government support.
Under these circumstances AIRFA-related cases consistently foundered on the same 
problems which had plagued Taos proponents in the battle for Blue Lake and 
Congressional advocates of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The inability to differentiate Indian 
religions from other tribal institutions made it possible for AIRFA claimants to express a 
religious interest in aspects of government policy normally treated as secular matters. Each 
of these claims, however, raised novel questions about the relationship between religion 
and American government. Just as Senator Metcalf had been skeptical about the notion of a 
48,000 acre church surrounding Blue Lake, various courts also doubted that AIRFA- 
related cases could involve a substantial right o f free exercise. The courts consistently 
denied that sacred site claims involved a burden on Indian rights of free exercise, 
imprisoned ceremonial practitioners for the taking of endangered species, minimized the 
importance of inmate's religious practices, and ultimately rejected even the long established 
legal accommodations for the Native American Church. AIRFA-related cases generally 
came apart whenever they were subjected to the usual terms of the balancing test, and hence
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the very rhetoric of religious freedom which had made the AIRFA possible became a 
serious liability to AIRFA claimants in the years following its passage.
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